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CONTENTS

JANUARY, FEBRUARY, MARCH, 1926

	PAGE
Mr. Chesterton's Confession of Faith. By Leo Ward	I
The Agnostic's Insufficiency. By John Butler Burke	13
Cardinal Acton and the Marriage of the Duke of Sussex. By Shane Leslie	27
The Synoptic Question in Recent Catholic Scholarship. By P. Boylan	42
Croce's Theory of Art. By H. R. Williams, O.S.B.	55
Concerning the Last Supper and Calvary. By M. de la Taille, S.J.	74
Modern Science and the Theory of Continuity. By John Ashton, S.J.	89
The Knights of Malta. By Monsignor Barnes	108

BOOKS REVIEWED

Mr. Algernon Cecil's *Dreamer in Christendom*; D. P. Bayer's *The Book of the Popes*; Mr. Chesterton's *William Cobbett*; Lady Lovat's *Marie Eugenie Milleret*; E. S. Durrant's *Flemish Mystics and English Martyrs*; Mr. D. Gwynn's *Reminiscences of a Maynooth Professor*; Frederic Whyte's *The Life of W. T. Stead*; Mrs. G. J. Romanes' *Anne Chichester*; Canon W. H. Carnegie's *Anglicanism*; Burton Hendrick's *Life and Letters of Walter H. Page*; *Myself not Least* (by "X"); J. B. Williamson's *The History of the Temple, London*; Capek's *Letters from England*; Father Joseph Leonard's *St. Vincent de Paul and Mental Prayer*; Right Rev. Ildefonso Schuster's *The Sacramentary*.

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The Dublin Review

JANUARY, FEBRUARY, MARCH,
1926

MR. CHESTERTON'S CONFESSION OF FAITH*

MANY years have passed since my father, as Editor of this Review, took up the defence of Mr. Chesterton. There was then, as there is now, a Chestertonian problem disturbing the public mind. There were some, like my father, who saw Mr. Chesterton among the prophets. There were others who called him a sophist and even a buffoon. All agreed that he was "brilliant"; but that very brilliance which to some betokened a startlingly vivid perception of deep issues was to others a proof of the facile optimism of one who fails to appreciate the really hard facts which he so lightly handles. The hostile critics were still in the majority when *Orthodoxy* appeared, and my father wrote: "It seemed to me a triumphant and irrefragable confutation of their view; but I found it regarded by them as a confutation of mine." These critics, he writes, continue to class Mr. Chesterton "with the brilliant writers of the hour, who have no claim to teach the age a serious lesson or to do more than interest us in their own whims and prejudices by stating them with lucidity and enforcing them with telling epigrams. I associate him with those writers of the past who have decried mere ingenuity in theorizing and have striven to find the path of philosophy traced by Nature herself. I class his thought—though not his manner—with that of such men as Burke, Butler and Coleridge." But the controversy about Mr. Chesterton was long ago closed for the generation which read

* *The Everlasting Man*, by G. K. Chesterton. (Hodder and Stoughton.)

Confession of Faith

Orthodoxy. Some went their way the happier for his jokes; others remained, the wiser for his thoughts. Both, however, felt the futility of further discussion.

But the really interesting fact is that the discussion does go on. It goes on among the younger generation. It was conducted recently with no little vigour by the Undergraduates of Glasgow University, who cast nearly a thousand votes for Mr. Chesterton as their Lord Rector. It is extremely evident in the very different attitude with which equally able critics (in the *Observer* and the *Times Literary Supplement*) have approached the discussion of his latest book on Christianity. It has been summed up with characteristic justice and moderation in a recent article by the Master of Balliol.

So the controversy about Mr. Chesterton is still with us. It is a lively controversy, because it is difficult even for the gravest critic to resist the delight of quoting from his works even when he is condemning them. It would be still more lively if Mr. Chesterton would join in it himself. But he does not, and he is not likely to do so. Mr. Chesterton makes jokes about himself (some of which we may even regret); but he is never likely to discuss himself seriously, because he has the humility which enables a man to be absorbed in other and, to him, more interesting things. Those things (in which he most truly believes) are God and man. Just as an egoist makes his own little hell which excludes the very sight of God and man, so Mr. Chesterton has found a very heaven in his enthusiasm for the world of men because it has taught him something of the immensities of the God Who made it.

In *The Everlasting Man* Mr. Chesterton imagines himself visiting this world of men as a stranger from some other planet. With characteristic humility he is not concerned with the impression which his sudden arrival would create. He is only interested in the impression that the world would make on him. He wishes to view it from outside and with the mind of one who is not under the influence of the particular intellectual reactions of our particular age. His reason for employing this method is

Confession of Faith

a conviction that we see things truly when we see them first, and he frankly warns the reader that he proposes "to strike wherever possible this note of what is new and strange, and for that reason the style even on so serious a subject may sometimes be deliberately grotesque and fanciful." *The Everlasting Man* is an account of the impressions which he thinks he would receive from such a fresh examination. Its name is significant. It is Man, he believes, who would dominate the whole picture and prove the clue to his whole voyage of discovery. He states this conclusion in a striking passage:

It is exactly when we regard man as an animal that we know that he is not an animal. It is precisely when we do try to picture him as a sort of horse on its hind legs that we suddenly realize that he must be something as miraculous as the winged horse that towered up into the clouds of heaven.

But to form a just estimate of Mr. Chesterton's conclusions it is necessary to try and look at the world with the eyes, not of Mr. Chesterton, but of an Intellectual Being coming from Mars to investigate this world of men and so make his contribution to an Outline of Universal History which the inhabitants of Mars are attempting to compile. Supposing then that this Intellectual Being were enabled to communicate with our world during a space of twenty years, we do not think that his investigations would be merely archæological or even zoological. In so far as such investigations provided him with knowledge, that knowledge would be due, not in any degree to the intelligence of stones or even of monkeys, but entirely to his own intelligence. If he were unaware of any essential difference between one animal and another he might waste much valuable time in catechizing the dog about his companion the man. But if he confined his investigations to such sources he would hardly get very far in his Outline of World History. At the end of the twenty years he would return to his planet a sadder but hardly a very much wiser Intellectual Being. If he merely asked monkeys about the evolution of man he would meet with no intellectual response; but if he asked men about the

Confession of Faith

evolution of monkeys he would soon find himself involved in an investigation in which he would be compelled to envisage, not only the evolution of monkeys, but the whole problem of a philosophy of life itself, physical, animal and even intellectual. The danger here would be a surfeit of reasoning, not an absence of it, and he would doubtless feel obliged to test that reasoning very severely as an objective historian. But whether the reasoning were valid or invalid it would certainly be the only essential means at his disposal for investigating the history or meaning of the world. The very problem which the world presents would exist for him only because he was possessed of intelligence, and it could be investigated only by contact with other intelligences.

If he were conscientious enough to confine his investigations in world history to the "ascertained results of modern enquiry" he would find that the intellectual habit (or habit of reflection) has always been characteristic of man. He would find that his earliest products are artistic. The earliest man known to us drew pictures of animals in a cave, whereas even the very latest monkeys have not drawn pictures of men in the Zoo. He would find very little record of the civilization of the men who drew these pictures, but he would be struck by the quality of their achievement. If in his leisure hours he read a description of them in which they were assumed to have been like the most degenerate of modern savages he would merely observe that this view was not based on evidence. Primitive man was certainly an artist. We know very little else about him. We do not know if he lived in the cave or outside it, whether he built houses above it or beside it. We only know that it was his studio.

Mr. Chesterton draws an amusing contrast between what we do know of primitive man and what popular "outlines" of history would have us believe about him:

When the psycho-analyst writes to a patient, "The submerged instincts of the cave-man are doubtless prompting you to gratify a violent impulse," he does not refer to the impulse to paint in water-colours; or to make conscientious studies of how cattle swing their heads when they graze. Yet we do know for a fact that the

Confession of Faith

cave-man did these mild and innocent things; and we have not the most minute speck of evidence that he did any of the violent and ferocious things. . . . The whole of the current way of talking is simply a confusion and a misunderstanding founded on no sort of scientific evidence and valued only as an excuse for a very modern mood of anarchy. If any gentleman wants to knock a woman about, he can surely be a cad without taking away the character of the cave-man, about whom we know next to nothing except what we can gather from a few harmless and pleasing pictures on a wall.

We have *not* sufficient data to form a comparison between the primitive man and the modern man (whether savage or civilized). But we have sufficient data to draw a contrast between man and any other animal, and it is provided by this one huge piece of evidence: the drawings which many of us have enjoyed in the cave at Les Eyzies. "It sounds," writes Mr. Chesterton, "like a truism to say that the most primitive man drew a picture of a monkey, and it sounds like a joke to say that the most intelligent monkey drew a picture of a man. Something of division and disproportion has appeared. Art is the signature of man."

We have dwelt on this first point in Mr. Chesterton's argument because, after all, everything else depends upon it. We wish we could dwell at equal length on the chapters which follow. Perhaps the most original part of his book is reached in the fine discussion of the different types of Paganism: how far were the myths intended to express faith and how far poetry, what were the underlying principles and ideals in the conflicts between Greece and Rome and between Rome and Carthage. His division of the purely "philosophical" interpretation of life into the three great types represented by Confucius, by the Buddha and by Aristotle is almost equally suggestive. His argument supports the contention of a modern Catholic writer that the Buddha might have written something very like the first two volumes of St. John of the Cross, but could not have even imagined the last two volumes. Christian mysticism is an escape from limits. Buddhist mysticism (or philosophy) is an escape from life.

Confession of Faith

But the argument of *The Everlasting Man* depends on its two main contentions: (1) that rational man is a unique fact which cannot be ascribed to a non-rational cause or compared with non-rational things, and (2) that Christianity is a unique supernatural fact which cannot be ascribed to a merely natural cause or compared with merely natural things:

If there was ever a moment when man was only an animal, we can, if we choose, make a fancy picture of his career transferred to some other animal. An entertaining fantasia might be made in which elephants built in elephantine architecture, with towers and turrets like tusks and trunks, cities beyond the scale of any colossus. . . . But if we are considering what did happen, we shall certainly decide that man has distanced everything else with a distance like that of the astronomical spaces and a speed like that of the still thunderbolt of the light. And in the same fashion, while we can, if we choose, see the Church amid a mob of Mithraic or Manichean superstitions squabbling and killing each other at the end of the Empire, while we can, if we choose, imagine the Church killed in the struggle and some other chance cult taking its place, we shall be the more surprised (and possibly puzzled) if we meet it two thousand years afterwards rushing through the ages as the winged thunderbolt of thought and everlasting enthusiasm—a thing without rival or resemblance; and still as new as it is old.

Mr. Chesterton has written few things more striking than the chapter called "The Riddles of the Gospel." There he again imagines a reader who has never heard the Gospels interpreted and who views them for the first time. What is the picture which he finds in them? Is it that represented by the devotion of the Church to a Saviour "meek and mild"? At first sight it appears something very different. There is a mystical sense in which that picture is true. But that sense has been so distorted by popular sentimentalism as to leave on the mind of those who do not read the Gospels for themselves the impression that Christ was a vague philanthropist who uttered platitudes about kindness. Very different surely is the first impression produced by a first serious reading of the Gospels themselves, so different and so terrible that men prefer not to speak of it:

Confession of Faith

There is something insupportable even to the imagination in the idea of turning the corner of a street or coming out into the spaces of a market-place to meet the petrifying glance of *that* figure as it turned upon a generation of vipers, or that face as it looked at the face of the hypocrite. The Church can reasonably be justified therefore if she turns the most merciful face or aspect towards men; but it is certainly the most merciful aspect that she does turn. . . . A man simply taking the words of the story as they stand would form quite another impression—an impression full of mystery and possibly of inconsistency; but certainly not merely an impression of mildness. It would be intensely interesting; but part of the interest would consist in its leaving a good deal to be guessed at or explained. It is full of sudden gestures evidently significant, except that we hardly know what they signify; of enigmatic silences; of ironical replies. The outbreaks of wrath, like storms above our atmosphere, do not seem to break out exactly where we should expect them, but to follow some higher weather-chart of their own. The Peter whom popular Church teaching presents is very rightly the Peter to whom Christ said in forgiveness, "Feed My lambs." He is not the Peter upon whom Christ turned as if he were the devil, crying in that obscure wrath, "Get thee behind me, Satan." Christ lamented with nothing but love and pity over Jerusalem which was to murder Him. We do not know what strange spiritual atmosphere or spiritual insight led Him to sink Bethsaida lower in the pit than Sodom. I am putting aside for the moment all questions of doctrinal inferences or expositions, orthodox or otherwise; I am simply imagining the effect on a man's mind if he did really . . . read the New Testament without reference to orthodox and even without reference to doctrine.

How different is this picture from the popular conception of the "humanitarian" Christ! How little did Our Lord ever say which was consistent with the popular modern idea of Christianity as a religion of pacifism, socialism, prohibitionism and the rest! How much did He say which is hopelessly inconsistent with it? Did He call on the Centurion to leave the army? Did He turn wine into water?

What torrents of effortless eloquence would have flowed from [the modern critics] to swell any slight superiority on the part of Martha [over Mary]; what splendid sermons about the Joy of Service and the Gospel of Work and the World left Better than we Found it, and generally all the ten thousand platitudes that can

Confession of Faith

be uttered in favour of taking trouble—by people who need take no trouble to utter them. If in Mary the mystic and child of love Christ was guarding the seed of something more subtle, who was likely to understand it at the time? Nobody else could have seen Clare and Catherine and Teresa shining above the little roof at Bethany. It is so in another way with that magnificent menace about bringing into the world a sword to sunder and divide.† Nobody could have guessed then either how it could be fulfilled or how it could be justified. Indeed, some free-thinkers are still so simple as to fall into the trap and be shocked at a phrase so deliberately defiant. They actually complain of the paradox for not being a platitude.

There are those who recognize the awful severity of the Christian moral code in regard to marriage, and tell us that it is the morality of another age. Mr. Chesterton replies that it is rather the morality of another world:

Christ in His view of marriage does not in the least suggest the conditions of Palestine in the first century. . . . [His doctrine] was quite as difficult for people then as for people now. It was much more puzzling to people then than to people now. Whatever else is true, it is emphatically not true that the ideas of Jesus of Nazareth were suitable to His time, but are no longer suitable to our time. Exactly how suitable they were to His time is perhaps suggested in the end of His story.

Mr. Chesterton maintains then that a man reading the New Testament for the first time and without any of the presuppositions of modern Liberal Protestantism would *not* get the impression of what is often meant by a human Christ: "The merely human Christ is a made-up figure, a piece of artificial selection, like the merely evolutionary man. Moreover, there have been too many of these human Christs found in the same story, just as there have been too many keys to mythology found in the same stories." The picture of Christ as a teacher of pacifism or of communism or of Christian Science or of prohibition or that of a mad prophet with a Messianic delusion are all equally unsatisfactory. Each is founded on a tiny fraction of the evidence. None of them really *results from* the evidence. Moreover, the vast majority of such human interpretations are *in spite of* the evidence. Each of these explanations is singularly inadequate; and yet

Confession of Faith

"taken together they do suggest something of the very mystery which they miss. There must surely have been something not only mysterious but many-sided about Christ if so many smaller Christs can be carved out of Him. If the Christian Scientist is satisfied with Him as a spiritual healer and the Christian Socialist is satisfied with Him as a social reformer, so satisfied that they do not even expect Him to be anything else, it looks as if He really covered rather more ground than they could be expected to expect. And it does seem to suggest that there might be more than they fancy in these other mysterious attributes of casting out devils or prophesying doom."

Surely this whole chapter is, what the Master of Balliol calls it, "admirable."* As Dr. Lindsay observes, "Mr. Chesterton is quite right in thinking that most of us are so used to the Gospels that we cannot read them with fresh eyes or realize the strange story they tell, and how unlike many things which Christ said are to the ordinary conceptions of Him. In that chapter on 'The Riddles of the Gospel' Mr. Chesterton really has succeeded in standing back and looking at the facts as though for the first time. . . ."

If it is not impertinent, however, we would suggest that Mr. Chesterton's treatment of the Gospel picture would have been even more effective if he had attempted to meet the most popular of modern objections. The man in the street who depends vaguely on second-hand conclusions for his estimate of Christianity is still under the impression that if only St. John's Gospel could be eliminated he could settle down comfortably to the belief that the Synoptic Gospels do give us a merely human Christ, and that as Dr. Kirsopp Lake is at pains to inform us, "the Son of man" merely means "a man." Christians, of course, have always believed that Our Lord was fully man as well as fully God. As St. Thomas Aquinas says, "The flesh of Christ was capable of suffering and death, and in

* "Mr. Chesterton looks at Mankind," by the Master of Balliol. *The Saturday Westminster*, October 10, 1925.

Confession of Faith

consequence his soul was also capable of suffering . . . there is no doubt that Christ really felt pain. . . . He could feel real sadness . . . and fear," though he adds that "these movements of the sensitive soul in Christ took place only according to the dictates of His reason and His reason could never be disturbed." The fact of Our Lord's humanity is, of course, as fully recognized by St. John as by the Synoptists. But this is utterly different from the popular conception of a merely "human Christ." Such a conception demands indeed an enormous struggle against the evidence, and can only be made even credible by dismissing much of the story in the Synoptic Gospels themselves on the ground that it is absurd. For instance, all the critics admit that all the sources give us most plainly the story of the Loaves and Fishes. Dr. Sanday admitted that it was as well authenticated as any fact of history. But such a miracle is so obviously absurd to those who regard Christ only as a man that it need not trouble them. The evidence is all one way, but the "obvious" conclusion is the other. This is but one instance out of so many.

Again, the story of the forgiveness of St. Mary Magdalen as given by St. Luke obviously assumes that Our Lord claimed to be God:—a debt to God was a debt to Himself. Simon the Pharisee is shocked because Our Lord allows a notorious sinner to approach Him and kiss His feet and show other signs of love. Our Lord replies, "Simon, I have somewhat to say to thee. . . . A certain creditor had two debtors, the one owed five hundred pence and the other fifty. And *whereas they had not wherewith to pay* he forgave both. Which therefore of the two loveth him most?" Simon answers rightly, "I suppose he to whom he forgave most." Our Lord replies by pointing again to Magdalen's love and contrasting it with Simon's want of love, concluding, "To whom less is forgiven he loveth less," and then to her, "Thy sins are forgiven thee . . . thy faith hath made thee safe, go in peace." And the Pharisees (who were later to rend their garments at His "blasphemy") began to say within themselves: "Who is this that forgiveth sins also?" The more we examine

Confession of Faith

that story in St. Luke the more meaningless it becomes if Christ did not claim to be God Himself. It throws, moreover, a yet clearer light on the claim to forgive sins as made in St. Mark (chap. ii 10).

But then Our Lord is always making such claims in the Synoptic Gospels. He speaks with "authority" (Mark i 22) in His own name, not in the name of another. He claims to be greater than Jonas or Solomon or even the Temple itself (Matt. xii). He is Lord of the Sabbath (Mark ii 28). He is Master of the Angels, to whom the Jews attributed so high a dignity (Matt. xiii 8). He claims to develop the moral law given by God Himself (Matt. v 22). He will judge the world (Matt. xvi 27). He controls not only the elements of nature but even the devils in His own name, and allows others to cast them out only in His name. Where two or three are gathered together He will be in the midst (Matt. xviii 20). No man may love father or mother more than Him (Matt. x 37). He claims to satisfy the human heart, "Come unto Me" (Matt. xi 28). He would have gathered Jerusalem as a hen gathers her chickens. He is put to death for His "blasphemous" claims. But He cannot be explained or even understood as one man is understood by another. "All things are delivered to Me by the Father. And no one knoweth the Son but the Father: neither doth anyone know the Father but the Son and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal Him" (Matt. xi 27; Luke x 22). What evidence is left for the merely human Christ? *Aut Deus aut non bonus.*

Mr. Chesterton uses this old Augustinian argument. Christ claimed to be God, therefore He was deluded or wicked if He was not God. In regard to the first alternative the exquisite balance and beauty of His thought is, as Mr. Chesterton urges, the last character which commonly goes with megalomania. Here, of course, the writer is moving in that borderland between reason and faith, where the mind itself is most reasonable in acknowledging something which is beyond our reason. Mr. Chesterton does help our minds to arrive there with him. His line of

Confession of Faith

argument is not new, but we believe that it retains all its force and that no modern "psychological" method is able to destroy it. Yet at the same time we do feel that his statement of it would have gained in force if he had attempted first to meet the popular criticism on its own selected ground, the claims made openly or implied throughout the first three Gospels. His argument from St. John would then have been more readily listened to. That the critics may be able to fit certain fragments of the Gospel story into their picture of a purely human Christ is obviously true, but that that picture is in any serious degree drawn from the Gospels themselves is quite as obviously untrue. And when a compromise is sought by which Our Lord is made to possess in a higher degree a "divinity" attributed to all men, we can only protest with Mr. Chesterton that "it were better to rend our robes with a great cry against blasphemy like Caiphas in the judgement, or to lay hold of the man as a maniac possessed of devils like the kinsmen and the crowd, rather than to stand stupidly debating fine shades of pantheism in the presence of so catastrophic a claim."

Here we will regretfully take leave of *The Everlasting Man*, or rather we will leave the reader with it. We feel that it would be really impertinent for us to criticize this book in any other spirit than one of reverent gratitude. Mr. Chesterton has given the modern world what it needs most, a very fresh picture of very old truths. He does not ask us to accept his own vision as ours, but rather to stand aside and look at the facts as if we saw them for the first time. It is only by doing this that we can decide whether he has seen them aright. But he does enable us to escape from the particular mood of our particular age, and it is this power which seems to me to justify my father's comment that his place is really among the prophets. He wishes to rouse us from sleep, and he believes that our wakeful eyes will see what he sees: the creature called man as the everlasting creature and the Creator Himself as the Everlasting Man.

LEO WARD.

THE AGNOSTIC'S INSUFFICIENCY

THE celebration of centenaries of great men, those who have done much of importance in one way or another to ameliorate the lot of Humanity, is beyond doubt a practice to be commended, and to be commended highly, when the hero or saint, or whatever his description might be, has a claim to our exceptional gratitude and veneration. The rewards of science, apart from the joy and the glory of achievement and the advancement of knowledge, are, after all, for the most part confined to honours, the scanty earnings of that last infirmity of noble mind. Yet these are more appropriate on the whole to the dead than to the living. For the living cannot always live by them; may be insensitive to flattery, or be offended by it, however well-intentioned their well-wishers might be.

That best of all judges, Time, has once more pronounced his verdict on the labour and the merits of a great Englishman, Thomas Henry Huxley, one of the intellectual giants of the Nineteenth Century. One need not be very old to remember him, for even comparatively young men can recall his presence. I have a vivid recollection of having seen him, and I shall never forget the thrill of emotion that agitated my mind as I first saw the man of all others who had aroused my youthful enthusiasm for the application of science to general culture. I say the man, for he was a man, and looked it every inch of him. On showing his photograph to a cultured old lady from Vienna the other day, she remarked, after looking hard through her lorgnette, "He looks most like an English Reverend." Such is the irony of Fate! It seems only like yesterday since I saw Huxley for the first and only time at the meeting of the British Association at Oxford in 1894, a memorable occasion when he vigorously assailed the Presidential Address delivered by Lord Salisbury. I felt as if I had seen Carlyle or Emerson or Newman, greatly as his teaching differed from theirs, for he was beyond all

The Agnostic's Insufficiency

doubt the man of his generation. In those days the controversy with Gladstone on "The Impregnable Rock of Holy Scripture" was fresh in everybody's mind. The questioning from the scientific standpoint of accepted Biblical accounts of events intimately associated with religious belief excited an intense interest at University College, Dublin, as well as at Trinity College. The Dean of the Faculty of Medicine at the former, Sir Christopher Nixon, and the Professor of Anatomy, Dr. Ambrose Birmingham, both intimate friends of my family, were, I know, enthusiastic admirers of Huxley as a scientific man; Sir Christopher expressed the view at a dinner, after the crushing reply to Gladstone, that "Huxley was unquestionably the man of his generation."

As a recent writer in the *Daily Telegraph* very justly remarks: "He numbered among his friends many of the clergy, and it was observed of him that he 'got on best' with those of the Catholic Church." It is not generally known that he was at the same school as the two Newmans, John Henry and his brother Francis, professor of Latin at University College, London. The school was Dr. Nicholas' at Ealing, where George Huxley, Thomas Henry's father, was senior assistant master. Yet he appears to have had no very great opinion of this school or its teachers, for he tells us, as recorded in his *Life* by his son Leonard Huxley: "I had two years of a pandemonium of a school (between eight and ten), and after that neither help nor sympathy in any intellectual direction till I reached manhood." It is difficult to reconcile this with the fact that at twenty he passed the M.B. examination at London University, obtaining the Gold Medal in Anatomy and Physiology. Presumably even in those days considerable general culture was required to enable a candidate in any particular subject to give his answers in such a manner as to surpass all other candidates or to attain the excellence required to impress the most critical and fastidious examiner. That he should have been able to do so by himself notwithstanding his "pandemonium" of teachers and absence of intellectual encouragement at home does infinite credit to his per-

The Agnostic's Insufficiency

formances. He tells us that as a young man he "detested the trouble of writing, and would take no pains with it"; but there can be no doubt that he acquired a literary style seldom equalled in lucidity and force by any English man of science. Yet he did not learn Greek until late in life; and of "Latin he acquired enough to help him through early scientific works or even, when philosophical controversy demanded, theological treatises" (Leonard Huxley in *Nature*, May, 1925). A curious impression has been created abroad that he was the author of an edition of Cicero's *De Senectute*. But this excellent work was by his son Leonard, a distinguished classical scholar of Balliol. It is further most noteworthy, as Sir W. T. Thiselton-Dyer reminds us, that as a young man he was not particularly interested in fossils, and that he actually refused an appointment that required special attention to such. But of course this was before his conversion to Darwinism. He might have been excused this antipathy in those days when we bear in mind that there are still amongst us scientists who take little or no interest in fossils.

Leaving aside for the present the theory of Darwin, which he helped so much to elucidate, though he was not, strictly speaking, a Darwinian (for he thought that "transmutation may take place without transition," the view now commonly held regarding mutation as distinct from small and continuous variations—Darwinism proper), let us consider that Agnosticism in his teaching which clashes with orthodoxy. We all know how he was forced to coin that term, feeling embarrassed at the Metaphysical Society at not being able to label himself and be classified like his fellow-members. In fact, he tells us that "he felt like a fox without a tail," and apparently endeavoured to clothe himself in the garment of an undisguised nescience, calling himself an Agnostic. As a student and in fact it might be said a follower of Hume, he was a sceptic, and his little book, *Hume, with Helps to the Study of Berkeley*, might nevertheless have been written a hundred years before its publication, by one who had never read *Die Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*. It is true that he read German fluently,

The Agnostic's Insufficiency

and as a student of Carlyle his attention must have been directed to German philosophy. It is stated, in fact, in the *Life* that he read Kant as a young man. But there is little evidence in his writings that he was much influenced by German thought—hardly a crime perhaps nowadays. Yet even Leibnitz appears to have escaped his attention, though he wrote in Latin or French. Descartes and other French philosophers he had undoubtedly studied, and his teaching in Scientific Method was largely Cartesian. He confessed that what really concerned him was not what others thought, but what he himself thought, taught, held, and believed. This we can well accept. Such an attitude of mind is of the very essence of independence, but it must be tempered with caution if it is to be considered sane. One may desire to begin as if no one had ever said or done anything before us. That was Descartes' method, which got him into trouble with the Sacred Faculty of Theology in Paris. What we must modestly bear in mind, however, is that, although it is our duty to think for ourselves, unless we are fools, we would be bigger fools if we thought all other men were fools beside us. In fact, we must acquaint ourselves with what others have thought and done; and whether we ultimately agree with or differ from them we should not begin by ignoring them. To begin where Noah did would have been admirable for the inhabitants of the Ark. But we have at least had the benefit of being the descendants of seventy generations of scholars and thinking men. How, then, can we discard what they have handed down to us? No doubt to be a philosopher one must think, and at times endeavour to think hard and clearly. But to be a scholar one must read, and study hard as well, and, if not too hard, at least with assiduity and perspicacity. For instance, though Descartes is generally regarded as the founder of Modern Philosophy, yet only his ignorance could excuse his claim to originality; for the teaching in the *Discours sur la Méthode* and the *Méditations* was largely that of St. Augustine, the greatest of the Fathers, a really original thinker, who did not merely endeavour to reconcile the

The Agnostic's Insufficiency

Aristotelian philosophy with the Scriptures, but struck out new ground and reached the bedrock of human reason and consciousness itself. St. Augustine commenced as Descartes did, passing, however, through far more varied phases of thought. I was greatly impressed by this fact more than thirty years ago in reading Father Thomas Finlay's *History of Philosophy*, and I have recently had occasion to go more fully into the matter. Dr. Grabmann of Munich does justice to the true founder of Modern Philosophy in the *Geschichte der Scholastischen Methode*, and in the *Die Philosophie des Mittelalters*.

To say that in dealing with the great questions of God, Freedom, Immortality, or Truth, Being, Substance and Causation, "we must lower our heads and acknowledge our ignorance, priest, philosopher, one and all," as Tyndall said, may no doubt sound very humble and very wise. Yet the Reason and Morality that Huxley worshipped in the veneration of Truth had its basis in an uncritical belief in Truth as such, and the utter incapacity of the human mind to attain it, except through the exercise of that very Reason which he could not deny, but the validity of which he could not prove; in other words, an ultimate belief in his own self and his own powers to grapple with Truth. The Agnostic who talks so fanatically about Truth resents nothing so much as being asked to state precisely what he means by it. But if we are not to argue in a circle, the criterion of Truth is ultimately a question of self-assurance, self-confidence, and intellectual satisfaction. This healthy frame of mind may no doubt be, and probably is, the result of natural selection. Those who do not possess this intellectual quality will never feel certain of anything. An Agnostic, it appears, can be certain, at any rate *morally certain*, but for no other reason than that he feels this satisfaction, which is not Agnosticism at all, though it may be Rationalism. Co-existence and succession of ideas or sensations and their coherency are his tests of reality. Truth is, however, admitted to be a relationship of ideas, of such a nature that, owing to the constitution of our minds, it (the relationship) cannot be denied. That is, it is some-

The Agnostic's Insufficiency

thing to which the mind must conform and give its assent. *That which I clearly and distinctly perceive to be true is true*, and similarly as regards what is right. Such, in fact, was Descartes' criterion.

There is an immense difference, however, between Descartes' position and Huxley's. Descartes maintained that he had in his mind the idea of Perfection, and further that if a Perfect Being were possible, existence would be one necessary attribute of its Perfection, so that the idea in his mind of a God that did not exist would be meaningless. The argument does not prove the existence of unicorns, centaurs, fauns, or other imaginary creatures, unless existence is a necessary attribute of any of them, which it obviously is not. But a Perfect Being that did not exist would be anything but perfect, and merely an Irish Bull, too subtle even for a Scotchman like Hume or an Englishman like Huxley to see through. One of Descartes' ablest arguments, the validity of which was admitted by Leibnitz and is still regarded seriously by many idealistic philosophers, this ontological argument, cannot be dismissed as an absurdity.

The existence of God was as clear to Descartes as that the three angles of a plane triangle are equal to two right-angles, or indeed as his own existence. For in *Cogito ergo sum* the implication is that, if a thing thinks, it exists—I think, therefore I exist. Similarly, if a thing is Perfect, it exists—God is Perfect, therefore He exists. For although existence does not necessarily imply thought, thought does imply existence, as much as Perfection must do so. Now there is no need at present to go into all that these two arguments imply. Volumes have been written upon them. What I do wish to emphasize is that Descartes was as certain of the existence of God as he was of his own existence, whereas Huxley, following Hume, was perhaps certain of one, but very doubtful about the other, which to Descartes and many of us is a far more important matter.

The Theism of the Cartesian philosophy removed logically the admission of self-deception or delusion, but Des-

The Agnostic's Insufficiency

cartes' assumption it must be admitted was unsatisfactory in the form in which he left it. Admitting as he did the possibility that his certainty might after all be a delusion or self-deception, he felt nevertheless the assurance and self-confidence that God the all-Wise, all-Good and Perfect Being would not deceive him or let him be deceived. We are only too deeply conscious, however, of our own fallibility, notwithstanding the certainty of our most profound convictions. What he was certain of in geometry has been disproved. Einstein, Riemann, Minkowski, and Robb have shown that the sum of the two sides of a triangle are not necessarily greater than the third, however certain we may once have been of this theorem. The sum may, in fact, under certain circumstances, according to our ideas of space, in a "space-time continuum," be *less* than the third side! It seems to me, however, that it is quite unnecessary to assume, as Descartes did, that God would not let us be deceived. Either there is or is not a God as previously defined. If there is, I may or may not be deceived. But if there is not, there is no doubt about the possibility of my being deceived about some things, including the ontological argument, and accordingly its counterpart which equally clearly applies to myself in the *Cogito ergo sum*. But of the latter I unquestionably do and must feel certain. Hence I am certain about some things and am accordingly certain that I am not deceived. Thereupon am I forced to believe in God, for if there is no God then at least I may be deceived, and I cannot admit it. This is a very different thing from saying that if there be a God I would not be deceived, which, as admitted, may or may not be the case. On the other hand, the Agnostic must be included amongst those who do not realize the validity of the ontological argument. But he will at least admit that if he is certain of anything, then there must be such a thing as truth.

But truth is incompatible with mere chance in the relationship and arrangement of ideas, whereas the absence of mere chance necessarily implies the opposite, that is, a Purposive Intelligence.

Therefore (1) Chance implies uncertainty, and the

The Agnostic's Insufficiency

absence of Truth as such. (2) Truth, if it exists independently of us, does not necessarily imply certainty on our part, for, although there may be such, we need not have attained to it. But (3) Truth eliminates blind chance; (4) that of which I am certain is true, *so far as I am concerned*, for I cannot admit the possibility of my being deceived if I am certain. Therefore, from the premises, the existence of God cannot be disputed for the following reasons: I am either capable of certainty or I am not. If I am capable of being certain of anything, I can have a knowledge of the Truth through Reason. Truth and Reason are incompatible with mere chance if they are eternal and immutable. But the alternative to chance is a Purposive Intelligence. Hence if I deny a Purposive Intelligence I must deny myself all certainty of Truth itself and all confidence in my own Reason. A rather uncomfortable conclusion for the so-called Rationalist. The reasoning is of such a nature that if we admit the possibility of there being no God, then there is no certainty possible, a conclusion that though at first sight not obvious if it does suit the Agnostic, certainly cannot satisfy the scientific mind whose quest is Truth. In this respect Huxley, as a naturalist, does not appear to me to have grasped the principles of the Cartesian philosophy.

Descartes' ambition was to apply mathematics to philosophy. He was more successful perhaps in his invention of analytical geometry, to which he applied algebraic treatment with results too wonderful to contemplate through the powerful weapon or instrument he gave us for the use of scientific method. Would that anything so precise could aid us in metaphysical investigations. Leibnitz followed in his track (see *La Logique de Liebniz*, by Louis Couturat, and *The Monadology*, by Robert Latta). But it was not until 1856, when George Boole, of Cork, published *The Laws of Thought* (New Edition, by Philip E. B. Jourdain, 1916) that the problem was properly, and it might be said successfully, attacked. In recent years Plano and Burali-Forti in Italy and W. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell in England have developed the subject.

The Agnostic's Insufficiency

These methods are far too laborious and difficult for popular exposition. F. H. Bradley's *Appearances and Reality* represents the latest developments of thought in the directions we have been considering, as also Alexander's *Space, Time, and Deity*. All of which shows that the Mid-Victorian Agnosticism is probably a thing of the past.

More popular discussions are those of Newman's *Grammar of Assent*, and A. J. Balfour's *Foundations of Belief*, really a second edition of his *Philosophic Doubt*. Neither Karl Pearson's *Grammar of Science* nor Clifford's *Common Sense of the Exact Sciences* touches the real question of the grounds of our beliefs. All these four, however, are masterpieces of exposition from their own particular points of view. Now I have never seen any evidence that Huxley, living when he did, had been influenced in the slightest degree or had even considered the aspect of belief presented in the *Grammar of Assent*, a book that a thinker and writer of his intellectual honesty and eminence should never have ignored. But I remember his review of the *Foundations of Belief*, shortly before his death, in the *Nineteenth Century* in 1895. His concluding remarks were to the effect that, after reading the *Foundations* from cover to cover, he was compelled to lay it down with the conviction that the author had demolished rather than established the grounds of all belief. Whether he would have said anything similar about the *Grammar of Assent* I know not; others, like James Anthony Froude, have said as much, whilst Clerk-Maxwell regarded it as but evidence of the extraordinary convolutions of which the human brain admits, an admission that nowadays would be considered to be an indication of its extraordinary intelligence. Newman's contention that the normal human mind, by a purely natural process, jumps from a comparatively small probability to a *moral certainty* commanding assent, and thence to a profound conviction or absolute certainty, through what he calls the *illative sense*, might have eased many of Huxley's scruples, as also Clifford's, about the sin of belief, when there is inadequacy of scientific or exact evidence. Nevertheless, Huxley, though denying absolute certainty

The Agnostic's Insufficiency

about anything as an Agnostic, must have entertained a *moral certainty* about many things which he regarded as unquestionably true in the realm of science. The healthy mind must have convictions, and even the Agnostic cannot deny the principle of *Cogito ergo sum*. Moreover, he adjusts himself to his environment on the principle of action and reaction. Of that adjustment he must be certain. If I am what I am implies a knowledge of something that is, it implies that indubitable relationship of ideas which I regard as Truth, and which is most clearly perceived by me in my own nature as a thinking being, and that relationship of subject and object forms an essential part of my reasoning, the abandonment or denial of which would mean the abandonment of my rational powers and processes. The admission, on the other hand, of the permanence of Truth independently of my mind must mean its contemplation by a permanent and universal mind, which is its Subject, and of which Truth is the object of perception, Subject and Object being reciprocally and inviolably related like action and reaction. This aspect of the question was ignored by Hume, but has been fully discussed by Lotze in his *Microcosmos* and more recently by James Ward.

When Huxley after Hume tells us that for anything he knows there may or may not be a God, he expresses not only a paradox but a parrotry of undeveloped thought that has not been carried rigorously to its logical conclusions. He shares our faith not in an Absolute Being, but in the foundations of his own beliefs and the basis of his own knowledge, even as the agnostic *ignoramus ignorabimus* of Dubois-Raymond betrays a certain amount of mental apathy or inertia. If Truth is an idea that exists only when a human mind contemplates it, then must it be purely subjective to us, using the word subjective to mean an object in our minds as subject. I emphasize this to avoid any confusion of thought through ambiguity in the words "subject" and "subjective." To regard it as anything worthy of special veneration would be sheer anthropomorphism or a self-apotheosis incompatible with Huxley's

The Agnostic's Insufficiency

own methods. But if it is something objective and independent of the human mind, then must it be the object of some other subject, and that subject is He whom we call God. Whilst if Truth is its own subject and object, it must needs be God Itself, and likewise most worthy of that highest homage and veneration that all rational beings offer it as the Most High, the Most Perfect, and the Most Sublime. Before *This*, the Great Reality, do we "lower our heads and acknowledge our ignorance—save only of Its presence and the divine light that It reflects in us—priest, philosopher, one and all." And Tyndall's apothegm may thus be amended so as to fit in with the sublime Itself, if mankind is not all that apprehends it.

In his *Romanes Lecture* on "Evolution and Ethics" Huxley emphasized that the ethical sense and the struggle for existence in the "cosmic process" are mutually antagonistic, the one being essentially selfish and the other unselfish. It was discovered, awakened, or invented to protect the interests of communities within themselves against the aggressiveness of the physically strong towards their neighbours, who may be equally useful, if not more so, and often intellectually their superiors.

The "cosmic process" ought not, however, to be confined to the merely physical struggle for existence, since it is a part of the more general law of self-adjustment of individuals with their environment. For as soon as the struggle for existence ceased in its crude form of brutal strife, by the formation of communities with mutual interests of the members constituting them, leading to mutual consideration and respect, the environment of the individual within the community was altered; so that what was fittest became approximately what was ethically best rather than ferociously aggressive. But the self-adjustment with the environment still continued, altruism tending to replace that egotism which to our sorrow still to some extent persists in us.

Here we have the higher self, however, at length divested of the limitations of the animal and lower nature: the free self which has evolved triumphantly over the

The Agnostic's Insufficiency

lower self, and being free to choose has chosen to act according to those nobler principles which make life an Art, as the pursuit of goodness, beauty and truth, the realization of the inner spiritual life of Man; the self within the corporal self, seeking knowledge for itself as a virtue, a virtue which obeys no necessity but that of truth. When the struggle for existence by "brute force" ceases, the evolution of the higher man begins. The potential higher man has remained hidden all the while, awaiting the opportunity in which to assert himself. Thus poets, philosophers, philanthropists, and saints of higher degrees have had to hide their lights under a bushel awaiting the circumstances that could permit the development of their finer qualities. The stronger of these asserted their force of character before their time, and were promptly eliminated, though their examples and their precepts served to mould the environment of their successors.

Under the stress of disease, of hunger and of brutal strife, poetry and philosophy, and, still more, human love itself, could scarcely thrive; and man's inner nature, except in relation to his physical wants, could have had little or no chance against the forces of ignorance, cunning, and ferocity. Yet the adjustment of internal to external relations of the organism with its environment was and is the essential feature of this true cosmic process. How an evolutionist like Huxley could have confused the issue it is hard to understand (see my article on "Darwinism and Modern Biology," *Outlook*, July 3, 1909). The mechanism of the process by which the individual or the race has been evolved affects not in the very slightest degree the greatness and the wonder of the result.

"The spiritual life is, above all, the formation of a coherent system of life. Subject and object are comprehended in a self-contained activity" (Rudolf Eucken, *The Life of the Spirit*). The unity forming the link of reality is what can never be severed if the triad of subject, object, and copula be a reality as we know it to be. Cannot one say to the other, "How can I exist without ye?" or "If I cease, must ye not cease also?" The body

The Agnostic's Insufficiency

is not essential to its nature. The emancipation of the human soul from matter is the highest result of evolution, the greatest work of creation. For the Ego is a reality and Truth itself, or rather, as the Church teaches, an image of the Divine incarnate.

Dean Inge has well said, "God is not in His most inmost nature involved in the time process. He is above it in the realm of absolute and eternal values." This we have clear reason to believe is true no less of the human spirit, His own image and likeness. Even as the Psalmist* boldly proclaims, "Of old hast thou laid the foundation of the earth; and the heavens are the work of thy hands. They shall perish, but thou shalt endure; yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment; as a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed. But thou art the same, and thy years shall have no end. The children of thy servants shall continue, and their seed shall be established before thee." Shall the thing formed then say to him that formed it, "Why hast thou made me thus?" Yet the true Evolutionist can assert, "I know that Thou hast made me so. For Thou art Truth Itself: and the knowledge Thou hast revealed to us through Reason is not the least of the virtues; but in its highest form all the virtues combined."

There is but one sin greater than that of credulity, and that is the Agnosticism of uncertainty of what must needs be true, if we are to pursue truth. It reminds one of that hysterical scrupulosity of the penitent religious fanatic that is so afraid of telling a lie that he is unable to speak the truth. This frame of mind is not healthy. In the certainty of knowledge must man seek his intellectual salvation with Science, Philosophy, and Religion as the inseparable triad of his beliefs—Freedom, Spirituality, and God the Absolute Being. For if once more we ask:

Whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened?
Who laid the corner-stone thereof?
When the morning stars sang together,
And all the sons of God shouted for joy!

* Psalm cii, 24-28. See also St. Paul's Epistles to the Hebrews.

The Agnostic's Insufficiency

the answer to Job is that they are fastened, as we have seen, in the inmost recesses of human consciousness and the inviolable relationships of Truth. St. Augustine, and after him Descartes, clearly perceived this. All deep modern philosophic thought moves in this direction. The Agnosticism of Huxley and Haeckel is but a superficial and not very serious treatment of the problem: a solecism more absurd than the most extreme forms of solipsism such as Hume's could well be; an incoherency that robs man of the guarantee of his self-assurance and birthright of intellectual Truth: with no ground for his self-conscious intellectual apprehension.

JOHN BUTLER BURKE.

CARDINAL ACTON AND THE MARRIAGE OF THE DUKE OF SUSSEX

DURING the last decades of the eighteenth century two secret marriages occurred in the Royal Family, both of which for different reasons were brought to the private cognizance of the Holy See: the marriage of George Prince of Wales with Mrs. Fitzherbert and the marriage of the Duke of Sussex, his brother, with Lady Augusta Murray. The first marriage took place secretly in London with a lady in communion with Rome, and the second marriage no less secretly with a Protestant lady actually in Rome.

In the second case the Duke of Sussex persuaded the second daughter of the Earl of Dunmore to marry with him secretly at Rome (April 4, 1792) in the presence of a Mr. Gunn, Protestant clergyman, and, as the Duke said in his Will, "for greater security and not from an apprehension of the first being insufficient I again performed the ceremony of marriage." The second marriage took place in St. George's, Hanover Square, the guileless or well-remunerated clergyman having no idea that "Augustus Frederick" was not an Esquire. The moment the King, George the Third, heard of this happy marriage, the King's Proctor brought suit and the Dean of the Arches declared it null and void in August, 1794, according to the terms of the Royal Marriage Act, as "the show and effigy of a marriage" only, there being insufficient proof by witness. This was felt as a great blow by Mrs. Fitzherbert, who realized that her marriage with the Prince of Wales must be at the mercy of a kind of matrimonial star-chamber, and that whom God joined together could under certain circumstances totally unconnected with any real reasons for nullity or divorce be put asunder by the Privy Council. To the State lawyers it was prefer-

Marriage of Duke of Sussex

able to let a woman rather than a statute appear to suffer violation.

The Princes appear to have forced marriage upon their brides by plea of their own safety. The Prince of Wales stabbed himself, and made Mrs. Fitzherbert marry him to save his life. The Duke of Sussex threatened to die of starvation, writing, "By all that is holy till when I am married I will eat nothing."

Lady Augusta Murray died in 1830, after bearing the Duke two children, and the Duke married Lady Cecilia Underwood, relict of Sir George Buggin, who ten years later was created by Queen Victoria Duchess of Inverness. Mr. G. E. Cokayne, *Clarendieux Herald*, observes in the *Complete Peerage* that "her recognition by Queen Victoria can hardly be explained on any other ground" than that the Duke was "presumed to have been through a similar ceremony of marriage [one probably ecclesiastically though not legally valid] about 1831." The words in brackets equate the official view of Mrs. Fitzherbert's. There was other ground for Queen Victoria's recognition. It was given in return for the Duke of Sussex surrendering precedence to the Prince Consort, on which the Queen's heart was set. The Duke of Sussex died in 1843, but his son, Sir Augustus D'Este, had already made strenuous efforts at law to validate his mother's weddings and to secure Royal rank for himself and his sister. He issued and dedicated to his mother's memory an account of their rights, "as the consequences of those well-judged measures which you took conjointly with my Father to ensure my religious and my lawful birth." But in vain. It might have been religious, but the Privy Council had decided it was not lawful, and three letters to his uncle William the Fourth remained unanswered.

From a legal and an ecclesiastical point of view the marriage was interesting and complicated. Though the London marriage was not lawful, the Roman might be lawful. England was not the only kingdom in which the Duke of Sussex was a Prince. He was also Prince of Ireland (in the year 1793 a separate kingdom under her

Marriage of Duke of Sussex

own Commons and Lords) and an Electoral Prince of Hanover. The German lawyers were of opinion that a German Prince was entitled to marry by a contract alone, but the Hanoverian Cabinet forbade him taking any steps for the establishment of his pretensions. Sir Augustus fell back upon Ireland as the son of a Prince of that kingdom and upon the opinion of Catholic lawyers and Canonists as to his marriage in Rome.

Daniel O'Connell was the most eminent counsel in Ireland, and the case was put before him in view of the fact that the Duke's marriage had taken place at Rome, and that the Duke as an Irish Prince could claim Dublin Castle as a parental residence, and that Dublin Castle was in a Diocese which had not received the Council of Trent. The Cloncurry Divorce had recently been argued before the House of Lords, and a Priest had sworn at the bar of the House that two Protestants could not be married according to the *lex loci* in Rome because it needed a Priest to conform to the *lex loci*, and no Priest would marry two Protestants in Rome. But the marriage had been held good in the Lords.

However, Daniel O'Connell gave his opinion on three points, which we transcribe from the autograph and signed copy which is bound into the copy of Sir Augustus D'Este's Claims in the British Museum—

1. "I am of opinion and this opinion is entirely free from doubt that H.R.H. at the time of his marriage in Rome was in no wise incapacitated by any law then valid in Ireland from contracting a marriage in that city. The marriage contracted by H.R.H. at Rome was in my judgment a marriage of undoubted validity in Ireland."

2. "The status of the son of H.R.H. was and is now that of a Prince of the Blood Royal, grandson of the reigning King of Ireland. He is entitled to all rights which depend upon or belong to his legitimacy in Ireland as a Prince of the Blood Royal."

3. "Any land purchased by the son of H.R.H. would in the event of his dying intestate certainly go to his sister as heir-at-law. The Right by escheat could not be

Marriage of Duke of Sussex

brought into operation. The sister would find no difficulty in obtaining possession of the land if it was withheld by any person not descended from her brother. Without going back to principles, the case of Lord Cloncurry argued before the Courts of Law and the House of Lords proves that no doubt can exist upon the question." This was signed by Daniel O'Connell (June 7, 1831).

The same argument applied to the marriage of Mrs. Fitzherbert and the Prince of Wales. It might be illegal in England: in Ireland it was legal as well as valid.

The marriages of the Prince of Wales and the Duke of Sussex with Mrs. Fitzherbert and Lady Augusta Murray though parallel possessed differences which may be worthy of schedule—

	MRS. FITZHERBERT.	LADY AUGUSTA MURRAY
<i>Date of Marriage</i> ...	December 15, 1785.	(1) April 4, 1792. (2) December 5, 1792.
<i>Locality</i> ...	London.	(1) Rome. (2) London.
<i>Minister</i> ...	Protestant.	(1) and (2) Protestant.
<i>Witnesses</i> ...	Uncle and Brother of Bride.	(1) ——— (2) ———
<i>Children</i> ...	———	Boy and Girl.
<i>In the opinion of the Holy Sec.</i>	Officially Valid.	(1) Unofficially and presumably Valid. (See Cardinal Acton's opinions.) (2) No opinion asked.
<i>In the opinion of the Privy Council.</i>	Unofficially and presumably Invalid. (No opinion asked.)	(1) No opinion asked. (2) Null and Void Officially.

On the death of the Duke of Sussex, his children made every effort to secure their dubious position, and, as the first marriage of their parents had taken place at Rome and not been met by the Privy Council, the conditions needed to be specially investigated. Cardinal Wiseman was then a Bishop living at Oscott, and he appears to have sent the *dubia* of the case to Cardinal Acton, who returned a profound discussion of the theory of the whole marriage, which we print in full, partly because of the interest of the case, which was certainly unique even in the tangled

Marriage of Duke of Sussex

annals of matrimony, and partly because of the rarity of the learned Cardinal's writings, of which nothing has ever been printed. Among the English Cardinals he has been allowed to be forgotten. And a note is due to his memory. His notice in the *Catholic Encyclopædia* is merely a reduced crib from Gillow, word for word.

If his biography is ever written, we may indicate where we have seen his papers. In the Vatican Library there are several volumes containing his correspondence as an official at the Curia, while his letters as a boy and a young man may be found in the Archives at Aldenham. We have glanced at both and made note of the more important documents in the possession of his family at Aldenham. His parents were Sir John Acton, Bart., of Aldenham, Captain-General to H.M. the King of the Two Sicilies, and Mary Anna, daughter of Baron Acton and niece of her husband. On account of this close consanguinity a Papal dispensation was granted on February 13, 1800. The family tradition, according to the late Lord Acton, was that Sir John had no desire to marry, but the King insisted, and, when the Baronet said he would preferably marry his own niece, procured the Pope's leave. Miss Acton, a child in her early teens, hid herself at the prospect and was enticed with sweetmeats from under the furniture, but the marriage turned out completely happy. It was celebrated in double according to the certificates at Aldenham, firstly on February 22, 1800, at Palermo in the house of Sir William Hamilton, the British Minister to the Court of the Two Sicilies, the Rev. S. G. Comyn, Chaplain to Lord Nelson on H.M.S. *Foudroyant*, officiating. This presumably made the marriage legal in England. Among the witnesses were Sir William Hamilton and Emma Lady Hamilton, who signed the marriage certificate. On the following day a second marriage took place in the Chapel Royal in the presence of King Ferdinand and his Queen. The nuptial Mass was celebrated in the presence of the Archbishop of Heraclea. Of the marriage were born three children, Richard Ferdinand, the future Cardinal, Charles Januarius, and Elizabeth.

Marriage of Duke of Sussex

Sir John Acton died at Palermo in 1811, and his wife brought her children to London, including the future Cardinal. The father had had an adventurous life before succeeding to the title. He served six years in H.M.S. *Phoenix*, and transferred to the Imperial Tuscan Navy, in which he served against the Algerian pirates. He was invited to reorganize the navy at Naples, and rose to supreme command as Captain-General. He became Prime Minister and confidant to the Queen of Naples. Scandal was rife, and French libellers "spoke no worse of Acton than of Nelson," but Mr. Jeafferson, in his work on Naples at the time, completely refutes them. Malcontents could only bandy the epigram, "*Haec rex, hic regina, hic haec et hoc Acton.*" In 1791 Sir Richard Acton of Aldenham, who had returned to the Faith in 1760, died without male issue, and the Baronetcy passed to Sir John, who had come to be on very friendly terms with Nelson during critical naval years in the Mediterranean. Lady Hamilton claimed to have exerted an influence on the anglicized Queen of Naples, which would render her services to the British Fleet remunerable, and Nelson endorsed her claim in his will. Sir William Hamilton appealed to Acton, who held a Council, and the Queen for her own ends sent Nelson, through Lady Hamilton, the secret warrant for the British Fleet to water at Syracuse. There is, of course, the famous tradition that through the Actons and Emma Hamilton Nelson received that information of the French Fleet's position which enabled him to return and win the battle of the Nile. The maid of the Queen of Naples received a letter from her lover on a French ship revealing enough of their whereabouts to make Nelson certain whether to set sail east or west. It is not curious then to find the signature of Nelson's adored Emma Hamilton on the certificate of the marriage from which sprang the future Cardinal.

The Dictionary of National Biography is wrong in stating that Sir John Acton sought to improve his fortune by means of his position and rank. He was more than a fortune hunter; he was in the best sense "one of the cleverest

Marriage of Duke of Sussex

and most fortunate adventurers of his epoch." He won the Orders of SS. Januarius, Ferdinand, and Andrew of Russia by his sword, and received the rare distinction of the Golden Fleece from the King of Spain. On his death Lady Acton brought up his children in England. The boys were sent to school with the Abbé Guicquet at Richmond, with a clergyman near Feversham, and for a time at Westminster School. They entered Magdalen College, Cambridge, though as Catholics they were unable to take degrees. The Cardinal's Armorial Bearings and Red Hat have been fittingly emblazoned in the oriel window of the Hall by the late Master of Magdalen, Dr. Benson, whereby the world is apprised that Cambridge as well as Oxford has bred a nineteenth-century Cardinal. Of his Cambridge life there is no record save in his letters to his mother. His desire to study for the priesthood was rewarded by a course at the Accademia in Rome. He was sent by Leo XII to assist Mgr. Lambruschini at the Paris Nunciature, and after two years was made Vice-Legate at Bologna. Pius VIII created him Monsignor, and the Brief rests at Aldenham directed to "*Carolo dilecto filio cubiculario secreto supernumerario.*" In 1829 he returned to England to marry his sister to Sir Richard Throckmorton. In 1837 he was made Auditor of the Apostolic Chamber, and on the death of Cardinal Weld he became adviser to the Vatican on all English affairs. He had a share and responsibility in dividing England from four into eight Vicariates. In 1839 Gregory XVI created him Cardinal, though he was not proclaimed till 1842. The King of Naples was anxious to secure him for the Archbishopric of Naples, but he always declined. He was present at the only interview that ever took place between a Pope and a Czar, Gregory XVI and Nicholas I, acting as interpreter between the potent twain. It was never divulged what was said between the two heads of the Greek and Latin Churches, but the Polish Persecutions were doubtless on the Pope's lips as well as on the Czar's conscience, for Cardinal Cullen recorded the look of awe and terror with which the superstitious Romanoff

Marriage of Duke of Sussex

left the Apostolic presence. At Aldenham a famous picture commemorates this interview. The Cardinal was also famous for his knowledge of Canon Law. His opinion was regarded as a sure indication in which way a case would take in the Ecclesiastical Courts. He died at Naples with the Jesuits in 1847 perhaps happily, for he was a deep Ultramontane, and would have been grieved by the events of the following year, though the restoration of the English Hierarchy, for which he had paved the way, would have abundantly consoled his austere and patriotic spirit. So valued and famous were his legal judgements that it is a pleasure to save one from the waters of oblivion and to print it as it was received by Bishop Wiseman in 1844. It passed at Wiseman's death into the Manning Papers preserved at St. Mary of the Angels, Bayswater. It shows the Cardinal's acute and Canonical mind at work on the puzzle of the marriage of the Duke of Sussex and Lady Augusta Murray in Rome.

CARDINAL ACTON TO BISHOP WISEMAN.

ROME, *Feast of St. Mary Magdalen, July 22, 1844.*

My Lord Bishop, Soon after I had been favoured with your lordship's letter of June 26 on perusing *Galignani's Messenger* of July 2 I perceived that my humble opinion on the points on which you had done me the honour of consulting me, could no longer be expressed with any practical utility as regards the case in question. Indeed, I would have felt some difficulty from motives, which I am sure your Lordship will appreciate, in giving out any opinion as my own in matters, which involve an interpretation of the Decrees of the Council of Trent separately from the Congregation appointed especially to decide on such controversies and of which I have the honour to be a member. However, to show my sincere readiness in complying with your Lordship's wishes to the utmost extent I can do in consistency with my official duties I will submit a few reflexions on the various shapes which the case in question could have been represented to a body of learned theologians for their opinion, or to ecclesiastical or civil courts in Rome for their decision, leaving to your Lordship to affix to such reflexions the weight you will

Marriage of Duke of Sussex

think they may deserve and to the competent tribunals to judge whether they may be applicable or not to any particular case before them.

Let us suppose in the first place, my Lord, that a son issued out of the marriage said to have existed between the late Duke of Sussex and Lady Murray, had become a Catholic, had wished to embrace the ecclesiastical state and presented himself to your Lordship to receive Sacred Orders, I think, my Lord, that neither your Lordship nor any other Bishop would feel a difficulty in ordaining him provided he were otherwise duly qualified, nor deem it necessary to apply for a dispensation on the ground of illegitimacy, bar only the common dispensation arising from having once professed or being of parents who professed heresy. The reason for so deciding would be that whatever might have been the value or defect at the marriage said to have been performed in Rome in April, 1793, yet the parties had subsequently so far renewed their union on a territory in which the decree at the Council of Trent on Marriages had not been promulgated, as to go through a second and public solemnization of their marriage in December, 1793, in the Parish of St. George's, Hanover Square, London. Nor would the fact of an Act of Parliament subsequently declaring that marriage null because celebrated without the Royal Consent prescribed as a condition for marriages of Princes of the Royal Household by the Statute of George the Third be considered by Your Lordship to extend the Canonical disabilities above alluded to to the individual presenting himself for Ordination. For whatever be the respect and obedience due to this Act and to the Law above cited, still it could not be supposed that they interfered in such a case, the more so because otherwise their application in Canonical matters would come in collision with the express declaration of the Council of Trent. This second marriage, if the first had been null, would have removed all Canonical disabilities from the children born between the one and the other.

Let us suppose in the second place, that during their life-time the parties, subsequently to the Act of Parliament, considering themselves free, had wished to proceed to other nuptials and either of them or both been inclined to marry Catholics respectively. I think no sound theologian would have been found willing to advise or sanction such a marriage, not even on the hypothesis that the Duke with the Royal Consent had wished to marry a Catholic Princess, had agreed to the Catholic education of all the children male and female, and had been in such a position as to be the presumptive heir of the Crown of Hanover, thus offering the advantage of securing a Catholic dynasty on the throne. All these considerations could never over-rule the in-

Marriage of Duke of Sussex

superable obstacle arising from the indispensability *a jure divino* once contracted and consummated.

It is true that some theologians have shown themselves willing to recognize in the Civil Power the right of putting diriment impediments to marriages. But with all their adhesion to this opinion in theory, yet they could never in practice, after a marriage had taken place, counsel parties to act accordingly without a decision from the ecclesiastical authority. In doing otherwise they would follow a dubious opinion in matters connected with the validity of Sacraments, which after the proposition condemned by Innocent XI could never be allowed.

Let us suppose in the third place that the Duke having divorced from Lady Murray, the latter returning to Italy and coming to Rome had wished to form a new match with some Catholic nobleman. In the first place she ought to have documented by certificate from constituted authorities or with affidavits upon oath that she was free and not engaged by any previous marriage. On learning all the particulars of the case, the Ordinary would have deemed it unnecessary to inquire into the merits of the Marriage said to have been performed in Rome in April, 1793, and could have sufficient reason to retain her Ladyship as incapable of entering into a new marriage, first on the presumption of renewed consent grounded on their subsequent cohabitation in a country in which clandestine marriages are not invalidated, and next on the express proof of the renewal of consent in the Public Marriage performed in London in December, 1793. The defect of the consent of parents, the violation of the Statute of George the Third, the declaration of Nullity given by Parliament would never be deemed sufficient for an Ecclesiastical Court to allow persons to marry again. The Justinian Law which required so many formalities and conditions for marriages yet made the distinction between *justae nuptiae* or *injustae*. The first were those which were made by Roman citizens and entitled the parties to all the rights and privileges of the Quiritian marriages. The second, though they did not communicate the same civil rights, yet were considered as real marriages, and the husband could act as accuser by the Law *Julia* in case of adultery. In the French legislation (I mean the one anterior to the Revolution) the Edict at Blois and its subsequent declarations did not interfere with the discipline of the Church maintaining the indissolubility of marriages, except in the case of Canonical diriment impediments, and the few cases which occurred of marriages contrary to the Royal Edict having been dissolved and others having succeeded in their place were such as involved the Canonical impediments either of Clandestinity or *Raptus*, as Sorbonian divines have shown.

Marriage of Duke of Sussex

Let us suppose in the fourth place that before they had left Rome and subsequently to the Marriage, said to have been performed in April, 1793, the Duke had separated from Lady Murray and either of them, considering that marriage not binding, had wished to make other engagements and applied to the competent ecclesiastical Court to obtain a declaration of freedom on judgment of Nullity of the same said Clandestine Marriage. Before we consider this hypothesis, I will beg leave to premise two others, the consideration of which will pave the way to a conclusion on the merit of such a question. From respect however to the parties hitherto considered, I will suppose others of much inferior rank and of less moral character to be concerned. Suppose that A and B to have married in the same way as the Duke and Lady Murray and B, the woman to have separated from A, who, after having employed in vain all fair means of persuading her to return, applied to the competent tribunal to order her to return *ad Obsequia Matrimonialia præterita*. In this case it would have to establish his rights and to prove that a Matrimony had taken place. But whence could he derive his proofs? Not from the sources pointed out by law, which are the Parochial Register and the deposition of the two witnesses. Could he bring supplementary proofs? In odious matters proofs, more than imperfect are required, and it would be difficult for a Judge to oblige B to go and live with A as long as any doubt could exist in favour of liberty.

Suppose again that A had become a Plaintiff in a Criminal Court against C, whom he accused of adultery with B his asserted wife. Here again in odious matters it would be required that A gave the clearest evidence of his having married B, for otherwise, although the Court might understand from his complaint that C had behaved immorally and might *ex officio* proceed against him, yet it could not inflict upon him the heavier punishment of adultery.

But let us turn away from such unpleasant topics and return to the former hypothesis between the Duke and Lady Murray, either of them wishing to be allowed in Rome to proceed to a new and different Marriage than the one said to have been performed in April, 1793.

The question, my Lord, would have exercised the ingenuity of the ablest advocates and of the official defender of Matrimonies, who even in cases of clandestine marriages must be heard. Many points of fact and at law would have been previously discussed. First, whether the parties were to be considered in the class *peregrinorum* or of domiciliated persons? and in the first case whether or not strangers in matters of Custom be not obliged to abide by the law at the place, in which

Marriage of Duke of Sussex

they contracted, whether the then condition of stranger and of transient visitors could plead in their favour, or whether in all cases universally it did not interest the public and consequently the residing authority to know whether parties were or were not bound to each other, especially by Link of Marriage? Whether the rights, which such a contract gives, and the obligations it imposes upon others to respect them and upon the State to defend them were not reasons of such a nature as to cause every Contract of Matrimony to interest Persons more than those that contract it? If the parties were domiciliated, whether or not they were even not obliged to conform with the Law of the Country? Whether the circumstance of the parties being Protestant excepted them from the Law after several decisions, which in former times have been given to the contrary? Whether the opinion of theologians and the decision of the Church in respect of countries, where Protestants form a Community, in which through successive generations the Council of Trent has been so obliterated as to need a new promulgation before it could be equitably enforced, could apply to Protestants leaving their Country and coming to Italy and to Rome, where the Law is in full and unrestrained vigour? Whether, notwithstanding the law, yet circumstances were such as to give ground for an *epithese* in the particular case not contemplated by the Legislature? Whether by enforcing the Law you defeated its end? etc., etc., etc.

The decision in such a case would be guided by the consideration of all the circumstances attending it, which might be found to vary from the circumstance of other cases in which different decisions have been given. In the opinion of those who maintain that the end of the Decree of the Council of Trent was to prevent polygamy by obliging parties to marry in such a way as to give proof of their marriage, then the want of evidence would not warrant the recognition of such a marriage to the effect of depriving the parties from the liberty of contracting others. The question will be whether supplementary evidence can be admitted in lieu of the proofs pointed out by the Law. I mention all these points, my Lord, to show that, however a divine or a Professor of Theology or of Canon Law may be willing to subscribe to general propositions, yet persons connected with tribunals would suspend their judgment until a particular case occurred and would grant it on the peculiar combination of the intervening circumstances, which might render applicable or inapplicable any special Law. I have known a more glaring case of Clandestinity, in which the Defender of Matrimonies endeavoured to make out an *impedimentum* against any future marriage. However it be probable he may not succeed, yet the case remains still pending, and new examinations have been ordered. I have read of another

Marriage of Duke of Sussex

case, in which much has been written by both lawyers and by divines to prove the non-existence of a marriage, in which, although the Parish Priest and witnesses had intervened, yet matters had been so arranged that industriously, as to render it morally impossible to prove the identity of the persons. One of the parties died before the decision was given, and therefore we cannot tell what would have been the result of the discussion.

It is true that no Parish Priest can read over the matrimonial service or impart the nuptial benediction to Protestants. It is true again that no Parish Priest can conscientiously give his positive concurrence in such a marriage. He might, however, in particular cases and with superior authority, to avoid greater evils, and in the same way as he may sometimes assist at a mixed marriage by a mere passive testimony to this Contract *per verba de praejectu*. The question may be in particular cases whether a Parish Priest has or has not been applied for? Whether it was or was not possible to have him? Whether parties even were not obliged to use every means possible to have him? Whether not having it, they were or were not supposed to be in a state in which the Law did not oblige them? Whether or not, although in the first instance or at least *prioritate rationis* the marriage was null and void, yet circumstances were not such as to presume a subsequent tacit consent? and is it even a *sanatio in radice* on the part of the Church and of its supreme Head?

Referring it to the competent tribunal to decide upon such a controversy, I will now suppose in the fifth place that property existed in Rome belonging to the late Duke and that is not claimed by testamentary succession. Should the brothers and sisters of the testator bring in the *querela inefficioris testamenti* on the plea that the heir was an illegitimate son, the effect would be to give them the legitimate parties' portion, leaving him the remainder. He would, however, call upon them to prove his illegitimacy, and if the question rested on the validity of the matrimony of which he was born, the Civil Court would have to suspend its judgment until the decision were given in the Ecclesiastical, before which, as we have seen, the marriage performed in London would have great weight even to the effect of allowing succession to property on the principle that *Tot haereditates quot regna*, and that the peculiar Laws of the Courts, in which property exists, must decide to whom it is to go.

In the same way, suppose in the sixth place that the Claimant applied for the property as son *ab intestato*. If legitimate, he would have the whole together with his own brothers and sisters. If illegitimate, he would have one-tenth or the twelfth part clear of the property for his *alimenta*. It would fall upon him, however, to prove his filiation legitimate or illegitimate in contradiction

Marriage of Duke of Sussex

with the brothers and sisters of the Intestate and with the F—which would succeed after ten degrees of legitimate kindred were exhausted.

I must observe, however, that if the inheritance were of such a nature as to be intransmissible out of the Royal Family, that even in the case of a Legitimate Marriage, not recognized as a Royal Marriage but only as a Marriage *ad Morganaticum*, then the heir, however he might succeed in other property, would be excluded from this. In this case for example of the Duke of Capua, although his marriage is certainly valid, and the King of Naples looks upon it as such, yet neither the wife nor the children can partake of their rights, preeminences, and distinctions which are exclusively reserved to the Royal Family.

Your Lordship will gather from these reflexions how difficult it would be to lay down a general principle, which might apply indiscriminately to all cases of Marriages between Protestants made in Rome. Then in each particular case, more or less rigorous proofs of the existence of the marriage would be required according to the greater or less danger of erring to the prejudice of others. Had I more time to myself, I would have developed a little more my reasonings and shown their grounds on the authority of the Canon and Civil Law and on the opinion of the writers considered classical in jurisprudence. Wishing from all my heart and most sincerely success to the present Claimant to the Dukedom of Sussex, I yet would be very sorry to see a precedent established in favour of English Protestant Marriages in Rome. Hitherto the English willing to marry have gone either to Naples or Florence, where they have Embassies. I will not admit as an exception to the Canon Law the Extra-territorial Law claimed by Embassies. This holds for all civil purposes and originates from an understanding between Nation and Nation. But in the Ecclesiastical decision of jurisdiction such understandings have not existed, and the Ambassador's house is a part of the Diocese or Parish, in which it is situated. Much less can an extra territorial right escape from the jurisdiction of the Council of Trent in places where it has once been published, and from the supreme authority of the Common Father of all Faithful. In saying this I will not conclude that all and every one of the Marriages performed by English Protestants in Italy are null and void. They may have been convalidated subsequently, where the Council of Trent has not been promulgated. They may have been tacitly confirmed and radically sanated by the Church.

Thus far have I endeavoured to comply with your Lordship's desires, and while I beg leave to assure you that I am always willing to do so, yet I feel how little I have been able to serve you on the present occasion and to satisfy to their full extent each and

Marriage of Duke of Sussex

every one of the queries you did me the honour of addressing me. With my best regards I beg leave, my Lord, to remain yours very faithfully in Jesus Christ.

C. CARD. ACTON.

The marriage of the Duke of Sussex has long passed into dusty *causes célèbres* of history. The interest of publishing Cardinal Acton's opinion is that it fills the gap left by the missing opinion given by the Holy See on Mrs. Fitzherbert's marriage. Mrs. Fitzherbert felt that hers was parallel and similar. Certainly what applied to Lady Augusta Murray applied to her. No copy of the Pope's opinion validating her union with George IV is known to survive. But we may be certain that it was considered with the same scrupulous care which allows favour neither to peasant nor to prince.

SHANE LESLIE.

THE SYNOPTIC QUESTION IN RECENT CATHOLIC SCHOLARSHIP

IT has come to be accepted by non-Catholic writers as an assured finding of criticism that St. Mark's Gospel is the oldest of the Synoptic Gospels, and that our canonical Mark (or, possibly, an earlier Mark—a proto-Mark), together with a source known as Q, which consisted mainly of a collection of discourses of Our Lord, supplied practically the entire material of the Gospels of Saints Matthew and Luke. This view is based on the fact that Matthew and Luke contain nearly everything that is in Mark, and largely reproduce the order of Mark's narrative, and on the additional fact that Matthew and Luke have in common a considerable body of discourse-material which is not to be found in Mark. This discourse-material, though it is differently arranged in Matthew and Luke, is regarded as derived from a definite source called Q (*Quelle* = "source"). Since the Gospels of Matthew and Luke are thus derived substantially from Mark and Q, the theory of Synoptic origins in question is popularly known as the "Two-Source Theory." There are, of course, many forms of this theory. Critics are not agreed as to the inter-relations of Mark and Q, nor as to the exact contents of Q, nor as to the grounds of the difference between Matthew's and Luke's treatment of Q. Neither are they at one as to Luke's relation towards Matthew. Again, many critics are inclined to regard Q as identical with the *Logia*, or Oracles, of the Lord, the composition of which in Hebrew (or Aramaic) is ascribed to Matthew by Papias of Hierapolis; others are unwilling to accept this identification.* But, in spite of differences in points of detail, the great majority of non-Catholic writers

* For a good summary of the critical literature dealing with Q and the Synoptic Question generally, see Jacquier, *Études de critique et de philologie du Nouveau Testament*. Paris, 1920.

The Synoptic Question

accept the Two-Source Theory as firmly established. Since, however, it is obvious from a glance at a *Synopsis* that neither Matthew nor Luke can be resolved wholly into Mark + Q, the critics are compelled to admit the existence of special Matthean and special Lukan sources—in regard to which there is also much dispute—so that Two-Source Theory is merely a conventional designation of the most widely accepted view on the inter-relations of the Synoptic Gospels, and there are indications that we may hear much in the near future of a “Three-Source Theory.”*

In view of the very general acceptance of the Two-Source Theory, and the assured confidence of the critics who uphold it, an attempt is here made to indicate, at least in outline, how some of the more prominent Catholic scholars of recent date have faced the critical problems out of which the Two-Source Theory has arisen.

The striking resemblances and the no less striking differences of the first three Gospels have occupied Catholic writers, more or less, since the time of St. Augustine. Until recently it was customary in Catholic circles to account for the agreements and differences of the Synoptics by a theory of their common dependance on the crystallized teaching, or Catechesis, of the early Apostles, and a certain amount of literary dependance of later on earlier Evangelists—that is to say, by a combination of the two Theories known as “Tradition” and “Literary Dependence.” When, however, the Two-Source Theory became popular some Catholic writers† were inclined to accept it in a modified form—mainly on the ground that it explained better than the theories hitherto advanced by Catholics the existence in the Synoptics of extraordinary verbal agreements in

* Cf. Procksch, *Petrus und Johannes bei Markus und Matthäus*. Gütersloh, 1920.

† So, for instance, Batiffol (in his *Six leçons sur les Évangiles*, Paris, 1907, and his *Orpheus et l'Évangile*, Paris, 1910), Camerlynck and Coppieters (in their *Evangeliorum secundum Matthæum Marcum et Lucam Synopsis*, 2nd Ed., Bruges, 1908), and Mangenot (in his *Les Évangiles Synoptiques*, Paris, 1911). But none of those writers, nor other Catholics of kindred spirit (such as Maier [*Bonn New Testament*, Berlin, 1912] and Sickenger [Article in the *Biblische Zeitschrift*, 1911, and *Einleitung*, Freiburg, 1916]), favoured an undiluted form of the Two-Source Theory.

The Synoptic Question

contexts in which the first three Gospels otherwise differed considerably from each other. It was felt, that is, that verbal agreement in the midst of difference could only be explained by a tradition already committed to writing before the Synoptics were composed. The phenomenon in question could not be explained by a simple theory of oral Apostolic Catechesis, nor by a theory of dependance of later on earlier Gospels, nor by a combination of these theories. Thus a certain tendency towards the Two-Source Theory began to show itself in Catholic works.

The publication, however, in June, 1911, and June, 1912, of a number of decisions of the Biblical Commission, insisting on the truth of the ancient tradition that Matthew's Gospel was composed before the other two Synoptics, and formally rejecting the Two-Source Theory, led Catholic scholars to reflect more carefully and critically on the popular non-Catholic theory. Their further reflection made clear certain serious weaknesses in that view, and of late in the Catholic schools there has been, in general, a steady movement away from the Two-Source Theory. But not such a movement as would in any way tend to ignore the issues raised by that theory, or the points which it had definitely established. It has come to be realized that the inter-relations of Matthew and Mark need fresh investigation, and the hypothesis of a Source Q has led to close examination by Catholic scholars of the literary relations of Matthew and Luke in regard to the discourse-material which they have in common. Catholic scholars now freely admit, moreover, that the needs of the Synoptic Problem cannot be met by textual criticism merely. Literary criticism, with a view to the study of the origin of the Gospel-form of narrative, is no less important than textual criticism. It is not enough, that is, to show how the text of any Gospel may be dependent on the text, or texts, of other Gospels: the literary structure of each Gospel must be itself closely examined so that light may eventually be thrown on the genesis of the primitive Gospel-form. In these new developments of Synoptic study among Catholics the decisions of the Biblical Com-

The Synoptic Question

mission have greatly helped by clearing the air, and preventing a misdirection of energy.

In its replies, given to a number of queries in June, 1911,* the Biblical Commission decided that the First Gospel was written in the vernacular of the Palestinian Jews by the Apostle Matthew, that it was written before Mark and Luke, that Matthew was not the author of a mere collection of *Logia*, afterwards incorporated by an anonymous editor in the First Gospel, that our canonical Greek Matthew is "identical in substance" with the primitive Semitic Matthew, etc. In June, 1912, the Commission, dealing with the origin and historicity of Mark and Luke, reiterated the traditional teaching that Mark, the *discipulus et interpres Petri*, was the author of the Second Gospel, and that Mark's Gospel was written subsequently to that of Matthew, but before the Third Gospel. The Commission, however, definitely stated that ancient tradition in no way opposes the opinion *quae asserit Evangelium secundum et tertium ante graecam primi Evangelii versionem esse compositum*. In view of its general teaching on the origin and inter-relations of the Synoptic Gospels the Commission goes on to declare that its decisions are not respected by those *qui nullo fulti traditionis testimonio nec historico argumento, facile amplectuntur hypothesim vulgo duorum fontium nuncupatam*,† and that this so-called Two-Source Theory may not be taught. The Commission, however, explains that, apart from the matters which it has decided in its replies, scholars are at perfect liberty to discuss the Synoptic Question in the fullest detail, and *ad hypotheses traditionis sive scriptae sive oralis vel etiam dependentiae unius a praecedenti seu a praecedentibus appellare*.

* The reader will find the replies of the Biblical Commission regarding the composition and inter-relations of the Gospels in an English version in Father Pope's excellent manual, *The Catholic Student's "Aids" to the Bible*.

† Lagrange raises the question (*S. Matthieu*, Introd.) whether stress is to be put on *facile*, and whether the Commission would be more favourable towards writers who would endeavour to base the Two-Source Theory on tradition or history or who would treat the *Logia* of the Two-Source Theory as a work containing historical narrative—that is, as a sort of Gospel.

The Synoptic Question

These decisions of the Biblical Commission had the immediate effect of damping the enthusiasm which some Catholic writers had manifested for the Two-Source Theory. Even after the publication of the replies of the Commission, however, there was still a tendency in certain Catholic quarters to make use of the Two-Source Theory as the basis of an *argumentum ad hominem* in Apologetics. Some theologians were ready, that is, to accept the premises of the Two-Source critics in order to argue against the Christological views of the advanced Liberal school.* But, in general, since 1912 Catholic scholars have treated the Two-Source Theory in a sharply critical fashion, and, though current Catholic exegesis of the Synoptics might appear at a first glance to accept many assumptions of the Two-Source Theory, a closer examination will show that all the best recent Catholic work on the Synoptic Gospels is quite in harmony with the teaching of the Biblical Commission.

The most extensive and detailed contribution of Catholic scholarship to the discussion of the Synoptic Problem in recent years is that contained in the monumental commentaries of Père Lagrange on the three Synoptic Gospels. In his Introductions to these Commentaries—especially in the Introductions to Matthew and Luke—Lagrange has studied in detail every aspect of the Synoptic Problem. The possibilities and the tendencies of Catholic work in this department can be well ascertained from a study of Lagrange's results. We shall try to indicate here as briefly and as simply as possible his attitude towards the Two-Source Theory.

It is obvious that the Two-Source Theory, as above outlined, implies (among other things)—

1. That there existed prior to the composition of our First and Third Gospels a work containing a collection of Oracles, or Discourses of Our Lord written either in Semitic† or Greek, which may, or may not, have included a

* Cf. Tillmann, *Die Quellen des Lebens Jesu* (in Esser und Mausbach, *Religion, Christentum, Kirche*, Kempten and Munich, 1913).

† It seems better to speak of a "Semitic" rather than of a "Hebrew" or an "Aramaic" Matthew. There are still scholars who maintain that

The Synoptic Question

small amount of narrative, providing a setting to the Discourses;

2. That the canonical Gospels of Matthew and Luke are, in the main, derived from this hypothetical collection of Oracles and the Second Gospel (or its prototype). Now, if it can be shown that there are no real grounds for admitting the existence of an ancient pre-Gospel collection of Oracles (Q), or that Matthew's Gospel is substantially independent of Mark, the Two-Source Theory falls to the ground. The same result follows if it can be proved that Matthew's Gospel, in a Semitic form, is older than Mark, or that the discourse-material in Luke could have been derived from Matthew. Thus it comes about that the most vital questions of Synoptic Criticism nowadays concern: (a) the inter-relations of Matthew and Mark, and (b) the inter-relations of Matthew and Luke. The relations of Luke and Mark are of secondary importance in view of the Two-Source Theory.*

The hypothesis of a document Q, containing a collection of Our Lord's Discourses, as underlying Matthew and Luke, is rejected *a priori* by Lagrange. How could a document of such importance, as to be incorporated in the earliest records of Our Lord's life, have so utterly disappeared that the ancient Church never heard of it? That Papias had in view such a collection of Our Lord's Oracles, rather than the complete Gospel of Matthew in its primitive Semitic form, is an assumption which is directly opposed to the explicit teaching of Irenæus and Eusebius, and to the authority of early tradition generally.† Moreover, it is an assumption which is being gradually abandoned by Liberal criticism itself. Again, though the existence of Q would certainly help to explain several phenomena of the Synoptics, scarcely any two critics agree

the primitive Gospel of Matthew was written in Hebrew. In the *Revue Biblique* of the present year a series of articles by P. Vanutelli has been published in favour of a Hebrew primitive Gospel.

* Lagrange and most Catholic writers are satisfied that Luke made extensive use of the Gospel of Mark, and very carefully followed, for the most part, the order of Mark's narrative.

† Lagrange, *Introductions, S. Matthieu, S. Luc.*

The Synoptic Question

in reconstructing that hypothetical document. Some critics (like Harnack, etc.) reconstruct Q on the basis of Matthew; others (like Hawkins, Stanton, etc.) regard Luke as more faithful than Matthew in the reproduction of Q. In fact, however, each critic works with his own Q, and the practical application of the Two-Source Theory in detail seems to postulate a fluid and indeterminate Q. Critical uncertainty as to the extent of Q is complicated by the further difficulty of the relations between Q and Mark. It is now widely admitted that, to account for certain Mattheo-Lukan agreements against Mark in narrative sections, Q must have contained a fairly considerable narrative element as well as Oracles—that it was, in fact, a sort of miniature Gospel from which Mark himself may have derived material. Thus, on the one hand, the hypothesis of Q raises a number of new problems, and, on the other, that hypothesis, when carefully worked out, seems to sublate itself by leading to a theory of a Q which is more than Q—a Q which may, indeed, be as extensive as the Semitic Matthew of Catholic tradition. Thus the hypothesis of the Q document is discredited by the absence of all historical evidence in its favour, and by the difficulty of applying it in detail. It is discredited also, as Lagrange points out, by the non-existence of any Jewish composition that might be regarded as serving as its literary prototype, or parallel.

Intimately connected with the question of Q is that of the relations between Luke and Matthew. If Luke had at his disposal our canonical Matthew we could at once account for the presence in his Gospel of much Matthean material, and for Mattheo-Lukan agreements in his text against Mark. It is admitted, however, by Lagrange (and by other Catholic writers) that, though a theory of the dependance of Luke on Matthew would be, in general, convenient, and would make Q wholly superfluous, it is not quite satisfactory. If Luke had access to our Matthew in its complete form we should find it difficult to explain (in view of Luke i 1-4) why he did not utilize Matthew's Gospel of the Infancy, and omitted definite reference in

The Synoptic Question

his Prologue to his use of a Gospel written by an Apostle. Again, if Luke knew our Matthew, how are we to explain the differences between the Lukan and Matthean narratives of the Gerasene demoniacs (Matt. viii 28-34; Luke viii 26-39), or of the cure of the blind men at Jericho (Matt. xx 29-34; Luke xviii 35-43)?* Further, if Luke knew and used our Matthew it would not be easy to explain why Luke, in the order of his narrative, mostly agrees with Mark as against Matthew. When every aspect of the situation has been taken into account, we are forced to hold, according to Lagrange, that Luke had not access to our canonical Greek Matthew, but only to a collection of extracts in a Greek version from St. Matthew's Gospel.† This collection comprised the discourses of Our Lord which are contained in Matthew, and presented them, for the most part, in the Matthean order. Thus instead of Q we get a theory of a fragmentary Matthew in Greek. That such a fragmentary Greek Matthew existed is a possible deduction from Papias' remark that Matthew wrote the Oracles of the Lord in Hebrew, and each one translated them as best he could.‡ This theory implies, then, that in the Mattheo-Lukan sections Luke depends on Matthew, and Lagrange has endeavoured to prove in detail throughout his commentaries that Luke's treatment of the discourse-material can be fully explained on this hypothesis.

If it is held, as Lagrange holds, that the differences between Matthew and Luke are so considerable as to exclude the hypothesis that Luke used Matthew's Gospel as a whole, this theory of a fragmentary Greek Matthew is more satisfactory than a theory of merely oral Catechesis to account for the close agreement of Matthew and Luke

* Cf. *S. Luc*, Introd. See, however, an acute analysis of Luke i 1-4 by Hartl in the *Biblische Zeitschrift*, 1915, which seeks to prove dependance of Luke on Matthew in the Gospel of the Infancy, and elsewhere.

† *S. Luc*, Introd.: Et si l'on veut tenir compte de tous les aspects de la situation, le mieux, est peut-être de supposer que Luc n'a pas eu sous les yeux notre Matthieu canonique, mais qu'il en a connu au moins des extraits en grec comprenant les discours dans leur ordre actuel et tels qu'ils sont, sauf quelques retouches dans le texte de Matthieu.

‡ Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.*

The Synoptic Question

in their non-Markan material. The view that fragmentary Greek versions of Matthew's Semitic Gospel were made by a number of individuals would, perhaps, help to explain the remarkable differences between Matthew and Luke in the discourse-material (for instance, in the case of the Beatitudes, the Sermon on the Mount, the discourses against the Scribes and Pharisees, etc.). It might be held, too, that variety in form had arisen in such fragmentary versions of Matthew, not merely through diversity of translators, but owing to influences of environment and the necessities of early Apostolic missionary work. It would, of course, be argued—and it has been acutely argued*—that the differences between Matthew and Luke in the so-called Q material are perfectly reconcilable with the view that Luke had access to our canonical Matthew itself. Lagrange, however, and other recent Catholic writers, such as Camerlynck, Vogels, etc., reject this possibility.

The question of the inter-relations of Matthew and Mark remains to be discussed. In the Two-Source Theory Mark, in its present form, or in a slightly different form, underlies both Matthew and Luke. It is true that Matthew and Luke substantially reproduce—Matthew much less faithfully, Luke more so—the order of narrative of Mark, and the Liberal critics maintain that in the Markan material of Matthew our Greek Matthew is distinctly secondary as compared with Mark.

Yet, on the other hand, if Matthew used Mark as a source he could scarcely have differed from him, as he does, in so many important points. Matthew shows, it is true, considerable traces of Markan influence in vocabulary, and the Matthean order of pericopes may be, to some extent—but certainly not nearly so much as the modern critics maintain—under the influence of the Markan narrative, but the two Gospels differ very greatly in their

* For instance, by the non-Catholic critic Lummis in his essay, *How Luke was Written*, Cambridge, 1915. Cladder, *Unsere Evangelien* (Freiburg, 1919), endeavours also to prove in detail that Luke is dependent on Matthew to a great extent in the selection of his material and the arrangement of his narrative.

The Synoptic Question

methods of presenting the facts of Our Lord's life and work. If then such agreement as exists between Matthew and Mark in the order of their respective narratives can be explained apart from the dependance of either on the other, or if that agreement (as well as other points of agreement) can be traced to an indirect connection of the two Gospels, there will be no necessity to invoke here the aid of the Two-Source Theory. Critics have often argued that Mark's Gospel, as more expressly historical in scope, must, in the nature of things, be more primitive than the First Gospel which is topical, or systematic, rather than historical. This argument, however, as Lagrange points out, proves too much—for if the priority of historical to systematic treatment were to be accepted as a principle, we might have to regard John's Gospel as older than Matthew's. The admitted existence in our Matthew of "doublets"—i.e., apparently double accounts of the same incident, or saying, has often been used as a reason for deriving Matthew from Mark and Q; but Lagrange explains that such "doublets" may be due to the circumstance that the author of the Semitic Matthew, before composing his Gospel, had noted down for himself in writing many incidents of Our Lord's life, and many of Our Lord's sayings. When, then, he came to compose his Gospel he made free use of such notes, and, under the influence of what he had already written, sometimes described two distinct events in an-already-half-stereotyped similarity of phrase.* Thus Lagrange disposes, one after another, of the chief arguments proposed in favour of Mark's priority to Matthew.

Though it is not possible to show that Matthew's Gospel, as a Gospel, is secondary, or dependent, in regard to Mark, it has to be admitted that the language of our canonical Matthew has been influenced by that of Mark, and it is, moreover, likely that certain narrative features of Matthew show the influence of the Second Gospel. But how is this possible if Matthew's Gospel is older than Mark's? If Matthew's Gospel were an original Greek

* *S. Matthieu*, Introd.

The Synoptic Question

composition we should be compelled, Lagrange thinks, to admit that it was written subsequently to the Second Gospel. But the ancient and constant tradition of the Church speaks of Matthew's Gospel as primitively a Semitic Gospel—that is, as having been composed in Aramaic or Hebrew. Our canonical Matthew is, therefore, a translation, and it is natural to suppose that the Greek translator of Matthew would have sought the assistance of Mark's Greek Gospel in his task of translation. It is also possible—though, perhaps, not so likely—that the translator sought help from the Greek Gospel of Luke. Since according to Catholic tradition the Semitic Matthew was reproduced substantially in the Greek Matthew, Catholic scholars have been mostly wont to limit the influence of Mark on our canonical Matthew chiefly to language. Lagrange, however, and other recent writers (Camerlynck, etc.) maintain that Mark's influence on the Greek Matthew is wider than the sphere of language. The original Semitic Matthew (called by Lagrange Ma) is identical, these Catholic scholars hold, with the Greek Matthew (=Lagrange's Mt) in its "vertebration" and "substance,"* but the translator of Ma may have occasionally borrowed from Mk certain characteristic details of the latter's narrative. Camerlynck is prepared to hold that the "substantial identity" of Ma with Mt does not exclude the possibility that the translator of Ma used Mark *qua verum fontem, ex eo desumendo quaedam tantum vel breviora vel minoris momenti ad Matthaeum aramaicum complendum quidem, ast non substantialiter immutandum.*† Sickenberger, in his Manual of Introduction,‡ holds that substantial identity of Ma and Mt is compatible with the fact that the translator of Ma, besides giving a free rendering of the original, inserted on his own account explanations of Hebrew names, accommodated Old Testament quotations in Matthew to the Septuagint text, and

* Lagrange, *S. Matthieu*, Introd. The Septuagint, Lagrange points out, is "still in substance the inspired Bible, though it contains certain lengthy narratives which are not found in the official Latin Vulgate."

† Camerlynck, *Synopsis*, 1921.

‡ *Kurzfassende Einleitung in das Neue Testament*, Freiburg, 1920.

The Synoptic Question

made other similar additions to the Semitic Gospel. Neither would "substantial identity" be excluded, according to Sickenberger, if we admitted that the translator "*noch grössere Perikopen eingefügt und Umordnungen des Stoffes vollzogen hat.*" Theories like these would make it free to the translator to insert fairly large borrowings from Mark in Mt. It may be expected that further investigation of the Synoptic Problem by Catholic writers will be seriously concerned with the determination of the exact amount of Markan influence on Mt that is compatible with the "substantial identity" of Ma and Mt. The most recently published Catholic Manual of Introduction to the New Testament speaks of the theory which makes Mark to depend on the Aramaic Matthew, and the translator of our Matt to depend on Mk, as "thoroughly precarious."* In the view above outlined, however, a dependance of Mark on the Semitic Matthew is not advanced, so that part of Vogel's stricture does not apply to Lagrange's work. Lagrange and other Catholic writers accept the old tradition which regards Mark as the reporter of Peter. In Mark's Gospel we have substantially the Catechesis of St. Peter, and if Matthew agrees fairly closely in his Gospel with the general order of Mark, and, therefore, with the general order of the Petrine Catechesis (as reproduced by Mark), may not the explanation of this phenomenon be the predominance in the early Church of the Apostle Peter?†

Lagrange is more interested in the inter-relations of the Gospels than he is in the genesis of the Gospels as a form of literature. Taking St. Matthew's Semitic Gospel as the earliest Gospel, how are we to explain its origin? The question does not concern the motive or scope of the

* Vogels, *Grundriss der Einleitung in das Neue Testament*, Muenster, 1925. Vogels seems to incline rather remarkably towards the Two-Source Theory without, however, making a profession of faith in it. Vogels seems to mean that the Synoptic Problem can be discussed most successfully by keeping in view the points which the Two-Source Theory has raised. He apparently rejects the existence of Q and accepts the old tradition that Matthew is the oldest Evangelist—*ein Zeugniß*, he says, *das wir nicht deshalb beseitigen dürfen, weil es uns unbequem ist.*

† Cf. Lagrange, *S. Matthieu*, Introd.

The Synoptic Question

author so much as the methods of his composition, the grouping of his narrative, the special reasons for selecting the material to be incorporated, etc. The same question arises, of course, in regard to the Gospels of Mark and Luke, but each later Gospel would tend naturally to be affected in its composition by those already published. The study of the Synoptic Gospels from the standpoint of literary form has made considerable headway among non-Catholic critics. On the Catholic side Soiron has pursued it with great success,* pointing out the links of language, association, numbers, etc., which bind together the actual contents of each Gospel. His aim, that is, is to discover the laws which govern the composition of the Gospels. This kind of inquiry evokes a tendency to regard each Gospel as a literary unity in which the author's purpose and literary method can be discerned clearly throughout. Looked at from this point of view, the Synoptic Gospels cannot be regarded as arising from the quasi-mechanical juxtaposition of sources such as "Mark" and "Q." They are unit literary products—not mere compilations of pre-existing documents. The development of this method of literary study of the Gospels among the liberal critics may be expected to have an unfavourable influence on the Two-Source Theory. It must lead to a very intense study of primitive Christian missionary work, and of the world in which it was carried out. Catholic teaching has nothing to fear, but much to hope, from the thorough investigation of Christian beginnings; and this new method of Gospel-study will probably give a fresh impetus to that movement against the radicalism of Liberal criticism which has been, for some time, noticeable even among non-Catholic writers.

P. BOYLAN.

* Cf. Soiron, *Die Logia Jesu*, Muenster, 1916, and *Das Evangelium als Lebensform des Menschen* (in the series, *Der katholische Gedanke*), Munich, 1925. Cladder in his very stimulating work *Unsere Evangelien* (Freiburg, 1919) has dealt also with the laws of Gospel-composition that can be discovered by comparison of the Gospels with Jewish works.

CROCE'S THEORY OF ART

IN Benedetto Croce's chief work, the *Filosofia dello Spirito*, three volumes are devoted to Æsthetics, Logic, and the Practical. A fourth, *Teoria e Storia della Storiografia*, was added later to complete his philosophy. The volume on æsthetics, the *Estetica*, is intended to be an exposition of the ultimate and essential nature of art. A philosophy of art, as of anything else, must be based on some sort of experience, and, as far as one can judge, the art experience on which Croce works is limited almost entirely to literature. There is no more dangerous ground to build a theory of art upon than that; for it is so replete with other values than the purely artistic, that it is very difficult not to be led astray. The references to painting in the *Estetica* are meagre; and there is hardly even a casual reference to acting or to dancing. As far as one can judge from another of his works on art, the *Nuovi Saggi di Estetica*, the whole modern movement of painting, one of the greatest epochs in its history, has passed him by without arousing any real appreciation—much less any enthusiasm. As, however, Croce would say, and rightly say, that it is not the business of philosophy to descend to particular forms of art, let us emphasize that it is only an impression we are left with—viz., that his æsthetic is conceived in terms of literature, and that, therefore, the art experience on which it is founded is limited. In this paper an exposition of his theory, and, where necessary, a criticism will be attempted which is conceived in terms chiefly of the plastic arts, and in particular based upon the study, theoretical and practical, of painting.

Croce is entirely right in holding that a theory of art is, in the last resort, determined by a man's philosophy. It is even true to say that a *critical* judgement of any individual work of art must depend for its value and truth upon the philosophy of æsthetics that lies behind it. We cannot quarrel, then, with him because his æsthetic is closely bound

Croce's Theory of Art

up with his philosophy, but it makes it very difficult to discuss the *Estetica*. His general philosophy is so unacceptable that there seems to be no common ground to start from. He is insistent that the parts of the *Filosofia* hang together as a whole, and that you cannot isolate any one of them. He is, moreover, an idealist and does not believe in an external material world. It is useless, however, to begin by discussing that; for his idealism is based, in part at least, on his *Estetica*. The *Estetica* being the first volume of the *Filosofia*, you must begin with it; but it does not get its justification till you have his idealist system completed in the other volumes. Obviously he has occupied a position of strong natural defence. So far as possible we must for the present confine the discussion to æsthetics.

His theory of art is sometimes called expressionism; it should be called exaggerated expressionism. For there are many who would hold that expression is the essential thing about art, but would refuse to follow him in the absurd lengths to which he goes.

The most general conclusion of the *Estetica* is that art is identical with *representation*. Art is not confined to a certain class of representations, but covers the whole field. Every representation in the mind of man is *by its nature* a work of art. In order to understand this aright we must bear in mind two things. In the first place, representation as he uses it has nothing to do with mirroring the external world; his theory is as far removed from the "imitation theory of art" as it can be. Representation means for him consciousness of the individual and particular, and it may be better expressed by the word "intuition," which he uses as its equivalent. In the second place, we must bear well in mind that a work of art is art just in as much as it is a representation or intuition. It might happen that every representation was a work of art because of some one or other element which it had to contain as a condition of its existence. In that case every representation would be a work of art; but the two concepts "art" and "representation" would not be identical. In Croce's view they are

Croce's Theory of Art

identical. An intuition or representation is a work of art just in so far as it is a representation or intuition. There are not two elements in the representation, whereby it is first representation and then a work of art. The two are simply *identical*. Let us add further that "expression" is in exactly the same way identified with all these, and we have the essential of his theory of art before us.

The problems which this statement of the *Estetica* raises may be enumerated thus: *Firstly*, what does the word "representation" embrace, *i.e.*, how much of the field of human cognition does it cover? *Secondly*, why should not art be the name for a certain class of representations or intuitions? *Thirdly*, what does *expression* mean, and why does he identify it with art and with representation? *Fourthly*, even though art, expression and representation cover the same field of cognition, are they identical in the sense he maintains, or are they different aspects and contributive elements of one and the same reality? *Fifthly*, do they *de facto* cover the same field of cognition?

In most of these questions we shall find ourselves differing from Croce. But that does not mean to say that we ought not to recognize the great value of his work in constructing a true philosophy of art. When we get to the heart of his æsthetic it will, I believe, be found that he has added a piece to the jigsaw of human knowledge that has long been wanted.

1. The first of the questions is, *What does Croce mean by representation and how much does it cover of the field of human cognition?* Representation is distinguished by Croce from conceptual thought. The concept is abstract and universal; the representation is concrete and particular. By this Croce does not mean that a conceptual thought is independent of representation. The conceptual activity functions in and through representation. Though concept is dependent on representation, representation is not dependent on concept. So much is clear, and it gives us an intelligible and definite delimitation of representation on one of its sides, *i.e.*, where it borders on the logical activity. It remains only to find out whether it covers all the rest of

Croce's Theory of Art

the field of conscious life. Does it cover all that we ordinarily speak of as *sensation*?

We can answer without hesitation that it is intended to cover all those sensations which come to our full conscious possession. Such a view is not unreasonable. There are other sensations which are not really possessed by us—at least, with full daylight consciousness. Of them we shall speak later. But before passing on to them we may mention certain psychological facts which might bear out Croce's view—viz., that you only come to the full possession of consciousness, of the fleeting rudimentary sensations, by expressing them in an imaginative representation.

A very few examples will be enough to show what is meant. A clock strikes while we are busy with some occupation or talking. If someone asks us half a minute afterwards whether it has struck, we should answer without hesitation that it had. A moment later and we might say that we were not quite sure but *thought* that it had struck. Later still we should say with confidence, and in a way with truth, that we *had not heard* it strike. The sensation passed through consciousness, and even left for a moment after its disappearance a trace of its existence.

Perhaps a still more striking example, because one that is always with us, is the sense of touch. Whether we sit or stand, there is always pressure upon some parts of the body, and that pressure we can, when we want to, locate quite definitely and express in words. We can feel it, and know that it is actually present as conscious sensation, the moment we give attention to it. Yet we may sit for half an hour and never be really conscious that our legs are crossed, that the hand is resting on the arm of a chair, and so forth. Ask a person just after he has moved where one of his limbs was and what it was touching, and he may be able to tell you. A little later you may tell him he was touching something, and he will say that he was quite unconscious of the fact. We can see more clearly that these sensations, which pass away leaving no trace behind them, were really conscious, if we take an instance where action follows on the sensation and yet all trace even of

Croce's Theory of Art

the action passes away in a moment. This is so with a transient irritation which we rub or with the feel of the page of a book which we turn.

It would be wrong to describe any of these phenomena as "unsensated sensation." Such phrases may tickle the fancy of experimental psychologists and others who have a love of the bizarre and out-of-the-way; but they serve no useful purpose. Let us rather call them "unexpressed" sensations. They come into consciousness and pass out, leaving a wake behind them which soon subsides and no trace is left. You can only preserve the fact of the passing of the ship by a photograph. So it is with consciousness, the focus of attention must be directed to the sensation if it is to be preserved. Only by so doing can you fix it in the memory for any length of time. The focus of attention means the imaginative representation wherein we give conscious expression to sensation. Even the schoolmen would admit that the imaginative representation is an *expression* of sensation. The conclusion is that all fully possessed consciousness is representation and also expression, but, as we shall see, expression means far more than this as Croce uses the word.

This conclusion is the starting point of the *Filosofia dello Spirito*. Croce does not treat the matter as has been done here. He identifies representation and the full possession of consciousness as though it were a fact obvious to any reflection. However, based upon the psychological reasoning indicated above, it certainly appears—if not a very original or startling discovery—a more accurate description of conscious life than the old focus and fringe description of the psychologists.

Thus we can all safely accept the identification of expression and full consciousness—but it must be observed that there is a stress upon the word *full*. Our acceptance is conditioned by that stress. Full or daylight consciousness only comes with representation, but prior to that there was a rudimentary real consciousness. It is one of the chief obscurities in reading Croce's *Estetica* whether we ought to consider that he also lays an equal stress upon

Croce's Theory of Art

the word "full." As you read through the *Estetica* you are at first inclined to think that he does. There are at least two passages which lend colour to such an interpretation.

In Chapter VI we read, "*Una scelta tra sensazioni o impressioni suppone che queste siano già espressioni; altrimenti come scegliere nel continuo e nell' indistinto?*" These last words certainly look as though we were to understand that before expression came there existed for us a vague rudimentary form of consciousness. Or in Chapter XVI: "*L'individuo cerca l'espressione di un' impressione che sente o presente, ma che none ha ancora espressa.*" Can an impression which is felt but not yet expressed mean anything except a conscious sensation? Still more important is a passage in the *Logica*. Recalling the various grades of conscious life, he writes: "*La oscura sensibilità, diventata già chiara intuizione (i.e., expression) e fattasi poi pensiero dell' universale, viene, nel giudizio individuale, logicamente pensata. . .*" There seems no point in calling it an "obscure sensibility" if it is not a form of consciousness. Finally Croce certainly holds that we make use of previous states of consciousness in the production of later ones. Any given representation is a synthesis of some previous ones in conjunction with the feelings and sentiments which they produced. One might be tempted to conclude from this that because these later representations batten upon previous states of consciousness, therefore the original expression drew its sustenance from conscious states.

This is the conviction that arises if we read only the first volume, the *Estetica*. But a complete study of his philosophy brings just the opposite conviction. There is no such thing as an original emotion in the sense of a conscious state. Sensation, pure and simple—i.e., unexpressed sensation, is only a mode or state of the practical, non-theoretic, non-conscious side of the human spirit. It comes to consciousness through expression and is at once representation and a work of art. This is the interpretation adopted by E. F. Carritt in *The Theory of*

Croce's Theory of Art

Beauty, and, as far as it goes, it is true. It almost looks as though Croce were practising a deliberate deception upon us when he speaks of *oscura sensibilità*.

The two views may, however, be reconciled if we suppose that there never was a first sensation. The *oscura sensibilità*, as an isolated reality, is only an abstraction, a mental fiction. There have always been representations or expressions; and these representations have produced the affective states of the will, which have given rise to new expressions and representations. This is the eternal see-saw of the spirit. The representation and in general the whole theoretic side of the spirit is continuously begetting the practical. The practical in its turn is continually begetting the theoretic. Croce is just as insistent that you could not have any state of the will unless it was the outcome of consciousness.

He glories in this circular movement of his philosophy in which A begets B and B begets A. Most people would be inclined to call it viciously circular. To the old problem, Which came first, the hen or the egg? there are four possible answers. The stupidest of them all is "Both." Croce's answer to the problem of the universe is exactly parallel to it. I could understand anyone saying of Hegel's philosophy that its parts are mutually dependent and constitute one necessary whole; but there is a world of difference between this and Croce's real evolutionary theory. In the *Filosofia* the theoretic side of spirit actually and actively begets the practical, while the practical no less actively and actually begets the theoretic—just as the hen produces the egg and the egg produces the hen. It seems more useless than a cheap return ticket, where both parts have to be used simultaneously by the one holder.

2. Coming to the second point raised for discussion, *Why should not art be the name for a certain class of representations?* Croce's argument is that all representations proceed from the same activity; all are expressions of the practical side of the human spirit. Therefore all are fundamentally of the same nature. We can, of course, divide them up and speak of poetic representations, musical ones

Croce's Theory of Art

and pictorial ones; or we can divide them into tragic and comic, classic and romantic, and so forth. But all divisions of this sort are arbitrary and have nothing to do with the nature of the human activity. They are no more valuable than divisions of pictures into those which are square and those which are circular, or of men into those with brown eyes and those with blue. Such divisions do not touch the nature of the reality. They give you not *real concepts*, but *pseudo-concepts*. The doctrine of the pseudo-concept is an important part of the *Logica* and would take long to discuss. Without consenting to the errors it contains, we may accept it as true in this case. For if art is a special form of human activity we can only arrive at a proper conception of it by considering the activity in its source. Unless we can show that the principle which produces works of art, the source from which they spring, is different from that of representation, we have not got to a concept of art which really differs from the concept of representation. To recognize the common source of art and ordinary representation is equivalent to saying either that they are essentially the same activity and of the same nature, or that art is not to be defined as an activity and faculty of man but as an independent object. So it is with the other conscious activities of man. If vision is a special form of activity, then you cannot divide it up according to the objects of sight, and say there is one vision for still objects, and another for moving ones. On the other hand, as Croce holds also, we can get real concepts in the case of concrete and conceptual knowledge, for there it can be shown that the very activity is different in the two cases. Only where we can show that knowledge proceeds from different principles, can we say that there are two really distinct concepts of knowledge. Croce's doctrine, then, on the concept and pseudo-concept we can accept in its application to a theory of art, and will either have to admit that art and representation, proceeding from the same activity, are one in nature, or else show that they have a different origin and principle. From what we have seen before it is not hard to guess

Croce's Theory of Art

what use Croce can make of his theory of the concept and *pseudo-concept*. For him there are two distinct sides of the spirit, the theoretic and the practical—the equivalent roughly of consciousness and will. The practical is continuously begetting the theoretic, and there is no other possible cause or origin that can be assigned. It follows, of course, that *all* representations are of identical nature. The concept "representation" is one from end to end, and embraces all that part of the theoretic life which consists in consciousness of the particular or individual—*i.e.*, all which is not universal and pertaining to the logical activity. Among these representations, which as we now see are all identical in nature, there are some which in ordinary conversation we dignify with the title "works of art," but such a division can only be an arbitrary and conventional practice—a mere question of more or less. Every representation is in its own degree expressive of the practical side of spirit. Those which are more so we call art; those which are less so receive a less honourable mention. But all are through and through "expression" just in so far as they are representation. They are all, therefore, works of art. This brings us to the third point raised for discussion.

3. Of the question, *What precisely does Croce mean by "expression" and what ground is there for identifying it with art?* we have already anticipated the discussion in part. If the theoretic activity is begotten of the practical in the way Croce maintains, it is quite right to speak of it as "expression." To express means to set something up as an object for the mind's contemplation. In this sense we spoke a few moments ago of sensations as being expressed in the imaginative representation. From the sensation, and by whatever chain of causes may be posited, the imaginative representation is produced as an object for the mind's more direct and concentrated gaze. This production we were content to speak of as "expression." In the same sense and with the same right Croce employs the word. It means the object of contemplation or of the theoretic activity, but that whence it is pro-

Croce's Theory of Art

duced is for him, not the original bare sensation, but a state of the practical spirit. You must not think that expression implies a sort of literal correspondence between the expression (*i.e.*, the contemplation) and that whence it is generated. In the expression of sensation in imagination, as we have understood it, there happened to be some rough correspondence, but it is not necessary. A sigh, a frown, the wringing of the hands are all expressions, spontaneous expressions of states of mind, yet there is no shadow of literal correspondence between the expression and that which is expressed. In the same way words are expressive of various realities, yet again there is no correspondence. If you say—which Croce will not allow—that words are conventional signs, at all events you must admit that the other examples are real expressions. Your tears and your laughter are not conventional signs, yet they bear no relation of correspondence to what you have heard or what you feel.

We must not deny, then, that Croce is right in using the word *expression* as equivalent to representation, if it be proved that all the theoretic life is begotten of the practical. But still we may reasonably complain when we are told to regard a brick wall before us as nothing but the expression of the practical side of our spirit. There is a consistency and a persistency about the experience of the wall which does not fit in with his theory.

A belief in an external world is, of course, bound to prevent the acceptance of Croce's theory in its entirety. In part at least the representation is produced by the mechanical and physical action of objects upon us. Still, that should not blind us to the merits of the idea he has started, and we may follow it up in our own way.

If once you grant—and it cannot be denied—that art is something over and above mere imitation and reproduction of external likeness, you must hold that the something "over-and-above" comes from the inside of the artist. *Ars est homo additus naturae*. This element which is added to the mere reproduction is, in the full sense in which Croce intends the word, *expression*. The

Croce's Theory of Art

reproduction is moulded, modified, determined by the artist, by his inclinations and tendencies, in a word by the gravitation of his being. This expression must not be understood as a new element superadded to the already existing representation; it is only one of the productive causes of the representation. It makes it what it is. Change it and you will have all through a different representation. It should rather be called a new element of production than a new element of the representation. It is like a new force introduced into a system of forces and modifying the course of a body's movement. The movement, supposing the forces are constant, is a simple straight line, and you cannot show in it, as a line, elements of different direction. So it is with the fully constituted representation. The different productive elements do not exist in it *as elements*. Consequently all talk of the matter and form of a work of art must be avoided where it implies that the imaginative representation itself consists of two elements. It is perfectly legitimate, however, when you refer only to the productive or determining causes of it. In this way we can, perhaps, reconcile the age-long dispute between those who wish to make art consist in the form in contradistinction to the matter of a work, and those who refuse to allow any such distinction of matter and form.

With this explanation we shall speak of the "reproductive element" and the "expressive element" in a representation or in a work of art. They are to be understood only as *causal* elements. It is the expressive element which comes from inside the artist. On that, at least, Croce and most other people would agree. Can we take one other step with him, and say that the expressive element is produced from the practical side of the human spirit, from the will? It depends largely on what you understand by "will." If "will" means only the translation of thought into action, then certainly something more than will is involved. Will in that sense is not a determining cause but the mere power which translates a fully determined representation into objective reality. If by

Croce's Theory of Art

will and the practical form of the spirit you mean the inclinations, desires, affections and tendencies of man—*i.e.*, the gravitation of his being or his nature, as it is sometimes called, then there are very solid reasons for taking this step with Croce.

At the risk of appearing crude we must descend to illustration, and will begin with the crudest of all—a change such as any amateurish artist might make in the colour of some object in his landscape. The particular colour which he puts on is the outcome of his colour appetite, working either deliberately or spontaneously. It works deliberately when many alternative colours present themselves and one is chosen out. When this happens, the artist knows he is not at his best—he is not working by inspiration. On other occasions there is no such deliberate selection, but all is spontaneous. The one needful colour comes and is at once set on the paper. Here the colour appetite works without reflexion, just as the food appetite of a hungry man does in bringing up the representation of a meal. In either case there is appetite and the manifestation or expression of some part of the inclination of the artist. There are two distinct activities of man involved—at least, in the case of the deliberate choice of the colour. One is the welling up of the imaginative representations which bubble to the surface, and this is the result of various physical causes such as blood pressure, circulation and nerve organization or even a fever. The other is an act of choice which is motivated by the tendencies and inclinations which go to form the character of a man. Where there is no deliberation and choosing from alternatives, it only means that our ultimate purpose is so strongly before us that all is crowded out of the mind except that which we want, and that the intensity of the artist's purpose—*i.e.*, of the end he has in view—brings to mind a new or appropriate way of achieving it. This experience is equally common in the practical affairs of life. It is when the stress of circumstance bears us down that we can sometimes act in the most efficient and successful manner.

Croce's Theory of Art

If this is true in the crude instance of a single change of colour, how much more true is it when the whole scene is translated into terms of oil or water-colour, with a full understanding that there must be translation throughout, that the whole must be visualized and rendered in a manner that will be best adapted to the medium! There is need of a more fertile imagination and a vast deal of paint experience, including all the characteristics of pigment when lying on canvas or paper, of the way it dries or runs, of the exact resilience of brush hairs, and what happens with greater or less pressure. True, there is all this, but we must not neglect the other aspect, the inclinations and tendencies of the artist's particular nature, which is always the ultimate cause of why the representation is this one and not another. What we have said here is true of a mere exercise in technique—a sketch thrown off for practice. But we must go further. If an artist can, by producing the work from within, manifest the inclinations, even of his sense appetite, it is equally true that he can manifest many other inclinations, other parts of his character, his love of simplicity, of dignity, of restraint, of strength, of vitality, of directness, of decision, or of definition. All this can be and is manifest in the work of a great artist, and by it you judge his picture. A single illustration will suffice. If you compare Tintoretto's "St. Andrew and St. Jerome" with Correggio's "La Notte" you will find that in point of view of drawing, colouring and in general fertility of imagination and skill the balance is probably in favour of Correggio, but Tintoretto's is undoubtedly the greater work of art. It is just the exaggerated gesture of the shepherd on the left which has been done for the sake of an equally exaggerated and far too obvious composition which spoils Correggio's picture—not that you could not find a shepherd standing as his stands, but under the circumstances of exaggerated chiaroscuro and the languid sensuality of the figure second from the left the whole must be judged a revelation of feeling and character that we should gladly be spared; and this perception reacts upon the figure on the left so

Croce's Theory of Art

that it becomes forced and unnatural. No one ever drew figures in more extraordinary poses than Tintoretto, but throughout his whole work I am not acquainted with one, not even the floating figure in the "Bacchus and Ariadne," to which exception can be taken on like grounds.

It is on the same ground that you ultimately judge the value of a poem. Two of the most remarkable odes in our language are Keats's "Ode to the Nightingale" and Shelley's "Ode to the West Wind." If you judge them by mere standards of skill, physical beauty or imaginative fertility, and even, be it noticed, by their depth of thought and reflexion, the balance is in favour of Keats. Yet Shelley's is definitely the greater work of art—but only when judged by the standard insisted on in this paper. There is a sense of strength, power, and vitality about it, and withal a restraint which is lacking in the other work.

While it is impossible, then, to agree with Croce that the whole representation is, in all its aspects, the expression of the practical, we must accept his theory in part. A work of art is a work of art just in so far as it is expressive of the practical side of the human spirit, meaning by that the *real* side or the *nature*. It cannot be too often repeated that this does not imply any division of the finished work of art into parts. There is not one part which is representative and another which is expressive. There is no distinction of matter and form in the given representation. It is through and through representation and through and through expressive of personality and emotion. The distinction refers only to the *causes* of the representation or to the activities involved. And, as we saw, it is in the activity we must seek the concept of art. Accordingly, there is no part or aspect of a work that can be left out when its artistic value is judged. One often hears it said, and by those who have a true appreciation of art, that the subject makes no difference to a painting and must be left out of account in weighing its value. This is an exaggeration, but an excusable one—one which anyone will deliberately fall into when talk-

Croce's Theory of Art

ing to ordinary people whose judgement about a picture is founded on conceptions that bear no relation to the true purpose of art.

In our distinction we have been speaking only of the causes or activities which contribute to the production of a work of art, and we may anticipate the next section by enumerating them here. In the first place there is the purely mechanical and physical action of the material objects of the universe, including our own nervous system and the sense organs and the brain. Under this falls the spontaneous welling up of images in the imagination *in so far as it is only a physical and mechanical act*. Secondly, there is the whole animal character of the individual with all its appetites, passions, and desires. This is always modifying and directing the first. Thirdly, there is the deliberate rational nature, with its aspirations, desires, and emotions, which, if not always, is at least sometimes a determining cause of the representation.

4. To the fourth point raised for consideration, *Even though art, expression and representation cover the same field of consciousness, are they identical concepts in Croce's sense?* the answer cannot be in doubt on the premisses that have been laid down. Even were we to derive the representation from only two causes, the one expressive, the other physical reproduction, it would be clear that art and representation are not identical in Croce's sense. The representation is art in virtue of its expressive character; it is representation in so far as it is mechanical production.

Putting *three* contributing causes, we have at least the speculative possibility of representations which are not art at all. For we now have before us the possibility of the animal world. We shall then say that representations are always *expressive*, but some are expressive only of *animal* sentiment and feeling, others of *rational* emotion. We have two distinct classes of representations: those of the animals and those of man. So that the concept representation does not even cover the same field as art.

If you object that Croce rules out the very possibility

Croce's Theory of Art

of animals from his system of reality, it is enough to say that he has not done so by his theory of art, but by his philosophy—and he begins the *Filosofia* with the theory of art. We must, at least, keep in view theories of art which would be true if animals existed until we have proved that they do not. In any case, as already pointed out, it is true that whether or not representation and art cover the same field, they are not identical in his sense.

The strange thing is that one seems driven to a similar conclusion if one accepts Croce's whole philosophy.

We must recall a brief outline of his system in order to see this. The activities of the spirit are first divided into theoretic and practical. The theoretic is subdivided into the logical activity and the representative activity (also called intuition or art). These two stand to each other in a relation which he is at pains to emphasize. The representative activity is *independent* of the logical one. That means you can have a representation which is not also a conceptual thought. The logical activity, however, is always *dependent* on the representative activity. You cannot have conceptual thought except in and through the representation. All this is, of course, perfectly true.

The practical side of the spirit is likewise divided into the economic activity and the ethical activity—a division which roughly corresponds to the common-sense division of the animal and the rational appetite. These two stand in the same relation to one another as the two parts of the theoretic side do. The lower is independent of the higher, but the higher is not independent of the lower.

Now, holding, as Croce does, that all representation is the expression of the practical, it surely ought to follow that representations are of two distinct kinds: those produced by the pure economic activity and those produced under the influence of the ethical. We should then have representation pure and simple and representation which is art.

It will perhaps be said that every representation is expressive of both. I do not well see how it can be said, in

Croce's Theory of Art

view of Croce's assertion that the lower or economic activity is independent of the higher; but even if it is, we might still say that every representation was a work of art only in virtue of being expressive of the higher or ethical activity.

5. The question, *Do representation and art "de facto" cover the same field of consciousness?* needs no discussion where the existence of animals is admitted. Their representations are not art, for they are not produced by rational emotion. When we come to man, however, the question is very difficult. The revelations of psycho-analysis seem to make it evident that every representation is affected by the entire life history of the individual. Directly or indirectly, all that we have done, or that has happened to us, has helped to build up our mentality, and any given representation is what it is because of the subject in and for whom it exists. It might perhaps be argued in the case of mere sensation that it is determined only by mechanical and physical causes, if among those causes we include the sense organ. But it is useless to try to carry the argument beyond the sphere of pure sensation. When we come to representation (*i.e.*, all that part of conscious life in which imagination plays a part) there enters unquestionably a new and personal factor determining our consciousness, *viz.*, our past psychic states. And as our whole psychic life is one continuous unity, must we not conclude that every representation bears some trace, more or less remote, of the rational emotions, aspirations, desires and tendencies? And, if we do so conclude, does it not follow that every human representation is a work of art?

The argument is strong, but I do not think it is conclusive. The representations, it is true, have been determined by the whole life, and therefore by the rational part, but it does not follow that they carry the impress of the past in the sense that is required. Art, we must agree with Croce, is an expression for the sake or purpose of *contemplation*. We must say, therefore, that a work of art is such only in so far as it carries the impress of rational

Croce's Theory of Art

emotion *on its surface*. Because a given representation is what it is in virtue of the whole life history of the individual, and even, must we not say, of the whole world's history, it does not follow that it carries on its surface for contemplation the impress of all that history. In the same way we may grant that the sense organs, the nerve centres, the brain cells, and even the entire animal psychology of a man are what they are in the particular individual because the rational emotions have been a part cause in building them up. But it does not follow that all the representations which arise in that individual are expressive of these emotions in the sense that art requires.

Certainly, however, we must allow that Croce is right in extending the meaning of "art" beyond its usual narrow limits. I do not see even that a practical end in view must necessarily rule out art. In cricket, for instance, run-getting is the end a batsman may have in view, but why should his batting not be also expressive of emotional character? Can it, in fact, be altogether avoided? The same would seem to be true at times of shooting, riding, and even of the way a business is conducted—the gentle art of living.

Of the many conclusions or corollaries that follow from Croce's general principles, nothing need be said. Many of them are peculiar, such as the theory that the work of art is always really completed in imagination and is indifferent to the external production, or that the critic is on an æsthetic level with the artist in his moments of appreciation. The aim of this paper is rather to analyze the sources of Croce's theory as they appear in his own writing, and to gather what of value is contained in them.

These sources were first a peculiar theory of sense consciousness, viz., that we only come to full possession of consciousness by expression. Secondly, the doctrine of the concept and pseudo-concept which we could accept only so far as it touched the problem in hand. Thirdly, his peculiar theory of the expression of the practical in the theoretic activity. Fourthly, and most general of all, a denial of the external world, a view with which we could

Croce's Theory of Art

have nothing to do, but from which we had to extricate the valuable part of his teaching. The third, the theory of expression, is the most valuable and original part of his whole teaching. By it he is enabled to show the necessity and importance of art in human life. Art is often enough regarded as a luxury in life—an occupation for the leisured classes, a mere by-path of education to which only a very little time should be given. Croce, by his history of æsthetics and his own theory of art, has done much to change all this, and secure it a place among definite subjects of scientific study. Before long it may even be a recognized course in our universities.

On his view, art is an essential element of human activity. It is the very basis of human consciousness, for it is identical with representation or intuition. It is the expression of the unconscious or practical, whereby alone there is something for consciousness. In the view that we have held something of the same value and necessity appears. Without it we should, indeed, have an object of contemplation before our gaze, but we should not be able to set up as object of contemplation the emotional character that is in all of us. By it, and in no other way, can a man express for himself and for others as a *direct* object of contemplation all that is best and noblest in his disposition.

H. R. WILLIAMS, O.S.B.

CONCERNING THE LAST SUPPER AND CALVARY

I OWE much gratitude to the DUBLIN REVIEW for the interest it shows in a book of mine,* on which no less than three articles have appeared in the last two numbers,† beside one from the scholarly pen of my Right Reverend friend, the Bishop of Hebron. The Bishop of Hebron has written in self-defence. I am happier than His Lordship. I have to write first of all words of thanks. Thanks to His Lordship for having coupled my defence with his. Thanks, and indeed profound thanks, to the Rev. M. C. D'Arcy, who in his winning style has written a most splendid and effective article. I might leave my cause in his fraternal hands. Neither intelligence nor sympathy is lacking on his side. And indeed what I may have to add will be very little, and spoken in deference chiefly to those who think that I ought not to keep away from the field, lest my reasons might be misinterpreted. But before I proceed to this troublesome part of my task, I may perhaps emphasize the special debt of gratitude which I owe to the Editor of this REVIEW for opening its pages not only to adverse criticism, but also to the other sort. He has set an example which I hope will henceforth be followed by other editors in England (I am not speaking of Ireland or America). If the iron rule, which, to the best of my information, does in certain periodicals exclude from the defence of a work anyone but its author, were from England to spread to other countries, where would be on the Continent the chance of English authors? I trust there is no impertinence in asking English editors kindly to remember that the language of their land is no mother tongue to Frenchmen. Wherefore, I am particularly glad that through the welcome appearance of a supporter in

* *Mysterium Fidei* (Paris, Beauchesne, second edition).

† Nos. 354 and 355.

Last Supper and Calvary

these hospitable pages I find myself relieved of the main part of what Fr. D'Arcy rightly terms an "unwelcome task."

This said, I must now turn my attention first to Abbot Ford, and then to somebody else.

I

My remarks on Abbot Ford's paper I will confine to his presentment of my position. In a pithy paragraph he has put together certain views, supposedly mine, "in connection with the Last Supper and Calvary, which sound strange (he says) to Catholic ears. For example: [1] there was no Mass at the Last Supper; [2] the Eucharistic Sacrifice of the Supper was, like that of the Cross, once for all and cannot be repeated; [3] there was no complete Sacrifice at the Last Supper; [4] at the Last Supper Christ did not offer up Himself, but only His coming Passion; [5] the death of Christ is not to be found in the Sacrifice of the Last Supper; [6] Christ did not die on the Cross in obedience to any command of the Father; [7] the Mass was inaugurated after the Ascension. It would not be unreasonable to suggest that a theory which either postulates or necessarily leads to so many strange views cannot itself be sound" (p. 30). Now let us go back upon these "strange views," and see how far they are mine, or how far they are strange.

First, about the Mass. Where did I ever say that "there was no Mass at the Last Supper"? In my book, I do not touch even the question whether it is correct or not to speak of a "Mass" as celebrated by Christ in the Supper-Room. This is so certain a fact, that it has been implicitly recognized in *Blackfriars* (January, 1925), with a view apparently to make me disclose my mind on the subject. The next issue of *Blackfriars* contained these words of mine: "If by the Mass is meant the bloodless oblation of the Body and Blood of Christ under the species of bread and wine by the Priests of the Church in memory of Christ's death till He come ('Ab Ecclesia per sacerdotes

Last Supper and Calvary

sub signis visibilibus immolandum in memoriam transitus sui ex hoc mundo ad Patrem,' *Conc. Trid.*, sess. 22, cap.1), which is the generally accepted sense, then there was in that sense no Mass celebrated in the Cenacle; although there Christ certainly did offer *virtually* all our Masses; which are now offered by us in virtue of that one offering of His, to which He *actually* conjoins and subjoins our own offerings, as particular agencies to a universal cause. But if you choose to mean by the Mass any bloodless oblation of the Body and Blood of Christ under the species of bread and wine: whether performed by the Priests of the Church in union with Christ, or by Christ alone; whether intended to commemorate Christ's death, or to dedicate Christ to His death; whether having no further continuation in view, or having still to be carried on and pursued unto death;* then in that indeterminate sense, which is not the current one, you will have to say that there was a Mass said in the Cenacle."

This has been my only utterance so far on the subject. It is perhaps a little more *nuancé* than one would be led to believe by Abbot Ford's over-simplified wording: "There was no Mass at the Last Supper."

With No. 1 ought obviously to be coupled No. 7, in which we read: "The Mass was inaugurated after the Ascension." I suppose by these words Abbot Ford is alluding to two Notes of mine, appended respectively to my seventeenth and twenty-sixth Dissertations. The first is entitled: *De inconcessa apostolis potestate litandi per triduum mortis dominicae*; the second: *De inconcessa apostolis potestate litandi ante diem Pentecostes*. From the very wording of those titles it appears that the question raised is strictly, solely and exclusively about the Mass as a sacrifice of the Church; not therefore, as Abbot Ford would have us believe, about "the Last Supper and Calvary." Now to the question thus restricted to the commemorative sacrifice, various solutions have been given

* How Christ's *Mass* was described by Luther's antagonist, Bishop Berthold of Chiemsee, as begun in the Supper-Room and finished only on the Cross, while our Masses end on the spot with the Eucharistic consecration, see *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, June, 1925, p. 578.

Last Supper and Calvary

by theologians: some have stated that the Apostles could offer sacrifice from the very first moment of their ordination in the Supper-Room, and, therefore, not only before Christ's Ascension, but even before His resurrection and death; others have denied it: men indeed of the greatest authority, particularly here in Rome; and these appear to me to be more faithful to Scripture, to the Fathers, and to what is commonly called the analogy of Faith. When this opinion is said to sound strange to Catholic ears, I wonder whether the opinion is not misunderstood, or the strangeness due to unfamiliarity with the problem itself, or whether for Catholic ears we should not read the particular ears of one Catholic, however distinguished. Anyhow, no clue is offered to us, as no reason is proffered, but only an expression of dislike, which we must take as it is, and leave where it stands.

No. 2 is of a peculiar character. "The Eucharistic Sacrifice of the Last Supper was, like that of the Cross, once for all and cannot be repeated." Needless to say, this sentence is not mine. What can it mean? Its probable import is that there was a certain sacrifice at the Supper, let us call it the Eucharistic Sacrifice; then *another* Sacrifice on the Cross, let us call it the Bloody Sacrifice; and that in the same way as Christ was not to be killed again by us, so too were we not to offer Him again under the species of bread and wine. I suggest that this is the obvious meaning of the sentence meant to "sound strange to Catholic ears." And, in truth, whoever means that, is more than strange: he is either a fool or an infidel.

No. 3 runs like this: "There was no complete Sacrifice at the Last Supper." Please, add at least that it was completed. It *would not have been* complete had it been left there. It was made complete by the Passion. In other words, it was not the whole of Christ's redemptive sacrifice; but it was a part of it, a component part, an essential part. Nor was the Bloody Passion, of itself, the whole of Christ's redemptive sacrifice, but a part of it, a component part, an essential part. If you wish for a simile: your confession is not a complete sacrament, unless abso-

Last Supper and Calvary

lution comes in. But once absolution has been pronounced, there is no incomplete sacrament left. Apply this to the present case, and do away with your fears of incompleteness for Christ's Sacrifice, even as you would for my own Sacrifice of this morning, when the consecration of the bread was completed by the consecration of the wine. In one word, Christ's Sacrifice, His one and only Sacrifice, the Sacrifice of Redemption, was a most complete one. But its completeness comes from the conjunction of Supper and Passion. At the Supper, as well as through each successive stage of the Bloody Passion, Christ was engaged in performing His complete Sacrifice. Properly speaking, He never made, never offered an incomplete one; no more than I did this morning, although no part of my Sacrifice was by itself the fulness of the whole.

No. 4 is perhaps the most surprising of the whole list. "At the Last Supper Christ *did not offer up Himself* [*italics mine*], but only His coming Passion." Where, where indeed, did I ever say or suggest anything of the kind? Of course, as Abbot Ford follows the grand method of giving no references, the average reader will not be able to verify, and is apt to think, therefore, that in the bulky mass of literature that has already come from my pen on the subject, I may have somewhere dropped this piece of extreme nonsense. To say that Christ did not at the Last Supper offer up Himself would be a most direct denial of the Catholic Faith. It would be Luther's heresy. Perhaps there is some antecedent improbability that it should be the view held and taught by one who, after all, is no Professor of Protestant Theology. What I hold and say, most expressly, is that Christ did offer up *Himself*; that He offered *Himself* up to His Father as the Lamb to be slain in His Passion; that He offered *Himself* to His Passion, as to the immolation through which He was to go over to His Father, in the shape of a gift for the ransom of mankind. I say so in so many words hundreds of times; and this is again what I constantly and most plainly mean, when I use the other

Last Supper and Calvary

phrase—namely, that He offered His Passion, or His death, or His life. I should have to quote nearly every page of my book. Let us be content with two or three passages. My first utterance on the subject is to be found in the third Dissertation, which happens to be also the opening portion of the third chapter. The title of the chapter is *De oblatione passionis peracta a Christo in coena*. What is the title of the corresponding Dissertation? “Christum in coena sacerdotaliter obtulisse suum corpus ad cruentam passionis immolationem, persuadetur primo ex narratione coenae in se considerata.” He offered a real, substantial thing; He offered His own Body; but He offered it to death; and this is what is called offering His death. Again now, let us see the text of the Dissertation itself. It opens like this: “Id nobis est propositi ut ostendatur Christus, in coena effigiem suae passionis conficiens, obtulisse Deo passionis suae veritatem sacerdotaliter.” Then comes the analysis of this statement, including four points: first, there is in the Last Supper a merely symbolical mactation, representing some real mactation to come; secondly, there is some oblation too; thirdly, an actual and real, not merely representative or apparent oblation; fourthly, the oblation of what? “Dico quarto: oblationem fieri hostiae ad ipsam immolationem veram quae repraesentatur futura.” The oblation of the Victim, of Christ Himself. Then comes this summary: “Uno verbo: in imagine alicuius immolationis offertur hic et nunc Christus ad immolationem cuius fit imago.” This is how I maintain that Christ did not offer up *Himself*, but only His coming Passion. In the demonstration of the fourth point occur these words: “Ergo in ipsa immolatione repraesentativa . . . actualiter quaedam perficitur oblatio Christi ad immolationem cruentam.” Again: “Quare . . . dicendum . . . : esse in ritu illo mysticae immolationis ipsam passionis hostiam, ut talem, oblatam Deo a Christo sacerdotaliter.” Finally comes a *Recapitulation*, in which I express myself thus: “Dabat se [Christus] in effigie mortis; dabat se pro nobis in mortem, atque per mortem se dabat Deo hostiam.” All those pas-

Last Supper and Calvary

sages are taken from one Dissertation only.* And Abbot Ford coolly writes that my thesis is: "At the Last Supper Christ did not offer up Himself, but only His coming Passion." The reader by this critic is well informed!

But perhaps, even though my teaching is that Christ did offer up Himself, yet I am wrong in using as an equivalent the phrase: Christ offered His Passion. But how could I be wrong? Abbot Ford himself acknowledges the equivalence, when on the words of Cyprian, "The Passion of the Lord is the sacrifice which we offer," he volunteers this commentary: "If the letter is read carefully, it will be recognized that St. Cyprian is among the Doctors who tell us that Christ in the Supper offered up *Himself* to His death." I think I was not totally unaware of it; and possibly some traces of this reading might be discoverable somewhere in my book.

No. 5 I profess not to understand. I am supposed to teach that "the death of Christ is not to be found in the Sacrifice of the Last Supper." What is the meaning of this? Ought I to teach that Christ was actually killed in the Last Supper? I hope not. But then do I fail perhaps to teach that the death was represented? I say it, or imply it, at every page. Is that all? I moreover say, what others do not say, that Christ's death was sacrificially offered by the High Priest according to Melchisedech in His Eucharistic feast. Is not that enough? I thought that in my view the death of Christ was a little more closely bound up with the Last Supper than it would be in the views of others.

So far we have had a glimpse of Abbot Ford's critical

* Elucidatio III. In *Catholic Faith in the Holy Eucharist*, I express myself thus: "Christ in the Supper offered *Himself* up to death" (p. 115). "He was offering *Himself* up to what was in store for Him" (p. 118). I make mine the words of Adolph of Schaumburg: "Christ offered Himself up to His Father with His own hands" (p. 124), etc. In *The Last Supper and Calvary*, I say that Christ in the Supper was "making over to God the Lamb to be slain, and by the very fact offering in the ritual sense of the word, not internally only, but outwardly, not by a mere purpose or promise to give, but by the actual giving and delivering up of the gift, not in mere figure, but most really and formally, the *Victim* that was henceforth sacred to God, and as such due to its ultimate fate" (p. 5-6). I call this (p. 7) a "sacramental donation of His own self and of His own life," again (p. 21), "His own self-offering." See also pp. 41-44, 46-47, etc.

Last Supper and Calvary

methods. No. 6 will give us an insight into his method as a theologian.

My sixth capital sin is to declare that "Christ did not die on the Cross in obedience to any command of the Father." A "conclusion . . . difficult to reconcile with the common belief and feeling of *all Christians* [italics mine]" (p. 41). Nothing less. Of course, this is saying a great deal; perhaps more than Abbot Ford realizes: it means excluding from among Christians the countless theologians, who for centuries and centuries have maintained with all their might that there had been no strict command of the Father to the Son in respect of the Passion and Death. Among those nearer to us suffice it here to mention these two, whose names are the glory of modern Theology, Franzelin and Billot. No Christians, apparently, in the judgement of Abbot Ford. Their case is settled, without recourse even to argument, by direct appeal to mere intuition. This intuitive method I envy; it would dispense me, and many of my painstaking brethren, of the toilsome task of reading books, of getting acquainted with the Fathers and their exposition of Scripture, and, when I discuss the opinion of some theologian, of troubling about what he may have written on the subject, were it in explanation of St. Thomas or St. Anselm, whom Abbot Ford quotes against me, without knowing apparently, or at any rate without notifying the reader of the fact that I have tried to give a reasoned and coherent commentary of their many and, at first sight, rather conflicting pronouncements. Yet, however much I may envy this method, I will not recommend it to anybody. For one, I hope never to trust my lights so much as to discard the views of either Franzelin or Billot with a mere *Ipse dixi*.

Now, this being said about the method, I revert to the doctrine, only to note this. As a matter of fact, I do not agree with those many and eminent theologians who hold that Christ did *not* die on the Cross out of strict obedience. I maintain that He did; that on the Cross, and during His Bloody Passion, He was strictly bound to incur death; that there was a law at the time, a Divine law, and in this

Last Supper and Calvary

sense a Divine command, making it unlawful for Him to decline death. But on the other hand, I maintain that this obligation was not originated by a "particular" command of the Father,* such as: Thou shalt die; no more than a monk's obligation to poverty, chastity or obedience has its source in any particular command of this kind: Thou shalt give up thy worldly possessions, and married life, and independence. Yet the obligation is there, once the vow has been taken (which you were free to take or not to take); but it is there as a special case of your general duty of religion—that is, of that specific justice to God which makes it incumbent upon you not to defraud the Almighty of what has been pledged to Him. Christ assuredly did not vow anything, in the proper sense of the word; but He did something more sacred and more thorough still: He did as a High Priest offer Himself up unto God as a Victim. This He did originally in the Eucharistic rite of the Supper: and from thence it was not permissible for Him to withdraw the Gift, which He had made sacred to God. Thus does the consecration of the Gift contain a pledge much more binding still than could be a mere vow; although it is not correct to say that there is in the sacrificial oblation only a pledge; there is the actual giving: which is something more; but therein is contained implicitly a pledge not to take back, not to claim back what has been "consigned into God's Hands."† This kind of obligation I do admit in Christ upon the Cross: a very sacred, strict and imperative obligation; referring decidedly to the will of God, to the law of God, to the *general* command of God, His foremost precept: that justice should be kept, the justice which is due to all, and above all to God. It may be that this does not approve itself to Abbot Ford, for reasons best known to himself; but it is clearly a nearer approach to the "particular" com-

* My phrase in the English text, first alluded to by Abbot Ford in his Summary, and then quoted by him in full on page 41, is this: "... It was Christ's duty to die, not to fulfil any particular command of His Father, which to the majority of our Doctors is unthinkable, but only to keep the law of justice even unto death" (*Catholic Faith in the Holy Eucharist*, p. 116).

† *Catholic Faith in the Holy Eucharist*, p. 115.

Last Supper and Calvary

mand, which he appears to favour, than the theory of either Billot or Franzelin; and if these good men still count among Christians, I fancy Abbot Ford may *a fortiori* reserve for me a little seat in the congregation of "all Christians," who glory in the name of "Orthodox and followers of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith"—if not in his own private chapel.

I am not here in the least demonstrating any of my views; nor am I even discussing the objections which Abbot Ford may think fit to raise against any of them. I think no discussion can be fruitful before the critic has read carefully and entirely the work under consideration. That this has not been the case I maintain out of respect for Abbot Ford himself, seeing that for such misapprehensions and misrepresentations as his have been, if the excuse were not to be found in lack of adequate perusal, then only unpleasant thoughts would suggest themselves, which I for one entirely dismiss. Let, however, critics remember that even carelessness is after all only a poor excuse; that authors have a certain right not to have their views deformed; and that to fail in this respect, were it unintentionally, entails, on the part of the offender, certain responsibilities and obligations which, when the matter is no trifle, may be of a serious character.

In the meantime I willingly acknowledge the civil tone of my critic, the parliamentary quality of his language, and a (comparatively) notable absence of acrimony. For these welcome features of his style let an expression of thanks be my last word to Abbot Ford.

II

The Rev. V. McNabb has already devoted to my work several articles or letters to the Press (*Blackfriars*, September, 1923; October, 1924; January, 1925; *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, June, October, and December, 1924). I have replied faithfully each time (*American Ecclesiastical Review*, July and August, 1924; *Blackfriars*, December, 1924; February, 1925; *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*,

Last Supper and Calvary

September and December, 1924; January, 1925). In the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* (June, 1924) I was accused of "serious errors in faith," amounting even to "heresy,"* while in support of the charge a statement of fact was made which, when challenged,† was neither substantiated nor withdrawn. In *Blackfriars* (October, 1924, p. 399) my doctrine was dubbed "repulsive," and, worse even than heretical, "blasphemous." In the meantime a slur had been cast on my literary honesty by means of methods which I will not here characterize, but which the reader may see exposed in *Blackfriars*, December, 1924, p. 551 ff.‡ To-day, the same critic comes forward with a new and remarkable discovery: Cardinal Billot opposes my view of the Eucharistic Sacrifice. And thereupon comment goes on.§ Some more discoveries of the kind it will be very easy to make for those who care. I have in *Mysterium Fidei* opposed many modern writers on the Eucharist; some without naming them, others by name. Cardinal Billot is one of the latter category. Not only have I discussed his view, but I have gone the length of saying (his friendship as well as the loftiness of his mind allows of such liberty) that, if carried to its ultimate conclusions, it would, in my opinion, not only sever the Mass from all essential connection with the Cross, not only deprive it of any intrinsic propitiatory force, but even endanger the very truth of its sacrificial character. It was not perhaps, then, such a matter of surprise that Cardinal Billot, on bringing up to date the sixth edition of his treatise, *De Ecclesiae Sacramentis*, should in his turn, were it but to defend his theory, criticize mine. And seeing that his view is bound up with a duality of sacrifices in the Supper and on the Cross, it was only natural that he should vindicate this duality, and thus impugn the unity. This he has done, and done by way of a scholastic discussion. That such an event should be described as portentous, and its significance endowed with the finality of a "condemna-

* See *I.E. Record*, January, 1925.

† See *I.E. Record*, September, 1924, and January, 1925.

‡ See also February, 1925, p. 109.

§ DUBLIN REVIEW, p. 167 ff.

Last Supper and Calvary

tion," is perhaps well in keeping with what has come before from the same pen; but it is none the less bound to appear ludicrous "to all students of the history of theological discussion."* I do not think that a single example could be found of an author converting all or even any large proportion of the writers that had previously committed themselves to an opinion different from his. Indeed, this should be accounted a miracle of the first class, a miracle which not even St. Thomas could boast to have achieved—far from it; and least of all should it be expected from the last of his disciples. The wonder is not that those whom I combat should combat me. The wonder would be the other way about: if they did not.

Nor do I in the meantime underrate the significance of dissent with Cardinal Billot; no more than I did when I first attacked him. Cardinal Billot is to my mind the greatest thinker that there is in the theological world of to-day. His authority is of the highest; and far from declining, I believe that it will rise and establish itself more and more as ages go on. But when it comes to some particular point to be decided scientifically, Cardinal Billot himself is aware and mindful of the old axiom: *Tanti valet auctoritas quanti valet ratio allata*. In the present case Cardinal Billot's argument is based simply and solely on his reading of a certain phrase in the Decree of Trent. Why that reading seems to me *historically* untenable, I have been at pains lately to show in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*.† Let that suffice. I am not here discussing the point with His Eminence, for obvious reasons. But much less do I intend to have a theological debate with one whom, much to my regret, I had to tell lately in *Blackfriars*‡ that such a thing was henceforth out of the question between him and myself.

* DUBLIN REVIEW, p. 167.

† June, 1925, *The Last Supper and Catholic Divines from Henry VIII to the Council of Trent*. The reader may also see in *The Last Supper and Calvary* (Dolphin Press, Philadelphia), p. 45, how the true mind of the Fathers of Trent had already been explained in the seventeenth century by the great Church historian, Noël Alexandre, O.P., in his Dissertation on the Mass against Lutherans and Calvinists.

‡ February, 1925, p. 108 ff.

Last Supper and Calvary

Only, in view of the general public, whose mind is apt to be disturbed by such an appeal as has been made to the authority of a Prince of the Church, I here beg to submit a few specimens of the view taken of this matter by some of the highest Church dignitaries in various parts of the world since the time my book was published.

The Archbishop of Toronto, the Most Rev. Neil McNeil, D.D., in a popular instruction on the Mass (*The Passion and the Mass. The Nature of the Mass and our Participation in it*), writes:

The primary purpose of the Supper was the offering up of the sacrifice of the Cross. At the Supper He offered His Body to be broken and His Blood to be shed in the Passion and on the Cross. The Passion of the Lord is the sacrifice that we offer, said St. Cyprian in reference to the Mass. If that is what priests offer now, then that is what Christ offered at the Supper. There He offered Himself as the victim to be immolated. Now He offers Himself in the Mass as the victim once immolated on the Cross. The offering of the Supper involved all that followed in suffering and death. . . . In the case of Our Lord, *the Supper and what followed are parts of one sacrifice*. The sacrifice of redemption began at the Supper and ended on the Cross.

On May 27, 1923, one who had been for years and years the professor of countless generations of priests in the Papal College of Propaganda, the world-famed author of the *Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae ad textum S. Thomae concinnatae*, wrote as follows in his Introductory Letter to Bishop Macdonald's book: "The Supper was THE SACRIFICE OF THE CROSS AS BEGUN; the immolation on Calvary was the same sacrifice as consummated." Twelve months later the signatory of this letter, the Right Rev. A. M. Lépicier, was raised to Archiepiscopal rank, and established as Vicar Apostolic over the whole Hierarchy of India.

A short while before, the Archbishop of Rennes, late Chancellor of the Catholic University of Lille, President of the Board of the Catholic University of Angers, in his Lenten Pastoral of 1922, in words which I have quoted more fully elsewhere, expressed the same doctrine:

Last Supper and Calvary

There [in the Last Supper] He already confronts His disciples with *the sacrifice of salvation*. Already *He is beginning it*; from this moment He offers Himself up to death. He does so in a significant phrase which does not bear on the future as a promise, but affects the present as an actual decision; by means of symbols too, more expressive still than words. . . . The Saviour is here placing Himself . . . as the lamb prophesied by Isaias, a victim mute and gagged, fastened by the sacramental bonds more tightly still than He is soon to be by the cords of the soldiers. Do you not understand that He wishes to make it clear to us that on His part everything is ready for the sacrifice, and that there is nothing left for Him to wait for but the knife. In this unbloody rite already appears before you the Christ and the Victim, along with the offering to and destination for immolation: which intention is here, as usual, expressed liturgically by the Pontiff himself. Jesus, I say again, *began in the cenacle that sacrifice which this very day shall be perfected in actual bloodshed*. Why then should we tear asunder the Sacrifice of the Supper from that of the Cross, as if they were two distinct entities, each one of which had in itself the constitutive and integral elements of a sacrifice: as if Christ had offered Himself twice! Does not the mystic immolation, entailed by the duality of the sacramental species, in quite a transparent manner connect our Victim with the immolation on the Cross, and with it alone? Is not the Victim already offered and vowed irretrievably to that death on the Cross? . . . From all sides then the same conclusion presses itself on us: the Passion has already begun its course; it is not only morally present, as in Christ's thought, but it is virtually enacted by the offering which Christ makes of Himself to His death in this solemn moment. After all, *was it not necessary that this offering should be made, and made liturgically, if Christ's Passion was to be a religious immolation and a sacerdotal sacrifice?* And where shall we find it in the Gospel but at the moment of the Supper? . . . Let Protestants exclaim that if the Eucharist was a sacrifice of His own Body and Blood offered by Christ at the Supper, then our redemption was already effected, and the sacrifice of the Cross is made void! The Fathers of Trent have replied that this was not a case of adding one sacrifice to another; that there was only one Sacrifice in all, extending itself from the Supper-Room to the mountain of Golgotha; that it was continuous in the order of events, even as in the literary texture of the Gospels.

Six months after the publication of this Pastoral the same Archbishop Charost was made a Cardinal, in express recognition (the Pope said, addressing publicly the Sacred

Last Supper and Calvary

College) of his theological eminence. These are all recent pronouncements, which might easily be supplemented.

In a past generation it was the Head of the English Hierarchy, Cardinal Manning, who in that standard book of his, *The Glories of the Sacred Heart*, had taught the Catholics of all English-speaking lands:

In that hour [of the Last Supper] and in that action [of the Eucharistic consecration] He [Christ] offered up the Lamb that was slain from the beginning of the world. The atoning sacrifice predestined from all eternity was then offered up. . . . In this last Paschal Supper, . . . *He began the act of oblation, finished upon Calvary, which redeemed the world.* He offered that sacrifice first without bloodshedding; but it was the same true, proper, and propitiatory sacrifice which redeems the world, because therein He offered Himself. . . . No man had power to take Him until He delivered Himself into their hands. . . . Therefore, at His Last Supper He made a free and voluntary offering of Himself. He had not yet shed His Blood, but throughout His whole life He had offered His will, and He now offered His death; and that which He began at the Last Supper He accomplished on the morrow upon Calvary by the shedding of Blood; for that shedding of Blood was the completion of His sacrifice. Nevertheless, when He sat at the table in the guest-chamber, He truly offered Himself, the one true, proper, and propitiatory sacrifice that takes away the sin of the world. He died to complete the sacrifice, to fill up its perfect propitiation by the last gift that He could give, by the last drop of His precious Blood.

The past generations of the French or German Hierarchy might be appealed to as well. In the meantime the English public, if perturbed, may feel reassured and realize that if "not all theologians are of one mind in assigning the proper nature . . . of that sublime sacrifice" (as Archbishop Lépicier remarks), yet they must all vie with one another in loyalty to the Church, to the Faith once delivered to the Saints, to authority expressing itself through the channel of Papal or Conciliar Decrees, or to the daily teaching of Pastors speaking in common agreement.

M. DE LA TAILLE, S.J.

MODERN SCIENCE AND THE THEORY OF CONTINUITY

PROFESSOR A. J. THOMSON'S *Science and Religion* is, in many respects, a powerful argument on behalf of Religion, from the point of view of a scientist. The distinguished Professor of Natural History at the University of Aberdeen insists on the inherent limitations of Science, and does not hesitate to admit that its tendency in the past has sometimes been that of the cobbler who goes beyond his last. "The aims and moods of Religion and Science," he writes, "are quite different," and he gives as a reason why "Science cannot clash fundamentally with religious interpretation," that its aim is "descriptive," while "the older, less clear-headed view of science was that it explained things." Hence "an opposition between scientific description and religious interpretation is fundamentally a false antithesis." "Science never asks, What is the meaning and value of this? What is behind it all? How is this scientific knowledge of things related to other constituents of our experience? Science works towards a cosmography; to grope after a cosmology is not its *métier*."

But this attitude, however praiseworthy it may be regarded as an ideal in a scientist, supposes such a degree of detachment from what is one of the necessities of thought, that it is scarcely surprising to find Professor Thomson admitting the difficulty. "It is difficult," he writes, "to keep from pressing certain questions whose answers lie beyond science: What is the meaning of this cosmic process, lasting for hundreds of millions of years? What is the meaning of man and his high thoughts?" But a further question suggests itself: Is this a necessary or even a desirable attitude to assume? Scholastic philosophy, at least, regards science as the certain and evident knowledge of things through their causes. And Sir Oliver Lodge

Theory of Continuity

has recently described the "aim of Science" as "not merely formularies, or convenient modes of expression. It is, or should be, the truth and reality; we seek on the evidence of our senses to form some conception of what reality is like." Sir Edwin Ray Lankester, too, has expressly claimed that it is the function of Science to enquire into the causes of things: "To us has been granted," he writes (in *Degeneration*), "the power to know the causes of things. . . . The full and earnest cultivation of Science—the knowledge of causes—is that to which we have to look for the protection of our race." "Of all kinds and varieties of knowledge that only is entitled to the name of 'Science' which can be described as knowledge of causes." And Francis Bacon, who has recently, again, been claimed by Levine as standing for "a great reaction and protest against the barren intellectualism of the scholastic learning," maintained that true knowledge is knowledge of causal relations. Perhaps, then, it may be allowed to suggest that a scientist, like everybody else, may claim to be at least something of a philosopher. Hence, he is not to be tied altogether and exclusively to his "descriptions." From time to time he will inevitably and justifiably trespass on philosophical territory. Only he will be wise if he remember that that territory is not exclusively his, and that there are others there, also, with claims to occupy it, though they have not travelled by the same road as he.

Professor Thomson seems to think that he has found a way out of the difficulty by the adoption of Professor Lloyd-Morgan's theory of "Emergent Evolution," as a philosophy on which to base his science, or at least claims to find in it a justification for the attitude he takes up with regard to the problems raised by Science. On its main issue it is the point of view adopted by Dr. Whitehead, Dr. Broad, Mr. S. Alexander, Professor Sellars, and commended by Professor Pringle-Pattison, in his Gifford Lectures. This theory regards concrete nature merely as a progressive movement towards the production of higher complexes with "new" properties or "emergents." "A salutary change," writes Professor Thomson, "in the

Theory of Continuity

scientific outlook is marked by the modern use of the term 'emergence.' It is distinctive of evolution that from age to age there is a succession of 'newnesses.'" "Synthesis with new properties at critical turning points was the burden of my evolutionary contention," writes Professor Lloyd-Morgan in *Emergent Evolution*. There is not supposed to be at these points "a gradual and insensible change from the physical qualities of the compound, but at the critical moment of the constitution of the compound there seems to be a new departure, and so on." But what has become of the principle of evolution? The concept of a "new departure," to say the least, obscures, if it does not abolish it.

Mr. Julian Huxley, also, in *The Essays of a Biologist*, appeals to the theory of "Emergence": "New combinations and properties thus arise in time. Bergson miscalls such evolution creative. We had better, with Lloyd-Morgan, call it emergent"; but, at least, Mr. Huxley states what he considers the implications of the theory: "In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it is the proper conclusion that mental properties are to be traced back to the simplest and most original forms of life." That is, "something of the same general nature as mind in ourselves is inherent in all life, something standing in the same general relation to living matter in general as do our minds to the particular living matter of our brains. But there can be no reasonable doubt that living matter, in due process of time, originated from non-living; and if that be so, we must push our conclusion farther, and believe that not only living matter, but all matter, is associated with the same general description as minds in higher animals. We come, that is, to a monistic conclusion, in that we believe that there is only one fundamental substance, and that this possesses not only material properties, but also properties for which the word *mental* is the nearest approach." From this statement Mr. Huxley draws the inevitable conclusion: "Not only miracles but Revelation goes by the board—save a revelation which is simply a name for the progressive increase of knowledge and

Theory of Continuity

insight. Last but not least, we do not pretend to know the Absolute. We know phenomena, and our systems, in so far as scientific, are interpretations of phenomena." The result of "the rise of evolutionary biology and psychology" is, that "there seems to be no place any more for a God in the universe." Evidently Mr. Huxley, at least, is not of opinion that it is the function of Science to be merely descriptive; in spite of his appeal to the philosophy of emergence. On the other hand, Sir Oliver Lodge, who, in the words of a distinguished college companion,* "has done so much to stem the tide of materialism," gives no evidence of his acceptance of this popular philosophy of the day.

Generally, it is not the doctrine of miracles that is attacked by these philosophers and scientists, except by implication. It is rather that of A. R. Wallace, who thought that the facts justified the religious idea of successive spiritual influxes—notably that at the origin of life, at the origin of consciousness, and at the origin of human personality. To this, Professor Thomson, as well as Mr. Huxley, takes exception: "There are several objections to this device," writes the former. "It jettisons the continuity of evolutionary process, to save *what*. It always includes a somewhat unpleasant suggestion that the original institution of the order of Nature was imperfect, and that it became necessary on various subsequent occasions to intervene with special aid to help the evolving world over difficult stiles. Furthermore, there is, if we understand it aright, a suggestion of two worlds, as if God were not behind everything all the time." Professor Thomson himself, therefore, follows "the general trend of opinion," which, he says, "is in favour of the evolutionist idea that there has been continuity of process from the whirling nebula to the earth revolving round the sun, and from the cooling earth to awakening life, and from simple organisms to tentative men, and from groping Hominids to *Homo Sapiens*. But what is meant by "continuity of process" if it is not merely continuity of matter, or of space and

* Mons. Kolbe, D.D., D.Litt., *Up the Slopes of Mount Zion*.

Theory of Continuity

time? Does it suppose that "the whirling nebula" was a closed system, containing within itself the potentialities of life, mind, spirit? It is, certainly, to be regretted that the writer does not give a definition of that "continuity" on which he so emphatically insists.

Drummond, in his *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, remarks that "few exact definitions of Continuity are to be found." "Its sweep is so magnificent, it appeals so much more to the imagination, that men have preferred rather to exhibit than to define it." He himself covers three pages in an attempt to "exhibit" it, after which he somewhat naïvely remarks: "Having defined [*sic*] the principle we may proceed at once to apply it." In giving this description he merely follows Sir William Grove, who argued in favour of continuity from the difficulty or the impossibility of imagining a world without it: "Perhaps *prima facie* the most striking argument in favour of continuity which could be presented to a doubting mind would be the difficulty it would feel in representing to itself any *per saltum* act of Nature." But can anyone represent to himself the act of creation, or whatever alternative theory the scientist or the philosopher may adopt, to account for the origin of the universe? He cannot *imagine* how higher syntheses "emerge" from the lower; nor even how motion is communicated by one body to another.

Had Drummond given a definition of Continuity, instead of elaborating a somewhat vague description of it, he might have escaped what must be regarded as an obvious inconsistency, if not a glaring contradiction. "What has Science done to make theology tremble?" he asks; and replies: "It is method. It is system. It is the reign of Law." "The one great Law" is "the Law of Continuity. . . . It was reserved for the Law of Continuity to put the finishing touch to the harmony of the universe. . . . A discontinuous universe would be an incoherent and irrelevant universe. . . . The universe would run deranged; the world would be a mad world." Yet, after all this dogmatism, towards the end of his book he definitely adopts the position, which is that, not only of scientists like

Theory of Continuity

Wallace, but also of philosophers like the late Freiderich Von Hügel, with regard to three breaks in Continuity. Drummond's argument is an "attempt to incorporate the Spiritual Kingdom (of Christianity) in the scheme of Evolution"; so that "it satisfies the Law of Continuity." To the obvious objection that in "starting off suddenly on a different plane, and in direct violation of the primary principle of development," Christianity offers "a sudden and hopeless barrier," his answer is that "as Evolution unfolds everything else, it is now seen to be itself slowly unfolding. . . . What we are reaching, in short, is nothing less than the *evolution of Evolution*. It is, no doubt, such inconsistencies as this which led the writer in the *Dictionary of National Biography* to describe Drummond's main thesis as based on a series of brilliant figures of speech rather than upon a chain of reasoning." Yet *Natural Law in the Spiritual World* ran through, at least, twenty-four editions, and at least eighty-seven thousand copies have been sold.

It seems to be Leibnitz to whom the formulation of the Law of Continuity is to be ascribed; for at least on several occasions he laid claim to its discovery: "Nothing is accomplished all at once, and it is one of my great maxims, and one of the most verified, that *Nature makes no leaps*, a maxim which I called the Law of Continuity;" "the Law of Continuity declares that Nature leaves no gap in the order she follows;" "everything goes by degrees in Nature, and nothing by leaps, and this rule regarding changes is part of my Law of Continuity."* Leibnitz, however, though he admits that "the beauty of nature, which desires distinct perceptions, demands the appearance of leaps," does not discuss the subject. No doubt, in his day, and until comparatively recently, it must have seemed a truism that all movement on the level is continuous. The difficulty arises when we come to consider movement upward, from one plane to another. And even on the same plane it is not easy to bring the theory of Mutations, for instance,

* *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, trans. by Alfred G. Langley.

Theory of Continuity

within the limits of any law of Continuity, which denies leaps in nature. Moreover, there are many changes that take place, which scientists of the present day have come to regard as so many discontinuities.

Experimenting with radiation of black bodies, in the year 1900, Dr. Planck found that energy does not vary continuously, but by leaps or jumps, as if it were composed of discrete bits or *quanta*. "*The continuity of all dynamical effects,*" he writes, "was formerly an undisputed hypothesis of all physical theories, which was condensed in Aristotle's well-known dogma: *Natura non facit saltum*. But even in this stronghold, always respected from ancient times, modern research has made an appreciable breach. In this case, recent discoveries have shown that the proposition is not in agreement with the principle of thermo-dynamics, and, unless appearances are deceptive, the days of its vitality are numbered. Nature certainly seems to move in jerks, indeed of a very definite kind."* And this breach seems to be widening with the progress of recent discoveries and theories, particularly with regard to the miniature solar system of Dr. Bohr's atom. Discontinuity, says Sir Oliver Lodge, "probably runs through the whole of atomic science, and, therefore, essentially through the whole theory of matter." "Modern physics," writes another scientist (Guye), "has had to have recourse to the atom of electricity (the electron), the actual existence of which is based on a very large number of experimental facts, and the numerical value of which has been determined by varied and already very exact experiments. This idea of discontinuity has not been limited solely to matter, but during the last few years it has invaded the domain of energy, which, accordingly, should be emitted by radiating bodies, not in a continuous manner, but in small discontinuous particles, called *quanta*. Even "the conception of Number would appear to have discontinuity for its origin, whatever the manner in which this discontinuity manifests itself to our senses: form, colour, sound, touch, and so on. . . . The study of physico-chemical

* *A Survey of Physics*, trans. by R. Jones and D. H. Williams.

Theory of Continuity

phenomena leads us more and more to assume that the structure (of matter) is in reality discontinuous. . . . In the domain of physics this discontinuity is again found at every step, particularly in the kinetic theories." Indeed, there are so many discontinuities in Nature that, at least, it should be stated what is meant, when it is claimed that the Law of Continuity is of universal application. It is true that Sir Oliver Lodge maintains that "through the connection of the ether with bodies, in the last resort there is absolute continuity." But what does that mean? Merely that while there is a "gap separating particle from particle," "there is no gap separating the particle from the ether in which it is immersed." Admittedly, if there is this material or spacial continuity between the particles and the ether, the physicist is well within his province in pointing out what to him must be an interesting fact, though to the philosopher it has little significance in its bearing on the question of Continuity at those critical points where there is an ascent from a lower to a higher order, or from the ether itself to the "emergence" of elementary bodies, admitting with Sir Oliver Lodge the probability of their formation from the ether.

Presumably, the disappearance of the pterodactyl, for instance, which, as Professor Thomson reminds us, is simply "a lost race, leaving no descendants," may be described as a break in continuity, since that particular line of the race of animals then came to an end. So that even Thomas Huxley believed that "Nature does make jumps now and then"; and he thought that Darwin would have made his position stronger had he not embarrassed himself by a too-frequent appeal to the aphorism, *Natura non facit saltum*. Again, De Vries, setting aside Darwin's law of the development of new species from small accidental variations, points out that Nature, at least when it suits her, insists on proceeding along a line of her own choosing. And here, again, there has been a certain discontinuity. Concerning these changes, Professor Thomson writes: "A brusque or freakish change in the course of generations is called, in biological language, a mutation, or 'discon-

Theory of Continuity

tinuous variation'; but the discontinuity simply means that the organism has passed suddenly, without intergrade stages, from one position of equilibrium to another. There is no more real discontinuity in a big step than in a little one." The discontinuity, however, does not consist in the length of the step, but in the change of method of advance from that of small accidental variations to one of development along certain definite lines.

The greatest difficulty which a universal law of Continuity meets is when it is called upon to show itself consistent with the ascent in Nature from a lower to a higher order. That there are these different levels is admitted by Professor Pringle-Pattison, who insists that a qualitative difference is implied, "when," for instance, "we pass from one order of facts to another, say from inorganic nature to the facts of life, or from animal sentience to the conceptual reason and self-consciousness of man" (*The Idea of God*). Excellent, too, is his further statement that "even if we were able to show a debatable land between the organic and the inorganic, as we can between the animal and the vegetable kingdoms, and to point to objects which might be classed almost indifferently as the one or the other, even then the existence of such intermediate and transitional forms would not obscure the fact that we do pass to a new plane or level of existence, qualitatively different, and through that difference opening up a new range of possibilities to the creatures which it includes."

But, like Thomson, Professor Pringle-Pattison surrenders to the spell of Lloyd-Morgan's theory of "Emergent Evolution": "We need have no difficulty," he writes (*Monist*, 1899), "in agreeing with Professor Lloyd-Morgan, when he repudiates as unphilosophical the idea of a supernatural hiatus between the inorganic and the organic, and combats the conception of Vital Force as 'something outside the recognized course of nature' introduced to bridge this particular chasm and account for the peculiarities of the new order of phenomena. But if Vitalism simply means that 'living matter has distinctive properties,' if we

Theory of Continuity

use the term 'vital,' in a descriptive, rather than in a causal sense, to denote a peculiarity of behaviour, which is found nowhere else in Nature, 'and which we cannot assert is anywhere foreshadowed in the inorganic sphere,' then no objection can be taken to the term." It is true that Professor Pringle-Pattison makes the comment that Lloyd-Morgan's "phraseology is occasionally grudging in its seeming unwillingness to recognize the relatively greater step from the non-living to the living, than from one phase of inorganic nature to another." "But in principle" he takes "his contention to be sound on the two points of immanence and continuity."

But who holds "a supernatural hiatus" or Vital Force as "something outside the recognized course of Nature" or a "particular chasm" to "account for the peculiarities of the new order of phenomena"? Certainly the scholastic philosopher does not; though he does not think that these new syntheses are adequately explained by describing them as denoting "a peculiarity of behaviour which is found nowhere else in Nature." It may be proper for science to use the term "vital" in a descriptive rather than in a causal sense, though on that point, as we have seen, there may be a difference of opinion, but for philosophy to confine itself to "descriptions" is to abrogate its specific function. In attaching "a descriptive rather than a causal sense" to the term "Vitalism," Professor Pringle-Pattison, after Lloyd-Morgan, has to admit that "vital force, chemical force, gravitative force, crystalline force, are similar terms; but if we speak of 'forces' in connexion with these different groups of phenomena, they must all alike be regarded, not as implying at any point what has been called 'an alien influx into Nature,' but as different modes of manifestation of the self-existent Cause." That, to say the least, is certainly open to a pantheistic interpretation, not, perhaps, of the Oriental kind, but rather as elaborated by Spinoza.

There are a number of words and phrases, often used by modern thinkers, such as "alien influences," "chasms," "spasmodic interferences," "gaps," etc., which are quite irrelevant in their bearing on the scholastic position, and

Theory of Continuity

are misleading as applied to the Christian doctrine of Transcendence. To illustrate the use of one of these words: "Theology," writes Professor Pringle-Pattison, "has itself in great measure abandoned the conception of a God who gives evidence of His existence chiefly by spasmodic interferences with the normal course of events—who lives in the 'gaps' of our scientific knowledge, and whose position, therefore, every conquest of science renders more precarious." And Henry Drummond in *The Ascent of Man*: "Positively the idea of an immanent God, which is the God of evolution, is infinitely grander than the occasional wonder-worker, who is the God of an old theology. Negatively the older view is not only the less worthy, but it is discredited by science." Why? Because "there are reverent minds who ceaselessly scan the fields of Nature and the books of Science in search of gaps which they fill up with God. As if God lived in 'gaps.'"

As we have seen, Sir Oliver Lodge explicitly and other scientists implicitly use the term "gaps" of certain breaks that are common in Nature. Hence to-day one might well take up the position that if there are all these gaps with which modern science acquaints us, it is unjustifiable to pass such sweeping condemnations on "gaps" in general. In any case, the charge implied in these phrases is irrelevant, if they are supposed to represent the doctrine of Catholic philosophy or theology. Let us consider an analogy or two, which may serve to illustrate what that doctrine really is.

A man plunges his stick into a nest of ants. We may suppose him to do it not from mere caprice, still less from cruelty, but from a benevolent motive, let us say, to remove an obstacle, and thus trace an easier path for the ants, by which they may get their food. The result from their point of view might be regarded as a catastrophe. Yet though there has been a break in the continuity of their lives, its line may be traced from the mind of the benevolent intruder down to the improved circumstances in which the ants now find themselves. If the action be described as an "alien influence," there is at least nothing unworthy about

Theory of Continuity

it. And if it seems to the ants to involve an element of disorder, that is evidently due to the imperfect environment in which they find themselves.

A man throws up a ball into the air. The act of free will is itself a break in continuity, and, therefore, also the result of that act, as manifested in the rise of the ball, against the "universal" law of gravitation, and along the line of which the continuity may be traced from the mind of the thrower. If we may suppose the particles of air to be endowed with a certain amount of intelligence, those in the immediate neighbourhood of the moving ball, being sent swirling through space, might interpret the unusual occurrence as due to an "alien influence." But if they could think on a higher plane, they would understand that behind it all, and giving meaning to it, was the motive of the man, and so far from confusion and disorder being the result, it would be seen to be in accordance with reason, law, and order.

Once more, to illustrate the continuity of the action whereby God illumines the mind and penetrates experience, we may consider the analogy of the communication of knowledge and power by individuals who have them to those who have them not. First, with regard to knowledge. A man dwelling in his own country and never travelling abroad knows nothing of some particular country on the Continent. But a friend, in whose word he has reason for placing implicit confidence, as a result of his travels, is able to give him information about it. There is here a break in the line of continuity of the knowledge which he has himself personally gathered, though it may be traced running down from the mind of another to his own, where it is absorbed to become an element in his own life. Again, to take the other factor. Even after receiving this information the man is unable to make any acquaintance with that country a matter of personal experience. He has come to the end of his powers through the limitation of the circumstances in which he finds himself placed. But again his friend comes to his assistance, and by means of a flying machine sets him down in the foreign country. And,

Theory of Continuity

once more, the line of continuity runs down to him from the superior powers in the possession of another, so that he can now do that which he could not otherwise accomplish. From above downward there is no break. From below upward there is a break; for the two are not necessarily reciprocal.

As has been pointed out, the difficulty generally raised by those who have treated of the subject of Continuity is, that it is impossible to *imagine* an exception to the principle: *Natura non facit saltum*. Admittedly we may not introduce any *à priori* element into our reasoning on the point, but, again, an analogy may help to keep us in touch with the reality of what takes place, as these "syntheses with new properties at critical points" come to be formed. Suppose a man to watch, somewhat inattentively, another engaged in moulding a mass of plaster or wax. In a listless fashion he watches the fingers at work on the material, without being particularly interested in the object of the worker. We may suppose him to have been so unobservant of all else, that it is as if on waking from a reverie he notices the plaster has been formed into a definite shape. The result has now a higher meaning than so much matter. Whether wax or plaster is comparatively insignificant, as being merely a means to the end which now gives meaning to that material object on which the moulder has been engaged. As a representation of a face or a building it can now be understood on a higher plane than that of the merely material. And that form is a reflection of the workman's mind, in which it was conceived and whence it proceeds. There is nothing mysterious about that which is "new," formally speaking, as an object of the mind. It does not "emerge" from matter, any more than life emerges from matter. Just as that which lives can only proceed from a living source, so that which is, or can be, understood only proceeds from mind; and such a mind may be said to be transcendent over the material order. It is true that in the case of the analogy which we have been considering, the form is external, while in that of evolutionary development it is internal, but whether we regard God as immanent or

Theory of Continuity

transcendent, and He is both, one who is omnipresent having no relation to distance, the form is a reflexion of the Divine Mind.

"The investigations of science," says Professor Thomson, "lead us to recognize an immanent order in the world." But when he insists that "if mind seems to emerge from matter it is because it was there all the time," he raises the question whether his theory is that of the American neo-realists. "Mind is not a thing apart from the organism," writes Professor Sellars (*The Essentials of Philosophy*), "but only a selective term for those inherited capacities of the organism which are developed and filled out by its functional activities." And Professor Perry (*Present Philosophical Tendencies*): "It is to be observed that mental action is a property of the physical organism." But if so, how is Professor Thomson going to reconcile his theism with this doctrine which it is difficult to distinguish from that of the well-known psychologist, Dr. Richet, who holds that mind is a function of matter? Or is it as the Soul of the world that he regards Mind? Much has been written by scientists, and many theories propounded since one who was a very great philosopher as well as an eminent scientist wrote in a well-known passage, and in words that were never more deserving of due consideration than at the present day: "This Being governs all things, not as the soul of the world, but as Lord over all; and on account of His dominion He is wont to be called Lord God, or universal Ruler; for God is a relative word, and has a respect to servants; and is the dominion of God not only over His own body, as those imagine, who fancy God to be the soul of the world, but over servants." Like St. Thomas, Newton guards himself against an illegitimate use of abstraction in reasoning about God. "He is not eternity or infinity, but eternal and infinite; He is not duration or space, but He endures and is present; and by existing always and everywhere He constitutes duration and space. . . . He is omnipresent not only virtually, but also substantially; for virtue cannot subsist without substance. . . . Blind metaphysical necessity, which is certainly the same

Theory of Continuity

always, could produce no variety of things" (*Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*).

It is on account of the ambiguous character of this philosophy, which refuses to face the question of cause, particularly as analyzed by Aristotle, that very different conclusions are inevitably drawn from it; and sometimes it is difficult to see how the conclusions are derived from the premises. Thus, Professor Thomson, while he recognizes a process of evolution from "the whirling nebula" to *Homo sapiens*, yet, regarding "purpose" as a scientific concept, writes: "But if the concept be used with regard to Nature, it must be ascribed to the Creator, the Author of Nature, the Prime Mover, God." But that is essentially a God who transcends the world which He has created, and in which He manifests His power. Professor Lloyd-Morgan, too, while he declares with regard to the philosophy of Emergent Evolution that "what needs emphasis is that however it may be named, as a frankly naturalistic interpretation, it must stand or fall," yet concludes his book with the words: "We acknowledge God as above and beyond." That, too, ought to mean that God is transcendent. "But unless we also intuitively enjoy His activity within us, feeling that we are in a measure one with Him in Substance, we can have no immediate knowledge of causality, or of God as the source of our existence and of emergent evolution." But if God created man as a finite image of Himself, as indeed must have been the case, if He was to create him at all, it is at least conceivable that man would have a finite and analogous knowledge of Him, not immediate, but arising from the study and contemplation of himself and his dependence, as well as of all the visible things that are. A "naturalistic interpretation" leaves no room for transcendence.

It is, then, only in a certain sense, and with qualifications, that a miracle can be said to be a break in continuity. When, for instance, Madame Josefa Ventura-Julia, a consumptive of Barcelona, who had been bed-ridden for nine years, was taken to Lourdes in a dying state, in June,

Theory of Continuity

1925, and on being bathed in the piscina suddenly rose completely cured, as twelve doctors on the spot testified, declaring that the facts could not be explained on natural grounds, the physical forces as *total* cause must be judged to be discontinuous with what then took place as effect. If those powers, such as the water, for instance, play any part in effecting the cure, it must be supposed that they function as secondary to the higher, principal, cause, becoming thereby transformed and raised above their ordinary, normal functions; just as when steam-power which drives an engine, under the control of the will of man, may be said to be the force of water transformed by him in order to carry out his purpose. So in the case of a miracle, descending from the mind and power of God continuously through the system of which the Divine Son made man is the centre, and by means of which man's higher destiny may be realized, the line of continuity runs down to that particular expression of the Divine Wisdom, in which all that takes place finds its explanation. When God works a miracle, therefore, He does not enter into conflict with Nature, nor is the orderly course of events turned aside as by some external and disturbing agency. It is a narrow as well as an erroneous view which would limit the whole of the reality of the world to such knowledge of it as we are able to gather through our sense perceptions. "God does nothing against nature," says St. Augustine. "When we say that He does so, we mean that He does something against nature as we know it, in its familiar and ordinary way; but against the highest laws of nature He no more acts than He acts against Himself."

Mr. Julian Huxley in his *Essays of a Biologist* would substitute "a science of an orderly for a disorderly conception of nature" as a protest against miracles. Perhaps Mr. Huxley would consider it an advantage to have everything determined and controlled by the mechanical laws of the physical universe, as a protest against whatever disorder may make its way into it, through the abuse of free will. But that would be to reduce us to the level of mere

Theory of Continuity

animals. It is not Christian theology, as Mr. Huxley says, which is "sunk in a quagmire." Yet, though we do not deify the laws of the physical world, or regard them with any superstitious reverence as the cause and explanation of everything, including the highest aspirations of man, we do hold by those laws that have been scientifically proved, such as that of Biogenesis, against what seems to be a growing tendency among a certain class of thinkers to support the theory of Abiogenesis, at least to account for the origin of life on earth. So, too, without forgetting the phenomena of growth, until the contrary proposition receives some degree of empirical support, we shall continue to hold, against the Emergent philosophers, that *per se* a stream, in a moral as in a material sense, cannot rise higher than its source, though by means of a higher power in the order of reality—the mind of man, for instance—a volume of water may be raised above its normal level.

How, then, scientists and philosophers are to interpret the Law of Continuity, in view of the innumerable gaps in the universe which seem now to be admitted, it is for them to determine. Mere continuity of space and matter is not sufficient, if as many of them now admit Purpose is to be recognized. For ourselves, we are content to follow St. Thomas on the point: "A single and creative power produces and maintains the whole creation, but though it does not spring forth afresh like a new force at each stage of creation, it none the less does not cease to flow through all of them. Hence, the effects of Divine power are naturally ordered in a continuous series of decreasing perfections, and the order of created things is such that to flow from one end to another this power must necessarily pass through all the intermediate stages" (Gilson-Bulough's translation). But if it is true that there is this continuous series of decreasing perfections, it is also true that in this concrete world in which we live there is an anabolic process, the continuity of which we shall succeed in interpreting, in so far as we are able to identify it with the design and purpose—in other words, with the supreme Reason and Will of God, as they flow down to us in the

Theory of Continuity

infinite variety of their expression. For the universe is hierarchically ordered "according to the different possible degrees of finite participation in the causality of the Cause . . . in the goodness of the Good, the nobility of the Noble, the truth of the True." And if these terms should seem to be abstract in character, we are reminded that they are identical with "the activity of the immovable Mover."

No less, then, than Dr. Blewett, from whose "striking book," *The Study of Nature and the Vision of God*, Professor Thomson quotes, are we concerned that the principle of Continuity should be "worthily treated." We can even accept his statement that "the true field of the principle of Continuity is the total history in time of the universe; and so viewed it is simply one way of apprehending the rationality of God, and of the divine action in history," provided that the "universe" is not to be taken as limited to that world of nature with which we become acquainted through our sense-knowledge. That would be to treat it as unworthily as by confining it to "certain physical and chemical processes." "The theologians" are told by Dr. Blewett that "if they would be true to theology, what they have to do is to protest, not against the principle of Continuity, but against a too narrow reading of it, and too narrow an application of it to reality." It is just because Dr. Blewett, Professor Thomson and others take a too narrow reading of the principle of Continuity that such treatment of it seems to be "unworthy." Among other things, no account is given of the meaning of the process of evolution, since no adequate term to it is suggested, and, as Professor Pringle-Pattison admits, processes can only be understood in relation to their end. Hence, this view has nothing to tell us with regard to man's destiny. It would seem to be worth while for such sincere and religious writers as Professor Thomson to remember how the philosophy of Immanence has been logically worked out not only by Mr. Alexander, but also by M. Bergson, and how Croce, who denies reality to whatever is supposed to transcend the

Theory of Continuity

historical process, holds that consequently there is no need either for religion or metaphysics. The philosophy of the supernatural supposes a higher sphere of reality than that which is contained within the limits of the natural order, which at the will of a transcendental power falls naturally into a subservient place. Life on earth would be an impossibility did not the *universal* law of gravitation hold. Yet confusion does not reign because a man "interferes" with it, no doubt for an excellent reason, by throwing a ball up in the air.

JOHN ASHTON, S.J.

THE KNIGHTS OF MALTA

THE history of the Knights Hospitallers of St. John—the Sovereign Sacred and Military Order, to give it its full title—was written while its sovereignty at Malta was still an actual fact, before the great change of the Napoleonic period, by a French priest, the Abbé Vertot. He begins his story with the following words, which well sum up the whole subject: "The history I have taken upon me to write is that of a Fraternity of Hospitallers, which afterwards became a military society, and at last a Sovereign Order, instituted upon the motives of charity and prompted by a zeal for the defence of the Holy Land to take up arms against the infidels; an Order which amidst the noise and clashing of swords, and with a continual war upon their hands, was capable of joining the peaceable virtues of religion with the most distinguished courage in the field. This union of two professions so remote and distant from each other, until then unknown to the world, the piety and bravery of these military friars, their zeal for the defence of the Christians, the numerous fights and battles in which they have been engaged for near seven hundred years, and the various success of their arms—all these particulars seem to me an object worthy the regard and consideration of mankind. Possibly the public will not look upon the history of these soldiers of Jesus Christ without surprise and admiration, for they, like a second race of Maccabees, have constantly opposed the arms of the infidels with a faith as firm as their courage has been invincible."*

The Knights have long since lost their sovereign power, but they have never given up their charitable work or their religious life. What they were founded to become in 1113, what they were when the Abbé Vertot wrote in 1726, that they are essentially to-day, shrunk though they be

* Vertot, *Histoire des Chevaliers de Malthe*, 1726.

The Knights of Malta

in power and reduced in number, yet capable in God's providence of revival and of playing at some future time once more a really great part in the fortunes of Christendom.

I. THE KNIGHTS AS A RELIGIOUS ORDER

It is, perhaps, not generally realized to-day, especially in England, that the whole religious constitution as it was originally planned is still preserved in being by properly "professed" Knights in Italy and Austria. These, of course, are the only real "Knights of St. John," the others being merely honorary, admitted to their privileges without sharing their obligations. These real Knights, the "Knights of Justice" properly so called, still make their profession in the Order for life "in the service of the poor and in the defence of the Catholic Faith, to maintain and observe with the grace of God the three things that they have promised, viz., chastity, obedience, and to pass their lives without ever possessing anything in personal property." The Order of St. John stands alone among the Orders of Chivalry, in that it has this strictly religious character which gives it the right to be reckoned among the other Religious Orders, the Benedictines, the Dominicans, the Franciscans, and so forth. The whole government of the Order, which is exercised through a Council of elected members, is exclusively in the hands of these "professed" brethren, with the Grand Master at their head.

The constitution of the Order was from the first a double one. Besides the Knights, and ranking with them, there have always been the Chaplains of the Order. These are of two grades: the senior, who in former days were those attached to the great Church of St. John at Malta, being known as the Conventual Chaplains; and the junior, who formerly were attached to Commanderies and other houses in various countries, as the Chaplains of Magistral Obedience. This double constitution of Knights and Chaplains still remains, although now, of course, there are

The Knights of Malta

but very few commanderies to be served, and the great Church at Malta has long since passed into secular hands.

At the head of the whole Order is the Grand Master. In past days, in the Crusades and, later, first at Rhodes and then at Malta, he ranked as a Sovereign Prince, holding the islands in full sovereignty, and assisted in his rule by several great officers of state, and by a Council elected by the Knights of Justice. All this state is, of course, now a thing of the past, but the great offices are still filled, and the Council is still elected, and in their hands lies the complete control of all the affairs of the Order.

These "Knights of Justice," who are fully professed and have taken the three vows, are now only a few in number. The Order nowadays has become also an international Order of Chivalry, giving its Cross as a matter of honour to a number of Catholic gentlemen who can satisfy its very stringent requirements as to nobility of birth. These Knights, who are appointed by the Grand Master on the recommendation of the members of the various "tongues," or local associations, are not required to take any vows or perform any duties. They are known as "Knights of Honour and Devotion." Those who cannot prove the full nobility of descent required by the Statutes, but who nevertheless are elected by the Order and accepted by the Grand Master, are called "Knights of Magistral Grace." Besides this ordinary Cross of Honour there is also the Grand Cross, to which only a few attain, and a Cross of lower grade given to those who have in some way been of special assistance to the Order and known as the Donat Cross. The Cross of Honour and Devotion is occasionally given to ladies of noble birth. The Chaplains and Donats do not have to prove their nobility to the same extent, their priesthood in the one case, and the services rendered to the Order in the other, being taken to supply the want. The Chaplains are of two classes: the "Conventual Chaplains," who were formerly the Canons of the great Church at Malta, and the "Chaplains of Magistral Obedience," who ministered to the Knights either in Malta or in the various Commanderies elsewhere.

The Knights of Malta

II. THE HISTORY OF THE ORDER

I. *The Foundation of the Hospital.*

No other Military Order of Christendom has a history which can in any way compare with that of the Knights of St. John. Others, such as the Templars and the Teutonic Order, had their period of glory and usefulness, but the Knights of St. John, first in the Holy Land, then in Rhodes and, lastly, at Malta, not only upheld for seven whole centuries their original purpose of serving the sick in their Hospitals, but also as one among the sovereign powers of Europe took their part, and that no small one, in the general defence of Christendom, and, it is hardly too much to say, saved Europe from being overrun by the forces of Islam.

The story begins in 1023, nine hundred years ago, with the establishment of a Hospital at Jerusalem by some pious merchants of Amalfi. This Hospital was to serve the needs of Christian pilgrims, for at that time the pilgrimage to the holy places was one which was necessarily attended by a great deal of discomfort and danger. This little Hospital was still in existence in 1099, at the time of the Irish Crusade, and was not destroyed by the Mahometans when Jerusalem was taken, and the Crusaders under Godfrey de Bouillon entered the Holy City in triumph. It was at the moment under the control of one Brother Gerard, now counted among the Blessed, and he to the utmost of its capacity threw open its doors to the wounded soldiers who had no one else to care for them. The returning armies spread abroad its praise in every country, and the hitherto obscure little Hospital found itself universally famous and enriched by gifts of lands and money from its grateful patients and others who had seen its good work. It was evident to Brother Gerard and to his companions that the time had come for putting the work on a wider and more permanent basis. They determined to form themselves into an Order for the service of the sick and suffering. They took the regular three vows of chastity, obedience,

The Knights of Malta

and poverty before the Patriarch of Jerusalem, adopting as their standard of life the Augustinian rule, and for their habit the black robe with the eight-pointed star-like Cross now universally known as the Cross of Malta. A few years later, in 1113, Pope Paschal II confirmed their constitution, took the Hospital under his own protection, and granted it the privilege of electing its own Superior. It was now a fully constituted Religious Order, devoted to the single work of the care of the sick and the help of pilgrims in the now Christian city of Jerusalem. Brother Gerard had done his work and passed away in extreme old age, acclaimed by all as one of God's saints.

2. *The Order becomes Military.*

The newly-founded Order was fortunate in that its founder was succeeded by another not less great or holy than himself, Blessed Raymond de Puy, who held the mastership for no less than forty years. This same year, 1120, in which he was elected, saw also the beginnings of another new Order of Knights, exclusively military in character, whose original purpose was to defend the roads along which the pilgrims travelled from the attacks of brigands. These Knights bound themselves by the three vows and took their name from the place where they were assigned a residence, close to the ruins of the Temple, as the Knights of the Temple of Solomon, commonly known as the Templars. The need for such an Order, in the perpetual state of warfare in which the kingdom of Jerusalem found itself, was very evident, and the Templars grew very rapidly in number, in power, and in wealth. Their example it was, probably, that gave the idea to the Hospitallers that they, too, without in any way neglecting their original vocation of the Hospital, would henceforth have the double character of Knights who went forth to fight for the recovery and maintenance of the Holy Land and also of Religious tending the sick in their great Hospital at Jerusalem. That is the point in which the Hospitallers have always been distinguished from the other Military

The Knights of Malta

Orders, that they have always borne this double character, have always regarded it as their duty to tend the sick and the wounded and to care for pilgrims, no less than to fight as occasion offered for the Christian cause against the Paynian infidel. The change from being simple Hospitallers was the work of Blessed Raymond de Puy, and when he died in 1160 he left the Order at the height of its glory, rivalling the Templars in numbers and influence—a great international institution drawing its members from every part of Europe, and fed by Priories and Commanderies in every country. These two great Orders, the Hospitallers and the Templars, to which a third had by this time been added in the Teutonic Order, were the great supports of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, now approaching the end of its century of rule in the Holy City.

In 1187 all Christendom was stirred by the news that Jerusalem had surrendered to Saladin, and the Third Crusade, the Crusade of Kings led by Richard Cœur de Lion and the King of France, was the immediate result. But the Latin kingdom was doomed. How great a part was played in the struggle by the Military Orders is well known to all students of history and to the readers of the historical romances of Sir Walter Scott. Crusade followed crusade, each feebler in effort than the preceding, all through the thirteenth century. The end came at last with the fall of Acre in 1291, and after that the Christians had no possession in the Holy Land. The Order withdrew to Cyprus, where the headquarters remained for several years.

3. *The Knights at Rhodes.*

The failure of the Crusades meant that the very object for which the great Military Orders had been established had come to an end. They had to begin afresh and to work out for themselves a new sphere of usefulness. Each of the three great Orders solved the question in a different way. The Templars decided to retire on their property in the various countries of Europe. There it was manifest that they were fulfilling no useful purpose. Their great

The Knights of Malta

wealth became an object of envy from Philip IV of France and other rulers, and their tragic fall soon followed. The Teutonic Order decided to devote itself to the conquest and conversion of Prussia, still a completely heathen country. They succeeded to a certain extent, converted the Prussians at the point of the sword, and established their principality along the coasts of the Baltic. Later on, amid the storms of the Reformation, the Grand Master and most of the Knights apostatized and married. The Grand Master, a Hohenzollern, became Duke of Prussia, and the steady aggrandizement of the family did not cease until his direct descendant, William I, became in 1871 Emperor of the Germans.

The Knights of St. John, driven from Jerusalem and the Holy Land, determined to stay on in the East and continue as far as possible in other surroundings the twofold object of their foundation. They seized the Island of Rhodes, fortified it strongly, and built there a great Hospital for the care of the sick. Their buildings still remain, the most important relics we have of the fortifications and hospitals of the fourteenth century. They became the great sea power of the Mediterranean. For two centuries at least they were the means of holding back the flood of Ottoman aggression, which but for them might easily have overwhelmed Europe. The debt which is owed by civilization to the Knights of St. John for their services in this respect has been largely ignored by English writers, but can hardly be exaggerated. Constantinople would have fallen soon after Acre, had not the Knights by sea warfare kept back the Turks. But they were inadequately supported from Europe, and by themselves unequal to the task. Constantinople fell in 1453, and then the whole force of the Turkish power was directed against the Knights. For seventy years they held out alone against all attacks. The story of the defence of Rhodes is one of the most glorious in history. But at last, in 1523, they had to capitulate, and retired with all the honours of war to Crete. The Emperor Charles V, when he heard the news, cried out that "Nothing in the world was ever so nobly lost as

The Knights of Malta

Rhodes." But it was lost, and could not be recovered, and so once more the Knights found themselves homeless and with no place from which their work could be carried on, although they themselves were numerous and full of zeal; and the need for their special works of preserving Europe from the attacks of the infidel, and of providing hospitals for the care of the sick in the Mediterranean, was clearly greater than ever.

4. *The Knights at Malta.*

Though Charles V would not help towards the recovery of Rhodes, he was anxious to keep the Order in being and very conscious of its value to Christendom and civilization. He offered them the Island of Malta in full sovereignty to take the place of Rhodes, and this offer was accepted by the Knights. The fortifications of Rhodes and the great Hospital and the necessary harbours for their naval forces were reproduced at Malta on an even larger scale. The great Church of St. John was founded to be the centre of their religious life. As Rhodes had been the bastion, so to speak, which had defended Constantinople and the Christian East from Moslem aggression, so now Malta took up the work of defence on behalf of Rome and Central Europe.

We are apt to forget how real a danger the Turkish Empire still was to Europe in the sixteenth century. The Turkish power was still advancing and still undefeated. And as formerly it had been Rhodes which was the bulwark of Christendom that held back their advance, so now it was on Malta that the brunt of the struggle fell. The Knights were hardly established when the great Turkish attack was made in 1565. By the efforts of the heroic Grand Master, Jean de la Vallette, the Turks were beaten off, and his name is still perpetuated in Valetta, the capital of Malta. A few years later the great victory of Lepanto, in which the Knights of Malta had no small share, broke the Turkish power and freed Europe from this menace.

The peace which followed Lepanto marks the highest point of the power and efficiency of the Knights of St. John,

The Knights of Malta

and also initiates the long decline which continues all through the eighteenth century. A Military Order, even if also devoted to charity, needs the stimulus of war in a just cause to keep it sound. The long period of comparative peace sapped its virtues. The Order was very rich, with Commanderies all over Europe, and luxury gradually crept into the private lives of the Knights. They no longer seemed to fill any real need. They were still "religious" in the technical sense, but the observance of their religious obligation had become lax. The French Revolution at the end of the century was fatal to their continued power. In 1798 von Honpesch, the feeble Grand Master of the day, surrendered the island to Napoleon and retired to Trieste. From that time onward the Order ceased to be in any real sense a sovereign power, and became little more than an Order of Chivalry. The headquarters of the Order was fixed at first at Catania, and later at Rome, where it still remains. The "religious" character of the Order still survives among the "professed" Knights of Justice, who retain the whole power of government in their hands. The charitable work is carried on in various hospitals, and is still recognized as one of the principal objects for which the Order exists. The old constitution is not dead, is not even in abeyance, though its scope is sadly shrunk from the magnificence of the past.

A. S. BARNES.

SOME RECENT BOOKS

“UN rêve est moins menteur, parfois, qu'un document.” Only in this perspective can we admit that Mr. Algernon Cecil's *Dreamer in Christendom* (Bell and Sons) has the value of a dream. We should rather be more inclined to use the word “vision,” because whosoever sees “Christendom” has his vision. And Mommsen is well quoted by Mussolini as having said that you could not “stay at Rome” without at least having a “universal idea.” But universal ideas are apt to seem abstract, and even a visionary, let alone a dreamer, is supposed to be occupied overmuch with the unreal. And no one can accuse Mr. Cecil of that. In this book, for example, there is an essay on Archbishop Heath which is a genuine piece of historical resuscitation, for many of us at any rate who find that More dazzles us for all other Chancellors, and Fisher for any other prelate. However, here is a man in whose “sustained grasp as well of political as of ecclesiastical reality we may discern his forgotten greatness.” An archbishop who can see, and say, that a Paul IV had been “a very austere stern father to us,” has certainly his eye on facts. How many would have glossed the austerity, if they were committed to the fatherhood, or denied the latter, if they had winced under the austerity! This man was “loyal to the temporal sovereignty of Elizabeth, but the subtleties and equivocations of the Elizabethan Settlement did not take him in.” And, on his illusionless vision, he acted. Perhaps Mr. Cecil has restored, by this one essay, a great figure to the Catholic gallery that the average man may visit. It was an American book, no doubt, that occasioned the essay, “Wycliffe, Wesley, and Newman,” but it renews our conviction that the Catholic can see all that the Protestant does, as well as a great deal more, but that it is impossible for the latter to understand the Catholic. A little arrogance is permitted. Catholics ought not to put up with the phrase, often used by their *vis-à-vis*—“We shall never understand one another.” Not so. Dean Inge will never understand Chesterton;

Some Recent Books

but Chesterton reads the Dean from end to end, and through and through. So the essay on the essay shows much more in the juxtaposition of those three Oxford names than the Congregational author can : and incidentally adds to our appreciation of the great Cardinal who became "the theologian of those who need both something more and something less than a master in theology can give them." And it was but right, for one who has the "Religio Historici," and does give himself Christendom for an objective, that there should be an essay, too, on Manning. Purcell has long since, we suppose, been put in his place. Strachey's essay on Manning is rather grimly put in its place here—we say "essay," though others might just say "Strachey," so severe is Mr. Cecil's estimate of that writer's mood. But we hold firmly that his *Queen Victoria* proves that the flaws in *Eminent Victorians* were due to a so-far unconquered mood and not to essential vice of temperament, so loyally did Mr. Strachey not disguise his gradual submission to the great personalities encountered by him as he wrote the later book. Mr. Leslie's work itself does not pass without due criticism from this very judicious writer, and altogether we are tempted to wish that Mr. Cecil would find a theme for a really full biography, so sane appears his judgement compared to that of many who either see no wood for the trees, or get so intoxicated with the beauty or hideousness of some one tree that they forget the others altogether. Add to these a very sympathetic article on Fr. Knox's "apologia," and you have a set of essays that are not at all like dreams, but can, even though but essays, be of substantial value to the historian. The paper on Vatican policy in the twentieth century was written to be read to the British Institute of International Affairs, and could not surpass a certain length. It was forced, then, to treat in what we feel impossibly narrow limits a vast theme. It is full of facts, brilliant, and wise. Yet behind the "policy" the figures of the Popes perhaps are dimmed. Perhaps the profound realization, by the Catholic world, of Pius X's sanctity, though mentioned and even em-

Dreamer in Christendom

phasized, is thus dimmed: and perhaps the martyrdom of Benedict is not fully guessed. We wonder whether the intuition of some historian will ever reach what there is so little evidence to prove! But we are sure that Benedict was great, and great in his circumstances—alas, for them! Wycliffe at the back of the Reformation, followed by a Heath, himself to be followed by a Wesley, followed by the two great Cardinals (and the subtle essay on Westminster Cathedral really gives us not a little Vaughan, and, if we think carefully, Wiseman), followed by all that occasioned the history and the books of Fr. Knox, rounded off by a chapter on Vatican policy—that really accredits the author's claim to be musing upon Christendom—at least, upon the run of the world, within which the *Res Catholica* still lives, if you insist that Christendom is no more. And it is a world in which is acted, even now, the Oberammergau Passion Play, and which still reads the *De Imitatione Christi*. We should like to have dwelt upon those two "dreamier" essays, though the chapter on the book is full of "document," no less than of real ascetical and indeed mystical appreciation—and every one of these chapters contains *aperçus*, say upon the Mass, that lift them into better than philosophy. And the last chapter, "*Religio historici*" (and it is part of the good modesty of this book that its author takes care to indicate that "*historicus*" here means student, not master, of history), really carries the whole thing forward into a realm where it is seen that Terrestrialism is at war with the Supernatural, and it is hard not to take sides, or should be hard. The worst of our contemporary symptoms may be that many men find it not hard at all. The fight is not finished, all the same, and perhaps never will be. But it is happy that we can point to a scholar, an artist, an epigrammatist, and a man of the world (as they say when "politician" or "diplomatist" would sound almost an insult), who perceives, acclaims, and bows to the Spirit.

C. C. M.

Some Recent Books

THE type represented by Algernon Cecil's *Dreamer in Christendom* has tended to give way to the news-agent or advertiser in Christendom. The cultured Catholic essayist whom it was a pleasure for Catholics and an envy to non-Catholics to read is extinct. Here is a book that the essayists and converts of the Oxford Movement would most intelligibly read to understand what of the literary current remains. The Tractarian Fathers in Limbo could read and realize that it was Rome that conquered in England. Mr. Cecil reprints his articles from the DUBLIN REVIEW on Father Knox's *Apologia*; on Wycliffe, Wesley, and Newman; between articles on the triumphant entity of Westminster Cathedral and on the Vatican Policy in the Twentieth Century, which is the most valuable paper in the collection. There are also contributions to the study of Cardinal Manning from the *Quarterly*, to the Ober-Ammergau Passion Play from *Blackwood's*, and an account of Archbishop Heath read to the Wiseman Dining Club.

On the Westminster Stations of the Cross, he says: "If the sublime is missed the realistic is secured without offence." These panels, which have troubled many quiet folk as much as Epstein's Rima, are without Divinity, but "we can realize better how immense must have been the spiritual effort to take His part, how improbable, at first sight, it may have seemed, that He was anything more than a deluded agitator." They remain the most distinctive emblems in a Cathedral which will not be able to swallow or eclipse them even if Bentley's dream were fulfilled and "the walls were sheathed in marble and mosaic and the floor was converted into a sea of polished stone—a symbolic sea of pale green cipollino from Eubœa, inlaid with fish in pink and pearl, upon which an emblematic ship of the Church would seem to ride whilst her crew stand casting their nets." The gift of Lord Brampton to the Chapel of St. Gregory suggests to Mr. Cecil an imaginary conversation between the two in which the genial Judge might have corrected the Pope's pleasant confusion of Anglian and Angelic beings. The Cathedral

Dreamer in Christendom

Taverner and Tye as the old English heard them before England what was. Here "they may hear the Masses of Taverner and Tye as the old English heard them before the Reformation."

The most important article is the quiet survey of Vatican Policy during the twentieth century. The paragraphs of facts and tendencies are summed up in sentences of attractive strength and tense discrimination. Of the amazing mission of Pius X and his Secretary of State: "It was with Apostolic fervour and evangelical faith that they faced the political problems of their time." The French separation followed for "the Vatican remembered that man does not live by bread alone." France had to use indirect means of approach, and as Merry del Val observed, "France is too great a lady to come up the backstairs."

The Italian situation face to face with the Holy See lay in "the inability of Liberalism to support the burden of its offspring." The development of Catholic Action in Italy followed. "An evangelical indifference to material loss and an equally evangelical readiness to do the best one may by those who have used one ill, stand out as the most notable events of the reign of one who was destined to restore all things in Christ." No clearer summary could be possible. So died the Tenth Pius, sending word to the last of the Hapsburg Emperors that he blessed Peace not War! The reign of Benedict XV was one long agony of neutrality and search for charity and peace. Europe preferred to exclude both, and after his last Peace Note was turned into a war trumpet by the hitherto far more pacific and neutral Wilson, the Pope withdrew behind the tombs of the Apostles. As he had declined to shout one side during the war he was allowed no say in the peace. "He had stood for a negotiated peace, and the world had preferred a dictated one." And yet the results of the war conveying the fall of Czar, Sultan, and Kaiser could not have been distressing to the Holy See. The heresies of Mohammed and Luther and the Greek Schism had all been shorn of their heads.

The Church has not failed the world with peace-counsels.

Some Recent Books

Ecclesia abhorret a sanguine. So much we can see writ large across the great Encyclicals of Leo XIII upon Labour, repeated in the dying benediction of Pius X, pressed upon the world most earnestly in the much-abused Eirenicon of Benedict XV, dwelt upon in the allocutions of Pius XI. It is clear that whoever has reaped the Treaty of Locarno, the evangelical seeding and the tear-stained growth of peace lie to the credit of the Holy See.

There is a delightful essay on the *Imitation*, with facts concerning the shrine of the writer, unknown to most readers of a book which, "fragrant though it was with the scent of Catholicism, slipped like a nosegay through the prison-bars of the Protestant, and spent its dying odours in the dungeons of the sceptic." Mr. Cecil turns Thackeray's thrusts against the *Imitation* by a fair criticism of *Vanity Fair*, its spiritual antithesis: "A precise demonstration by one, not wholly ignorant of their charm, of the emptiness of the shadows men habitually pursue—shadows of wealth and distinction, echoes of good company, memories of wine and of such women as can be mentioned in the same breath with wine, reflections of the glass of fashion, and poses in the robe of state." A subtle way of describing the *Imitation* is recounting what it is not!

From the essay on that rare Elizabethan, Archbishop Heath, we draw a citation of Froude's brilliant as unexpected insight into the character of a Catholic Bishop in history: "A Catholic Bishop holds his office by a tenure untouched by the accidents of time. Dynasties may change, nations may lose their liberties, the firm fabric of society itself may be swept away in the torrent of revolution—the Catholic prelate remains at his post; when he dies, another takes his place, and when the waters sink again into their beds the quiet figure is seen standing where it stood before—the person, perhaps, changed—the thing itself rooted like a rock on the adamantine base-ments of the world"—a good quotation to slip into the fly-sheet of Cardinal Manning's unpublished book on the Episcopal Office. Manning leads Mr. Cecil to Mr. Lytton Strachey, of whom he writes as "probably the best example

Dreamer in Christendom

of a literary valet that any country has ever had the good fortune to possess. He appears to have no English heroes at all; and he consequently valets the Victorian age, where heroes abounded, with the most finished perfection." Mr. Cecil's critiques never fail in taste, perception, and charity.

S. L.

THE BOOK OF THE POPES, translated from the German of Dr. Bayer, with a preface by Fr. Thurston (Methuen), makes a delightful companion to Ranke or Pastor or Mann. Here we have not only the correct card, but pictures of the Popes, their tombs, arms and residences. The only dubious additions are the Malachian prophecies on which Fr. Thurston warns the reader that they were forged in the sixteenth century with the help of the book published by Onofrio Panvinio in 1557. Panvinio was often inaccurate, and is corrected in two examples given here. The Fourth Clement was given the Malachian motto *Draco depressus*, because Panvinio attributed a dragon trampled by an eagle as his arms. The Third Calixtus was ascribed as *bos pascens* for the same reason. In the authentic arms the *bos* carried his head in the air and there was no dragon at all. The translations of the mottoes do not always cover their meaning. The English Pope, the Fourth Adrian, was *de rure albo*, which is obviously an attempt at Albion. "The white land" might be anywhere in the north. *De modicitate lunae* of the Fifth Nicholas may mean "out of the humble moon," but heraldically a decrescent moon refers to his place of origin. Naturally the mottoes since the Fifth Sixtus have generally struck a miss except by an accident, such as the *aquila rapax* of the Seventh Pius, which may be taken to refer to Napoleon; or by the general application of such as the *ignis ardens* of the Tenth Pius or the *fides intrepida* of the Eleventh. The accident of war gave a special sense to the *religio depopulata* of the late Pope. Incidentally 1880 is not the date of the Seventh Pius. Except for these mythical mottoes, which cannot be sufficiently discredited, the book is a sound historical memorizer. S. L.

Some Recent Books

MR. CHESTERTON has been able in his *William Cobbett* (Hodder and Stoughton) to expand the tribute he has already paid more allusively to the man who, a century-and-a-half ago, held almost solitarily right views about pretentious shops and paper-money and brutal floggings of soldiers and strangely unpunished politicians, and the elementary chicanery of National Debts, which its contractors leave other generations to pay—if they can. And when a man who can think honestly can also, as Cobbett could, put his thoughts into an answering English, not shrinking, if need were, from what Mr. Chesterton accounts his splendid scurrilities, he seems to be such an one as is predestined to gather some of the fruits of his labours. But Cobbett was not so comforted. He died a beaten, broken man. He has had to wait a century for the honour that would have pleased him more than that of any possible contemporary conferring—a book of Mr. Chesterton's about him.

The son of a small Surrey farmer, and the grandson of a farm-labourer, William Cobbett was born at Farnham in 1762. He supplemented his rustic schooling by a good deal of reading on his own account—almost the first book he read under a haystack was Swift's *Tale of a Tub*, a title, Mr. Chesterton notes, "so much in his own verbal fashion," and an author summed up as "that dark but not ignoble spirit who, a hundred years before, had seen the first victory of our Venetian oligarchy and despaired." Adventure called even Cobbett from the land. "He saw a coach with 'London' on it, and inconsequently got on to it and went careering away, leaving his lady friends, his fair, his farm, and his family behind him, like things of the past." Like young Disraeli later, he went into a London lawyer's office—and went out of it. That was not the only kinship between those two men who probably cannot be named together without a guffaw from Mr. Chesterton. But whether he got it from Cobbett or not—his sympathy with Thomas Cooper, Chartist, is an evidence of Disraeli's open mind on the great "condition of the people" question—in *Sibyl* (which he spells *Sybil*)

William Cobbett

he puts the case of the despoiled Religious Houses, and the Reformation's robbery of their patrimony from the poor, precisely as Cobbett himself would have put it. Mr. Chesterton, in this regard, has his own delightful byplay :

We should think it rather odd if a profiteer had a country house that was called The Cathedral. But we can hardly see the posterous profanity by which one chance rich man after another has been able to commandeer or purchase a house which he still calls an Abbey. It is precisely as if he had gone to live in the parish church, had breakfasted on the altar or cleaned his teeth in the font. That is the short and sharp summary of what has happened in English history.

And, after an allusion to *Northanger Abbey* and to General Tilney, whom "even Jane Austen could hardly have mistaken for an abbot," he profoundly says of her :

She could not be expected to see the truth about the Tudor transition. In these matters she had begun with books, and could not be expected to read what is written in mere buildings and big monuments. She was educated, but had not the luck to be self-educated like Cobbett. They were the four sharpest eyes that God had given to England at that time; but two of them were turned inward into the home, and two were looking out of the window.

After that sentence, on which every educationist may well ponder, he says :

All this is written in large letters of stone and clay across the land; in a giant alphabet of arch and column and flying buttress. And these three striking things stand out to tell the main tale of English history, even to a man who had never opened a book. Somehow or other there had once been a larger religious life which was also a popular life. Somehow or other its memorials had been taken over by a new race of men, who had been able to disdain alike the people and the religion.

When Cobbett himself began to read, he had the good luck to get hold of the right kind of book, a rare chance in the case of histories written by Englishmen :

Cobbett had to go a little deeper than these superficial summaries to trace in the past the truths he had already discovered in

Some Recent Books

the present. It was a fortunate coincidence that it was precisely at this time that the most learned and laborious of English historians produced the work on which so many other works have been founded. John Lingard was a very moderate man, but even the prejudices he was presumed to have gave him a detached position from the fashionable fallacies of that particular age. With a mass of material he established his own very moderate version of what had really happened in England; and by the use of that material Cobbett produced his own version, which some have hesitated to call moderate.

Mr. Chesterton goes on to show that violence need not compromise veracity. It is, he says, accurate to say: "The Rev. Titus Oates declared on oath his knowledge of a Papist conspiracy; but his statements, which led to the execution of many Papists, were subsequently found to be fictitious." But, he adds, it is every bit as accurate to say: "The liar and perjurer Oates cruelly swore away the lives of innocent Catholics, blasphemously calling on God to witness to his murderous lie." In those sentences may be indicated the chief difference between Lingard and Cobbett:

But the shock came from the moral comment or application rather than from the definite details. For instance, it is supremely characteristic of Cobbett that he reversed the common titles by talking of Bloody Bess and Good Queen Mary. Everybody knew even then that Queen Elizabeth was bloody, if pursuing people with execution and persecution and torture makes a person bloody; and that was the only reason for saying it of Mary. Everybody knew even then that Mary was good, if certain real virtues and responsibilities make a person good; a great deal more indubitably good than Elizabeth. It was not really Cobbett's history that was in controversy; it was his controversialism. It was not his facts that were challenged; it was his challenges.

Perhaps, even in this quiet pronouncement, a touch of autobiography will be felt—it must have been the challenge of Mr. Chesterton, indefectible in his facts, that has sometimes roused the light resentments of the ignorantly ribald reader. There may even be times when readers of quite another kind may wish for a little less retort, made sometimes in advance of the objection, than they get in

William Cobbett

these pages. Mr. Chesterton has yet to give that specimen of a perfect relation of biographical narrative which many of us await at his hands.

Cobbett as a Member of Parliament had almost of necessity wordy wars with O'Connell, the days of whose duelling ended with the death of D'Esterre, in penitence wherefor he wore a symbolic white glove on his right hand, to remind himself of his sin, especially when he received the Sacrament. When Cobbett died, he died in a privacy which he prized, but which might have been named neglect:

Only his family and a few friends appear as recognizable figures in the landscape of his funeral; but as they carried the coffin through the meadow and churchyard, there followed it one lonely figure that would have been conspicuous in any landscape; a man of giant stature, clad in black and with a white glove on his right hand.

The return to the platforms of to-day of so much that Cobbett taught is of course obvious. But only a poet's touch could, in the final lines of the volume, bring it home to us in language that stirs us to the depths by its beauty:

I passed much of my childhood along that main thoroughfare where Cobbett had his seed-farm at Kensington. All that he hated has triumphed on that spot. The ordinary shop that he thought a nuisance has swelled into the big emporium he would have thought a nightmare; the suburb has sunk deep into the new London; but the road still runs westward down which he went riding so often, heading for the open country, and leaving the Wen (his name for London) as far as possible behind. The Wen has pursued him, shooting out further and further in telescopic perspective, past Hammersmith and Chiswick and Richmond; and still I seem to see the back of that vanishing rider ever ahead, and lessening amid changing scenery; hills turning about him like a transformation scene, almost away to the stormy wall of Wales. And yet it seems to me that with us also things change and even change places; and the war does not always go one way. When I used to go out as a boy into the green twilight, having written nonsense all night, and drink coffee at a stall in the street, brooding upon all these things, it seemed then as if the tide were running high enough in one direction; but I have since had a notion that high tides can turn. I discovered, at least, that even in all that labyrinth of the new London by night there is an unvisited hour

Some Recent Books

of almost utter stillness, before the creaking carts begin to come in from the market-gardens to remind us that there is still somewhere a countryside. And in that stillness I have sometimes fancied I heard, tiny and infinitely far away, something like a faint voice hallooing and the sound of horse-hoofs that return.

A smile should perhaps be given to relieve the affecting quality of all beauty, including beauty in words. There is material quite handy, as, for instance, a casual witticism of Mr. Chesterton's that must pass into the story of the land—his allusion to the pheasant as sometimes more a matter of concern than the peasant—an *h* that the squire never dropped!

W. M.

DURING the eighteenth century, holy Frenchwomen never ceased to found Religious Orders, and of the survivors few have become better known than the Assumption Nuns. Alice, Lady Lovat has written the life of the Foundress, *Marie Eugenie Milleret* (Sands), and Sir John Lavery has painted a posthumous frontispiece, in which the face of the modern educationist is blended with the mysterious mediæval robes. Her life is one of success and sanctity. Owing her vocation to Lacordaire, she commenced her Order of Nuns in 1839 in Paris under the direction of an eccentric director, who deserted them when they would not accept his endless changes of rule. But what man even spiritually endowed has the common sense to advise a community of women? Their new protector, Archbishop Affré, was shot on the barricades of 1848 in the act of restoring peace between the army and the mob. In 1870 the House at Auteuil lay between the fire of the Communists and the troops, but in spite of all troubles the scheme of education was advanced and the Order slowly reached, like the sound of the Apostles, into all corners of the earth, to Manila and Malaga, Philadelphia and Kensington. The Nuns reckoned among their pupils a Queen of Spain and the niece of Leo XIII. Lady Lovat has made the life of the Foundress as touching as hagiography and as interesting as a novel—but a novel with a heroine.

S. L.

Mystics and English Martyrs

A valuable addition to the history of English Catholic institutions has been made by E. S. Durrant (the sex of the author is not indicated) in the book on *Flemish Mystics and English Martyrs* (Burns Oates and Washbourne), which deals with John Ruysbroek and the mystics of the Windesheim congregation of canons regular as well as with the four English convents of nuns which derive their existence from that celebrated congregation. These four convents are those at Abbotsleigh in Devonshire, its filiation at Hoddesdon in Hertfordshire, the English convent in Bruges, and its filiation at Haywards Heath in Sussex. The early chronicles of St. Ursula's, Louvain, now settled at Abbots Leigh, were edited by Dom Adam Hamilton of Buckfast Abbey and published some years ago; now we have the story of the convent at Bruges, and it is obvious that the author of this book has had free access to inside information.

The real founder of the Windesheim congregation was Gerard Groote, who never became a canon regular himself, but on his deathbed bade his followers, the Brothers of the Common Life, adopt the rule of St. Augustine, which they did. Some of them went to Groenendaal, near Brussels, in the forest of Soignies, for training in the canonical life, and this brings the mystic Blessed John Ruysbroek into the story, though he was not a canon of Windesheim. The rule of St. Augustine was adopted in 1386, and the new congregation of canons flourished exceedingly: in 1407 it possessed a dozen monasteries, and by the end of the century there were eighty-six houses of canons and twelve of canonesses. One of its mystics, Thomas à Kempis, would alone arouse an interest in any book dealing with this observant congregation, and this one will certainly be much appreciated as the author makes the Windesheim spirit a living thing. But to the generality of readers perhaps the second part will be more attractive, for it relates the story of our two ancient convents of Windesheim canonesses.

Among the houses for women was one at Louvain, dedicated to St. Ursula, which was founded from Deventer

Some Recent Books

in the year of grace 1415. There, some hundred and thirty years later, appeared one day an English canoness from the suppressed abbey of Burnham in Buckinghamshire. The name of this lady was Elizabeth Woodford. She joined the Louvain community and remained at St. Ursula's till her death, a quarter of a century later: and it is suggested that some of the terms and customs still in vogue among the spiritual descendants of these Louvain canonesses may, through her, be an inheritance from the English nuns of Burnham—as, for example, the office of chaplain to the prioress, which appears to have been unknown to Windesheim though known in England, as witness Chaucer. As time went on a number of English ladies joined the community; and they form the link between the Flemish mystics and the English martyrs, for many of them were near of kin to those who suffered for the faith in this country. Among the rest was a lady named Margaret Clement, who became prioress at the early age of thirty; she has left on record the interesting fact that Elizabeth Woodford would sometimes advise that, should the English nuns return to England, they should never have abbesses, on account of the abuses which she had seen enter into religion through such dignitaries; prioresses, she said, were in England much better followers of the observances of the Order.

In 1609 an offshoot from St. Ursula's was established in Louvain for English nuns. This was St. Monica's, which on the outbreak of the revolutionary wars was removed to England and is now at Abbotsleigh. Many relatives of the martyrs and many daughters of the noblest English Catholic families became nuns in the new house: so many, indeed, that only a score of years after its foundation a filiation was established at Bruges, where the community life has gone on unbroken save for a short period during the Revolution when the nuns came to England. And as Abbotsleigh had established a daughter house at Hoddessdon, so in 1886 did Bruges establish one at Hayward's Heath; but in this case daughter is joined to parent by exceptionally close ties, as by a special privilege granted

Mystics and English Martyrs

by the Holy See interchange of subjects is allowed between the two houses. There are then to-day four houses of English canonesses which have come from Windesheim; houses which have always observed and still observe substantially its constitutions. That being so, it cannot be doubted that *Flemish Mystics and English Martyrs* will receive a warm welcome. E. B.

IN May, 1920, Dr. Walter McDonald, Prefect of the Dunboyne Establishment at Maynooth, died. During the last ten years of his life he occasionally spoke to his friends about his *Reminiscences of a Maynooth Professor* (Jonathan Cape). It would contain, he used to say, his memories of student days in Maynooth, and his recollections of persons with whom he had been associated, and crises through which he had passed as a member of the Maynooth teaching staff. Now, more than five years after his death, this work has been given to the world by Dr. McDonald's literary executor, Mr. D. Gwynn. The Editor warns us in his Preface that he has omitted in the publication certain portions of the MS. because they "might have given more offence than he (the author) would have wished," and others because Dr. McDonald's attitude towards the matters with which they dealt could be more fully ascertained in works published during Dr. McDonald's life-time. It has been widely rumoured also that Dr. McDonald, during the last few days of his life, decided, for one reason or another, to arrange for the excision of not unimportant sections of his MS. The work as it is now accessible to the public is, therefore, much less perfect in its literary balance than it was originally intended to be.

The composition of his "Reminiscences," Dr. McDonald tells us, began about 1913. The final pages of the work were written very shortly before his death—when even the Author himself knew that the end was near. That the *Reminiscences* were written largely in the war period, and in the troubled times that followed it, must be kept clearly in view by those who would desire to judge

Some Recent Books

the work fairly. It must be said at once that this book is quite unlike what a volume of Reminiscences by a venerable professor, whose whole priestly life had been spent in teaching, might be expected to be. Dr. McDonald did not write his Reminiscences in a mellow and genial spirit, judging the times and people of his youth and prime with the kindly indulgence of ripe experience. He wrote rather as a soured and disappointed man whose ideals had seemed to himself to have been flouted even by his friends.

The Reminiscences begin with his childhood, and even in his recollections of his earliest years there is bitterness. It is the same with his memories of the years which he spent in the primary and secondary schools. He had no memory, it would seem, of the pleasant friendships and emulations and pranks of the average schoolboy; he remembered only the defects of a school-system which retarded his intellectual growth. One is half inclined to suspect that one has here rather the critical attitude of the discontented Professor than genuine memories of youth. But it is possible that the critical tendencies that were to show themselves so strongly in later years had begun to appear even in the schoolboy. When Dr. McDonald comes to describe his entrance into Maynooth and his first years as a student there, student-mentality predominates clearly over philosophic reflection. Here we should have expected a sympathetic treatment of the difficulties under which the teaching system of a recently disendowed college laboured. But Dr. McDonald's account of the Maynooth of his student days might have been written by a disgruntled Third Divine who had done badly in the Order List. The more important Professors—men like Murray, Crolly, Walsh, Molloy—are presented to us as second-rate teachers afraid to face the difficulties of their subjects, or, worse still, unconscious of the very existence of such difficulties. Other Professors are depicted as living in dread of their classes because of their own incompetence. Superiors are, almost without exception, described as men who would have failed, perhaps, less miserably in any office other than that to which the

A Maynooth Professor

Trustees had appointed them. There is scarcely a gleam of brightness anywhere in this description of the college in which Dr. McDonald learned the elements of Philosophy and Theology. The reader will feel that in this section of his *Reminiscences* the author's prejudices have perverted his historical judgement, and that he has failed utterly to distinguish between the needs and possibilities of different periods. When we come to Dr. McDonald's memories of his associates as a member of the college staff there is still a thick atmosphere of pessimism. He represents practically all his colleagues as ambitious of ecclesiastical promotion, and, therefore, time-serving and dishonest. In his reminiscences of the crises of his life as Professor—the condemnation of his book on Motion, his resignation from the editorial staff of the *Irish Theological Quarterly*, the O'Hickey case, etc.—he has not a friendly word for any colleague of those days except Dr. O'Hickey. He does not hesitate to publish the results of votings at private and confidential meetings of College Faculties in order to prove that not many more than one just man could be found in his days in Maynooth. His long account of the condemnation of his work on Motion is interesting as indicating the great kindness with which Dr. McDonald was treated in that affair by the Trustees. It is interesting, also, as emphasizing Dr. McDonald's eagerness to show that his condemned work was less advanced in teaching than manuals which were accepted in Rome. It would have pleased Dr. McDonald, perhaps, if he could have known that the Westminster Ordinary would have given the *Imprimatur* to the *Reminiscences*—even though they contain a confident restatement of the Kinetic Theory—did they not “so strongly criticize the ecclesiastical system of the Irish Church.” The account of the O'Hickey case is the longest unit-section in the book. As we read it we feel that the section ought to have been headed, “The McDonald-O'Hickey case,” for Dr. McDonald appears as the protagonist in the affair. It is very questionable whether the lengthy treatment of a highly technical matter

Some Recent Books

like the O'Hickey appeal to Rome is likely to be of much service or deep interest to any reader; and it might be argued that Dr. McDonald, in his presentation of the case, has seriously shifted its centre of gravity.

In the book's closing section is a pathetic interest; for the "Last Flutter," as he calls it, was written when the shadow of death was beginning to envelop the author. Much indeed of the "Last Flutter" merely summarizes what is contained in certain essays published shortly before the author's death. But there are also here strange glimpses of the theological mind of one who knew that he was about to pass through the portals of death—dimly outlined problems of Scripture, Dogmatic Theology, History, and Psychology, on which he had long brooded, and which he was looking forward eagerly to solve when the veil should be lifted. But, in spite of his problems, his faith was serene. Those who saw him die know that he passed away upborne by a simple untroubled faith in the great truths of the Christian revelation. Shortly before his death he spoke about it calmly in the most matter-of-fact fashion, as if he were preparing to go on a vacation journey or to make some other not unpleasant tour. Though here and there in the *Reminiscences* he speaks of faith-crises through which he had passed, it would almost seem as if his theological difficulties were concerned, in general, more with the formulation than with the content of Catholic teaching. He speaks of Modernism with contemptuous hostility, but his animus against certain Catholic theologians who, as he thought, confounded essential and unessential teaching, was scarcely less bitter. When, however, his book on Motion was condemned he submitted in the most complete fashion to ecclesiastical authority. When it is wondered at that the Trustees should have left him at peace in his Chair for so long after his book had been condemned, it must not be forgotten that he had made full submission, and withdrawn his book from sale. It must be remembered, further, that, as Prefect of the Dunboyne, he had very few students, and only such as were already ordained and capable of taking a

A Maynooth Professor

critical attitude towards his teaching. It is an interesting fact that, so far as is known, no student of his ever became an apostle of his special doctrines.

As an account of the history of Maynooth during the author's lifetime the book is a failure. It gives no genuine idea of the great progress in the organization of college studies and teaching made since the middle of the last decade of the nineteenth century. A casual reader of the *Reminiscences* might well imagine that the Maynooth of Dr. McDonald's student days had remained substantially unchanged to the end of his life. One is tempted to think that the great additional teaching facilities provided in Maynooth during the last quarter of a century had somehow escaped the notice of the author of the *Reminiscences*. To a certain extent, no doubt, his own immediate personal interests and ambitions and his somewhat bitter memories of the past prevented him from seeing the new life that was springing up about him in the college. Had he seen it he would, perhaps, have claimed in the *Reminiscences* to have in great measure inspired it; and, though such a claim would have been exaggerated, it might reasonably be maintained that his example of untiring industry and zeal as a Professor served as a stimulus and an inspiration to the college generally, and thus helped to evoke the new spirit which has come to reign at Maynooth.

To the friends, associates, and students of the late Dr. McDonald this book must appear as a sort of a riddle. Instead of the brilliant, stimulating Professor who, in spite of his wealth of knowledge, was always ready to lend a sympathetic attention to every opponent's theory, and always eager to learn even from the humblest student, we have here a proud and self-centred thinker who will accept no explanation of his critic's opposition but ignorance or dishonesty. The cheerful friend and delightful companion that we knew of old, with his sunny smile and mirthful laugh, is here hidden away utterly behind a mask of dour and cynical pessimism. None that was acquainted with the Dr. McDonald of the pre-war period will recognize him in the portrait which the author of the *Remi-*

Some Recent Books

niscences has sketched of himself. The book is a pathetic self-misrepresentation, and, though here and there it gives much interesting information and suggests valuable educational points of view, we cannot help regretting its publication. X.

MEN for the most part get the biographies they deserve; and *The Life of W. T. Stead*, by Frederic Whyte (Jonathan Cape) offers no exception to the common rule. Two goodly volumes will not be grudged to the record, Stead being the man he was, and Mr. Whyte the recorder that he is. For Stead was the journalistic creature and creator of his time, a time of great journalistic transitions. He was the father of the sensationalism that lovers of the older reserves may regret; but sensationalism was with him a means not an end. He united in himself a great sincerity and a mastery of the arts of the advertiser. Cardinal Newman, whom no one would name a sensationalist, once apologized for his emphasis—we have to shout, he said, in order to be heard. If those shouts would pass as the faintest of whispers now, Stead's bombs have been a large factor in that readjustment of the capacities of the human ear. His pen speared away the reticences, where he thought the reticences became the confederates of wrong; his pen that was to him very much what his sword had been to the crusader; even to the detail that he would willingly have knelt to receive for it the blessing of a Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster.

For the name of Stead will always be associated with that of Manning. No two men could have been more unlike in temperament, or taste, or in all the accidents of environment. Manning was an incarnation of all the decorums. He had, as Aubrey de Vere said when he first saw him, *Sacerdos* written on his brow. Harrow, Oxford, Chichester marked his demeanour and spoke with his tongue. Stead, the son of a Dissenting Minister, without the background of Merton and with no windows in the world automatically opening for him, stepped forth a free-lance among his fellows. But there was one thing

The Life of W. T. Stead

that united them, whatever else might be the severance. Both had the enthusiastic love of their fellows which sprung from an enthusiastic love of Christ. All prejudices and preferences paled before that Light which in these two so differently constituted men, was apparent, the one to the other. The association between them was at its closest where the need was greatest—when Stead, as editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette* in 1885, entered on the campaign that helped and forced into law the Criminal Law Amendment Act, an Act that further safeguarded young girls from allurements to ruin. To Archbishop Benson and Cardinal Manning, Stead made in advance a personal appeal. Benson “shuddered at the plan”; but Manning was convinced that the evil called for extreme measures—he may have shuddered, but he did not shrink. A private Committee of Enquiry was held, with Manning as its President. When, a little later, one of Stead’s proofs of the ease with which a mere child could be procured brought him into the dock and sent him farcically to prison, the Cardinal was subpoenaed for the defence. In prison Stead wrote: “My brother came to see me and read me a very kind message of sympathy from Cardinal Manning, who throughout has ever been the kindest and most thoughtful of friends.” And, in a letter to the Cardinal from his cell, he makes to him an unexpected request: “I shall be very glad to have the benefit of your advice as an Englishman, an ex-minister of the Anglican Church, and the Chief of the Catholic Hierarchy in England, as to how best within possible limits to increase the usefulness of the Established Church.” It sounds like a jest; but the Cardinal wrote in reply:

I was glad to receive your letter and to see from the vigour of it that your health keeps up, for of your courage I had no fear or doubt. There can be no misgiving as to the work you have done, or the work you have begun: or of the effect of trial, sentence, and imprisonment. It will all stir up greater resolution, and add wisdom and caution to those who are working with you; and, if it does not stop the mouth of the lions, it is only because nothing can. We would do everything to take the Christianity of England up into the verity of perfect faith. We will do nothing to pull

Some Recent Books

down or mutilate or destroy. I shall rejoice to see any work of good in the Anglican system; for I hold that the nearer a man is to God, the nearer he is to the Council of Trent.

Stead, the willing reformer (from without) of the Anglican Church, did not hesitate to extend his operations to the Roman. His "Letters from the Vatican," published in the *Pall Mall* in the autumn of 1889, were re-issued in a volume, *The Pope and the New Era*, "the outcome," says Mr. Whyte, of that friendship with Cardinal Manning which had begun in connexion with the "Maiden Tribute" articles, and which was to last until the Cardinal's death in January, 1892. Manning, for a time at any rate, failed to get the biographer he deserved, for his support of "the odious *Pall Mall Gazette*" is dismissed by Purcell in half-a-dozen lines. Stead's personal impressions of the Cardinal, like Mr. Bodley's, may do something to correct the caricature put forward, with consummate skill, especially as to its omissions, by Mr. Lytton Strachey. In Stead's case it was homage at first sight:

How well I remember the day on which I first saw Cardinal Manning! I had been three years in London, and during all that time—so great a recluse had I been—I had never seen the Cardinal. Cardinal Grandison in *Lothair* was quite as real to me as the actual Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. At last the time came when I saw him. The annual meeting of the Metropolitan Association for befriending Young Servants was being held in Stafford House, and the Cardinal was present. It was not a scene to be soon forgotten. The representatives of all the philanthropies met at the foot of the staircase of that stately hall to listen to a plea for the little slaveys of London from the lips of the Roman Cardinal and Prince of the Church. When he rose to speak I was almost aghast at the extreme fleshlessness of his features. His tall form, erect and slender as a spear, showed to great effect above the throng. I remember no other speaker. I only see the Cardinal. He spoke with feeling and tenderness, born of evident sympathy for the hard-worked, over-driven little serving-maids of this great city. There was no passion save compassion. He spoke quietly and tenderly.

When Stead sent *The Pope and the New Era* to the Cardinal, he said:

The Life of W. T. Stead

I send you my book, which may be said to owe its being to you. For that there could be any relations between the Pope and the New Era excepting those of war to the knife is an idea which would never have gained possession of the popular mind but for your life-work. Whether you are not somewhat of a white blackbird in the Church is now the only question. But it is an immense change to have it admitted that even sometimes a blackbird may be white.

When Stead started *The Review of Reviews* in 1893 the letters of good wishes that came to him included, as almost a matter of course, one from the Cardinal. It was to be no ordinary magazine, be sure! It was to be a go-between and bond between such as the Catholic Church itself had set out to be, with disappointing results. And so on, and so on. Stead the idealist was always there—he could not be content with common things—not even with the common romances of journalism. We have dwelt on his friendship for the great Cardinal as just one episode, but a thoroughly characteristic one, of his chequered career. A fanatic, he did not fear the laugh against him. He was only a Bed-stead to Henley and his group. His messages from Julia in the Beyond are even more unconvincing than most of their class. They did not serve to keep him safe from the *Titanic*, in the destruction of which he endured a death such as he might well have devised for himself in one of his sublime yet advertisingly-propagandist moments. His biographer has our thanks for the great industry and greater ability of which these volumes, in themselves and in their offshoots, will be a long-enduring monument. W. M.

ANNE LESLIE, who became the *Anne Chichester* of whom Mrs. G. J. Romanes has written the story (G. Bell and Sons) was a pleasant girl, and the story itself is pleasant, too, and friendly. Certainly she had some bad times and went near to being embittered, but she came through unharmed, owing to the Faith that found and shepherded her. Her husband wasn't much of a fellow, but then Mrs. Romanes never meant him to

Some Recent Books

be, and never allowed us to suppose he was going to be, though he turned out not so badly after all. Even the young lady he went off with hadn't got very much of the "devil" that Anne, an artist of the kind who paints character, showed, without meaning to, peering out of the still-innocent Doris's eyes. And Doris, too, finished in peace. In fact, the book is full of friendly pleasant people whom you are quite glad to meet, and if you never come to know them *very* well, you know them just a little better than you know most friendly and pleasant people, and that is all to the good. The Scotch atmosphere is pervasive, and you don't feel you are being ordered to breathe it, and it is a healthy atmosphere and you like it. One cavil: Mrs. Romanes *must* make her proof-reader more careful with foreign words: *genüthig*, il Cavalleria, *serrement du cœur*, faites *lui* monter, abbé *Sertillage*. Finally, Anglo-Catholics, like Presbyterians, figure in the book, but there is no breath of unkindliness: this is excellent. Some sternness is reserved for an Established prelate—but that, too, is right.

N. K.

A book by Canon W. H. Carnegie, sub-dean of Westminster Abbey and Speaker's Chaplain to the House of Commons, cannot but be a work of culture, courtesy, and balanced view. His new *Anglicanism* (Putnam) indeed combines the noble aspirations of the *Morning Post* with the judicious outlook of *The Times* and the wisdom of the *Spectator*. "Anglicanism," chapter i begins, "is becoming a factor of importance in Christendom." The statement is honourably modest. Christendom is the wider thing: Anglican is a departmental adjective: words in -ism suggest a system of thought or behaviour or a mood rather than a concrete living entity; and anyhow, Anglicanism is *becoming* important in a world-wide way. It has not quite escaped from its insularity, but it is *en route*. The Anglo-Saxon race is provoking vast reactions, creating cosmic situations, and in some of these the Anglican Church cannot but be "called upon to play a prominent part." For instance, a

Anglicanism

Church "in which Catholicism and Protestantism can combine as complementary rather than as contradictory forces" encourages one to hope that it may help in the wider field. The Canon foresees the day when, "under the conditions established by Anglicanism," Catholics and Protestants may everywhere co-operate, enrich one another's thought, and so forth. Moreover, Anglo-Saxons are increasingly conscious that they are destined to a "determining part in the oncoming period of the world's history"; and that "a leading place; perhaps the leading place" has been "assigned" to them in the "march of civilized progress." The Higher Imperialism. But then, the Anglican Church, including in itself our splendid characteristics of traditionalism, experimentalism, adaptability to circumstance, and subordination of theory (we had almost said, of principle) to success, will be able to do much for those more limited Christian groups she encounters as she marches, groups to whose "partial" movements of thought she is not a victim. Thus the Established Church, being in origin and soul national, bids fair, as the Empire waxes, to become an instrument of universality: this may be her vocation; thus is she "true Church"; and here is the link between her obvious nationalism and her potential internationalism. For (chap. ii) internationalism is of the essence of Christianity, and the Church of England, despite its tendency from the outset, owing to its insular segregation, to "develop along the lines of independent nationalism," was really international owing to her Roman apostles. That Augustine conquered was to the good, though the real man who admitted England into the European comity of life appears to have been Theodore. He created an ecclesiastical unity which rendered the inestimable service of creating in its turn a national one. This caused the Church in England, however Roman in allegiance, especially after the Conquest, to remain "in essential texture" national, and to be but "slightly affected by Roman influence." None the less, the Conquest did good. "The old, somewhat sluggish, and not always reputable, Anglo-Saxon ways" were re-

Some Recent Books

placed "by activities of a far more cultured and comprehensive character" emanating from Rome, making indeed for intellectual and spiritual progress, but never, thank God! becoming a dominating factor. Even the kings most loyal to Rome somehow managed (by virtue of our power of not being "too logical") to remain and declare themselves spiritual heads of the Anglican Church. The Royal Supremacy was never invented by Henry! "His manner of applying" it "was in some respects unprecedented," *voilà tout*. But at last Henry VIII, not realizing what he was doing, any more than did his docile hierarchy till they perceived that he was indeed causing his breach with Rome to become a breach "with Catholic tradition and practice," when they "transferred their allegiance to the papal side," brought about the consummation of the fight between nationalism and internationalism. The former, in England, conquered. It may seem distressing to recall that "the main trend" of Christ's teaching, despite a nationalist sentence or two, is international (but anyway St. Paul is all right: "There is neither Jew nor Gentile," etc.), and so the Pope had right on his side. But then the Pope was very pagan. He owed a lot to the Emperors. What are the Cardinals but the Senate? What is church membership but the imperial citizenship? Useful as all that had been—how else unify the barbarians?—it was now instinctively recognized as no more necessary. Nations chafed, and had to look after their virile adolescence. Rome ordered a "mechanical acceptance." That is no use. In the unique whole that the Anglican Church is, Catholic and Protestant can alike find a place, even though "occasionally colliding."

Matters were worse under Edward's Calvinizing Council; but if only Mary "had been content to revert to her father's ecclesiastical settlement" all would have been well. As it was, she neither "understood nor sympathized with the spirit of English nationalism," but was "deeply imbued with that of Papal internationalism." She was Latin, logical, and heartless. Hence she was "execrated," while Elizabeth, who made a place for Cal-

Anglicanism

vinists as well as for Catholics within the Establishment, "provided that they conformed outwardly to the traditional ecclesiastical system," not only placed herself in line with popular feeling but actually maintained the system without "break in its continuity." "Its fundamental institutions, its creeds, its forms of government," not to insist upon its sacraments, "were maintained in their integrity." This is a hard saying, we confess. But the author acknowledges that the Calvinist element, issuing into Puritanism later on, worked two kindnesses to the Established Church. One was, that it forced her authorities to compose a number of perfectly ambiguous formulæ, so that all sorts of people could remain within her fold—a state of things by no means to be sneered at—and, it developed that sense of duty which causes the Englishman to remain "in that place or station to which it shall please God to call" him. Chapter iv deals with the post-Restoration rationalism, which reduced the Establishment to a state of deplorable worldliness and squalor, but had no such profound effects as upon the Continent because English traditionalism countered it, though it did occasion Methodism, which had its value as a tonic but could not enter into the structural life of the Church. Romanticism followed, bearing an unexpected child, Tractarianism. This would not do for Newman, who was a cross between a sentimentalist and a rationalist. The Church of England, then, rejected Methodist sentiment—and do what he would, Newman could not idealize her with any real success. Also, she was very averse to governing life by clear-cut theories, which manifestly won't *do* in life—and it is our national recognition of this that has earned us among foreigners the adjective "hypocritical"—so she could not retain his intelligence: he disregarded or explained away the "prison houses of liberty and lethal chambers of sincerity" that lie behind the imposing exterior of Rome, and crowned the "pathetic tragedy" of his life by committing himself to the society of a lot of suspicious malevolent stupid calumnious treacherous obscurantist persecutors. How far his years were "tinged

Some Recent Books

with misgiving and disillusionment," is "a question which has been much debated but never conclusively answered." (Possibly Newman's rather tart answer to it proves only that he was "tinged" with the circumambient mendacity.) Anyway, the English people are radically anti-Papal. They will not follow Newman. A few intellectual or emotional specialists "may dream of a reunion: but—never while Nationalist English and Internationalist Rome remain what they respectively are." Quite so. The materialist epoch followed. "Miracles do not happen—because they cannot happen." From this we are emerging. Christianity demands, as foundation, some "momentous nature-miracles," and need no more be afraid to claim them. Yet what about the Higher Criticism? For if miracles, more modest science grants, and wiser philosophy concedes, *may* happen, does not History suggest that there is no evidence that they *did*? It is true that we must much revise our view of the Scriptures. Room must be made in them for all sorts of mistakes. If we still hold them inspired, why do we? The Canon here advances a reason that he considers to be the "*only* doctrine historically or philosophically tenable." It is, that the Scriptures are the product of an "inspired society." The Church knows herself to be this. Now and again, by a "series of instinctive reactions," and *not* by any authoritative decree, she, as it were, says: "Aha! Here is a document well worthy of my inspired state. It, then, is inspired." Just in the same way a group of true artists and even the world at large say: "Dante is a great poet. What a painter is Botticelli!" And everyone agrees. And presumably always will. Else, posterity may be found saying: "Well . . . that, then, was the product of the artistic feeling of that period. How we have changed!" Perhaps the Canon would allow that the time may come when the Christian folk at large ceases to exclaim with one voice: What a Botticelli document is the Epistle of St. Jude! What a Dante was the author of the Book of Numbers! And they might even cease to feel that the gospels expressed much of their contemporary instinct.

Anglicanism

They would then have to confess that the Scriptures had but a temporary inspirational value. I have to own that the Canon's idea of how the Scriptures were inspired, and were known to be, has no philosophical meaning whatsoever that I can see; and as for history—I cannot imagine that anyone with the slightest appreciation of the states of mind of the first three Christian centuries will find in this theory even the caricature of anything that anyone *then* "felt" or thought. His notion is as different from any of theirs as a top-hat from a toga. Agnosticism is then refuted on the whole by an appeal to the credibility of the Resurrection-records, though here too the inspired Anglican society is better off than the inspired Lutheran individual and the corporately tyrannized Roman—even with his doctrine of development which lands him in Modernism. But alas, when we take Industrialism into our view, there at last we find the Establishment in a dangerous position. She is *not* lending the hand that she should. She is not even partner in the national concern, let alone boss. She should learn from the House of Commons. There at least extremists begin to understand one another; the youthful enthusiastic reformer and the die-hard melt into a gradual embrace; and the Anglo-Saxon community expresses the impossibility, due to its temperament, of class warfare.

We think that this book, along with Bishop Hensley Henson's, might do good abroad. When the Dago, Chink, and Nigger turn their eyes towards the religion of the privileged races, they see it chiefly as American, not English; not Anglican, but Y.M.C.A.-ish; not spiritual, but (however impertinent) on the whole remunerative. If you force their attention to the Established Church, they perceive it, with ruthless clarity, to be one more illegitimate baby of King Henry's. This requires, may one not feel, not a little correction?

C. C. M.

THIS third volume of the *Life and Letters of Walter H. Page*, ably presented by Burton Hendrick (W. Heinemann), shows how great a friend and fellow-feeler

Some Recent Books

England had in the American Ambassador in London in the critical days of the European War. President Wilson's death, since the first two volumes were published, has removed the ban on the publication of many of the letters that passed between them—two men to whom, more than any other two onlookers, England and the Allies owe a debt of gratitude difficult adequately to express. The immense contribution to the cause of the Allies made by a country with nine millions of its population German in descent and in sympathy has something almost of the miraculous about it. President Wilson felt the difficulty almost to exaggeration. One of his messages to his Ambassador, sent through Mr. Bryan, said, early in 1915: "The British public is quite naturally uninformed as to the character of our population. While the English element predominated in the original stock, the immigration in later years has been largely from other countries. Germany and Ireland, for instance, have contributed very materially during the last half-century, and among those who are the children of foreign-born parents the German element now predominates." But, as Mr. Hendrick knows, and as Page knew, the British element in the United States is enormously greater than that of any other people. The white population in 1790 was 3,200,000, almost wholly of British and principally of English origin. By 1910 this prolific stock amounted to 39,000,000; and with the immigration of the last hundred years from England, Scotland, Wales, and British provinces in Canada, some 55,000,000 in 1910 owned to that lineage, out of a total population of 94,000,000. There was at the same date a German racial contribution of 8,200,000, and an Irish of 4,500,000. "It is an almost startling fact," says Mr. Hendrick, "that this native American population forms the largest body of Anglo-Saxons in the world." Nevertheless, even among these, "sentiment was still a strong emotion; memories of the Revolution were keen." But there was no such bitterness about France. Blockade incidents had therefore their dangers for Britain; and when the *Dacia*, making a test eagerly watched by

Walter H. Page

other interned German vessels, sailed from America to the English Channel on the way to Germany, she was captured by a French, rather than an English, cruiser, to the saving of a possible *casus belli* between England and America. That tactic of historic tact was due to a suggestion made to Sir Edward Grey by Page.

In a record of great issues it is a relief now and then to come on the lighter sides of diplomatic life. These are not always so rich in amenities as one might wish them to be. In the June of 1915, for instance, Page cables to Lansing, the American Secretary of State:

John S. Sargent, the distinguished American artist resident in London, has a decoration, conferred several years ago by the German Emperor, which he now wishes to return. He has handed me a note addressed to the proper Court authority in Berlin respectfully returning the decoration, and he asks me if he may send it to you under cover of a letter, requesting you to ask Gerard to deliver it in Berlin or if I, under your instructions, may send it to Gerard direct.

Sargent was not a practising American, it is true, and some regret, though hardly resentment, might excusably be felt by his fellow-countrymen in view of his exchange of homes; but the rudeness of the reply to Page must have made it unshowable to the man it most concerned:

Not matters with which Department or its officers abroad can have any connection. Sargent should reimburse Embassy for your telegram, and pay for their reply, five dollars.

If the Admiralty was not always in the right in its inactions, they were likely to be informed of their lapses by Arthur H. Pollen, the bearer of a name that has its own distinctions as well as its proud associations with the names of Henry Edward Manning and Wilfrid Blunt. In the autumn of 1917 Page is writing to the President about reports current in Washington that the British authorities were not co-operating as they ought with the American Navy:

Balfour, Geddes, and Jellicoe protest that they have been perfectly frank and have opened all doors of information to us, and given the profoundest consideration to every suggestion that has

Some Recent Books

come from us. I suspect they have a fear lest Pollen, now in the United States, has been stirring up trouble. It seems that the Admiralty and the Navy here have never been able to please Pollen. Whether my guess is correct or not, something is wrong in fact or in gossip. I asked Jellicoe why he did not go to Washington, and his reply was, "The problem itself is here."

The appointment of Geddes as First Lord, when Lloyd George himself saw the need of "the utmost push in the Admiralty," had the high approval of Page, who recalled that Geddes, as a boy, ran away and worked in a saw-mill camp in West Virginia. "I don't believe," reports Page, "that this fellow will play any tricks on us or on anybody else." And, having that high opinion, he must have been a little pleased to add: "One nickname they have for him is the Yank."

Such alertness as that of Geddes was naturally not the mark of everybody. And not all critics, with a sting, fertilized like Pollen:

I was at a dinner of old Peers at the Athenæum Club—a group of old cocks that I meet once in a while and have come to know pretty well and even to marvel at. I think every one is past seventy—several of them past eighty. On this occasion I was the only commoner present. The talk went on about every imaginable thing—reminiscences of Browning, the years of good vintages of port, the excellence of some Court opinions handed down in the United States by quite obscure judges—why shouldn't they be got out of the masses of law reports and published as classics?—wouldn't it have been well if the King had gone and spent his whole time at the Front and in the Fleet—what's an English King for, anyhow?—then a defence of Reading; and why should the Attorney-General or the Lord Chief Justice be allowed out of the kingdom at such a time? Then the talk went on about the commonness of modern British Governments—most modern Governments, in fact. French Statesmen, most of 'em: common fellows; and Italians and Germans—what swine! "But," turning to me, "you are to be congratulated. You have a gentleman for your President. How do you do it? That breed seems to be out of a job in most countries." Take them as mere phenomena of human society and of a social system—well, that's another story. But they and their like are not going to give up in this war.

The Courts held by King George may go down to history, if at all, in the descriptions of the American Am-

Walter H. Page

bassador, unvarnished records of ceremonies devoid of all joy or spontaneity or dignity, alien to the tempers of an undramatic race, a bore and a business to all concerned, and, in their mere material wastefulness and their essential meaninglessness, a mockery, almost, of the people starving within a stone's throw—the people who, asking for bread, do indeed get a stone. We have a passing glimpse of Mrs. Page at one of these Courts, but we must go to the two earlier volumes to make a better and well-worth-while acquaintance with her. She and her husband make indeed two Pages of history, the memory whereof will not lightly be expunged.

W. M.

A MAN who has seen something of his more or less distinguished fellows seems now to be accounted remiss unless he writes his reminiscences. Especially if you knew the 'nineties of the last century are you encouraged to enter on your anecdotage. In *Myself not Least: Being the Personal Reminiscences of "X"* (Thornton Butterworth) the author goes further afield than is usual. He has chapters on "Some French Acquaintances," "Spain," "Bulgaria," "Roumania," "Montenegro," "Serbia," "Salonica in War Time," and "Turkey and Greece." If these are unavoidably something of back-numbers now, more perplexingly purposeless still are the persistent pages devoted to Bottomley or to Will Crooks.

Wilfrid Blunt, on the other hand, was a man well worth writing about, even by "X," whose private secretary he was for a time, but whose opinions, if he ever held them, he no longer holds. It is difficult, no doubt, to write without prejudice of a man who passed among his countrymen as unpatriotic, because he believed that the policy of Empire-making and aggrandizement at the expense of peoples less well armed was as contrary to the Golden Rule of the Gospel as it was to our vaunted love of Liberty—that alluring but elusive word. Blunt knew that India, Egypt, Ireland, in struggling for self-determination, were doing precisely what we commonly praised everybody else for doing when the oppression was not our own; and he

Some Recent Books

lived long enough to hear the assurance of Asquith that England joined in the Great War in order to protect small nations—an assurance that might have made him happy had he not known what credence to pay to a professional politician's word. Obviously such a man as Wilfrid Blunt is the least likely to have an understanding justice done to him by contemporary penmen; and "X" falls now and again into the pit of commonplace condemnations. That is a little disappointing in the case of a writer who had the privilege of being brought for a short time into close contact with his subject, and whose own attractive personality ensured for him that free contact with others which may happily result in enlarged tolerances and charities.

When Blunt and Dillon went to Cambridge to speak at the Union, and "X" was among his hearers, the contrast between the two speakers accentuated the impression made by the hesitations of the Englishman. "The two bees in his bonnet," says "X," "were the emancipation of subject races, especially in Egypt and Ireland, and the superiority of Oriental over Western ideas." This second bee should be made to buzz a good deal more distinctly. Blunt was too wise to indulge in generalizations, but he knew that Christ, the Light of the World, rose in the East, and he loved such simplicities as those of tent-life rather than the corruptions and organized unrealities of European cities. "X" calls Blunt's championship of "distressed nationalities" a pose, and his quotation-marks seem to indicate that they had an existence in literature rather than in life. He adds: "Because Byron had busied himself with Greek insurrection against the Turks, it became a poet's sacred duty to foment rebellion everywhere. The Arabs were a picturesque people." And "X" himself was for the moment almost a disciple: "I was young and impressionable enough to believe all his fables about the wrongs of Egypt and Ireland." Even that very fine family, the Pollens, because they were attached to Blunt, have, like Blunt's beliefs, to be burlesqued by "X":

The standing dish at Crabtree was the Pollen family. There was John Hungerford Pollen, the paterfamilias, with a telescopic

Myself not Least

white beard that went down to the skirts of his clothing or was rolled up like a mat or disappeared inside his shirt; kind, matronly, managing Mrs. Hungerford Pollen; Arthur Hungerford Pollen, who hoped to win the All Souls Scholarship (or was it Fellowship?) for the cleverest and most popular undergraduate at Oxford; Sub-Lieutenant Habbakuk Hungerford Pollen—I forget all their names, for they were countless as locusts in an oasis of Ethiopia. All I remember is that they were all said to be “very clever.” Arthur Hungerford Pollen filled Crabbet with all his cleverest and most popular friends, and oh! how weary one grew of the talk about their cleverness, which began and ended in talk.

Even to be a friend of a friend of Wilfrid Blunt was something of a fatality:

Arthur Pollen’s chief undergraduate friend, Hilaire Belloc, was certainly clever, a little irritating perhaps with his omniscience and verbosity—I was always afraid he would talk the hind legs off Butterfly, the mother of all Judith’s spaniels; but he was quite a tonic in small doses. He was half French, and talked broken English, and was consumed with admiration for all things French, even the French Revolution. During the War, he and Arthur Pollen became famous critics, rating our generals for not following their advice, and prophesying immediate victories which never came.

All this sort of writing is a disappointment, and for many reasons, not the least of which is that we are sure it does not show “X” to us, as we should wish to meet him, at his nicest and cleverest and best. W. M.

AN exhaustive account of the Inns of Court has been long wanted, and now at length the story of two of the four honourable societies is admirably told in *The History of the Temple, London* (John Murray), which has been compiled from the original records of the Inner and Middle Temple by Mr. J. B. Williamson, a barrister of the latter society. The Inns of Court are among the most interesting of our national institutions, and are certainly more specifically English even than the two great universities which are the pride of this country and the envy of the foreigner. Not a little in their history is of considerable interest to Catholics; there are, for example, repeated entries in the parliament books dealing with conformity, orders directed against those who in the sixteenth century

Some Recent Books

refused to accept the new religion. It is interesting to note that in spite of these decrees the celebrated Edmund Plowden, one of the great lights of the Common Law, remained a member of the Middle Temple: and it is even said that Elizabeth offered to make him Lord Chancellor if he would but apostatize, which he would not do. Quite early in the seventeenth century the earliest Jacobean legislation against Catholics made it impossible for them to be called to the bar.

One might cull numerous items of interest from the pages of Mr. Williamson's book, but two or three specimens must suffice. In the fifteenth century it would appear that the studies of the Templars were not confined so rigorously to law as at the present day. Sir John Fortescue, a Chief Justice of the King's Bench in the middle of that century, tells us that in the Inns of Court there was "beside the study of laws, as it were an university or school of all commendable qualities requisite for Noblemen. There they learn to sing and to exercise themselves in all kinds of harmony. There also they practise dauncing and other Noblemen's pastimes as they used to doe which are brought up in the King's house. On the working daies most of them apply themselves to the studie of the Lawe. And on the holy daies to the studie of Holy Scripture; and out of the time of the Divine Service to the reading of Chronicles. For there indeed are vertues studied and vices exiled. So that, for the endowment of vertue and abandoning of vice Knights and Barons, with other Noblemen of the Realme place their children in those Innes, though they desire not to have them learned in the Lawes, nor to live by the practise thereof, but onely upon their Father's allowance." He goes on to say that there was very little dissension in the Inns, and that for the reason that expulsion was the only punishment in force; and expulsion was dreaded more than "imprisonment and yrons," for no one expelled from one society would be admitted to any of the others. The regard for law and order which the words of Sir John Fortescue suggest may perhaps explain the objection of the Inns to admit Irishmen to their fellow-

History of the Temple

ship: whatever the reason, in 1554, when Mary was on the throne, the Middle Temple ordered that no one born in Ireland should be admitted to the Society, and in this they followed Lincoln's Inn, which had made a similar order in 1437, though that Inn modified its order a century later when it allowed the admission of four Irishmen.

Another matter, not lacking in archaeological interest, relates to the dress of members in chapel and hall. It had been the custom in the Middle Temple for round caps to be worn by members in chapel and at mealtimes in the hall. At the beginning of the seventeenth century this practice became unpopular with the younger members, who preferred to wear their hats; therefore in 1608 the parliament of the Middle Temple ordered that hats should not be worn in church or hall, not apparently because it was deemed disrespectful to wear hats in either place, but because caps were part of the academic costume. This is of especial interest to the ecclesiologist, reminiscent as it is of the ecclesiastical biretta. Before the middle of the thirteenth century, with the exception of bishops, certain abbots and certain canons, who on occasion wore the mitre, everyone, cleric or layman, was uncovered in church. Then certain religious, finding that their heads were more intolerant of draughts than had been the heads of their predecessors in the bygone centuries, petitioned the Holy See for permission to be covered; and permission was given to them to wear their hoods, except at the more solemn parts of the Mass. Once introduced, the custom became universal for the clergy: but the laity do not appear to have been incommoded by draughts to the same degree. In course of time the secular clergy wore their outdoor cap, which has come to be regarded as a badge of dignity. For outdoor wear, however, in the second half of the sixteenth century hats gradually ousted the cap; in this case, as in many others, ecclesiastical sumptuary laws proving of no avail. And, what gives the order of the Middle Temple especial interest, it is obvious from the decrees of synods that the clergy began to wear their hats in choir—this, however, was stopped, though in the light of the history of the

Some Recent Books

laws regarding clerical dress, it is perhaps but little more than an accident that the canons of Westminster do not to-day wear a silk hat with their cappa!

So far Mr. Williamson's book has been referred to merely as a history of the Honourable Societies of the Inner and Middle Temple: but the early part deals with a matter of by far greater interest to the great bulk of Catholics—the suppression of that heroic order for which the London Temple was built, a suppression carried out with such violence that it must rank among the great crimes of history. A distinguished French historian has, Mr. Williamson notes, pointed out that later ages, with less means of forming an opinion, have proved much more credulous of the charges laid against the order by Philip V of France than the most enlightened of his contemporaries. Dante, Villani, S. Antoninus, the Councils of Salamanca, Tarragona, and Mentz all believed the Templars to be innocent. They were, in fact, found innocent in Spain, Portugal, and Germany, in Italy, except in a few districts, and in Cyprus. At the Council of Vienne, too, the majority of the fathers were in favour of the order, which was dissolved not by a penal sentence but by the direct act of the Supreme Pontiff. All of this may be seen in the *Catholic Encyclopedia* in an article on the Templars, written by the Professor of History at Louvain. Mr. Williamson sums up the case admirably: "To those accustomed to weigh evidence according to the more enlightened rules which now prevail it must be a matter of no little astonishment that learned scholars should ever have treated as worthy of serious consideration testimony so tainted at its source." And in a footnote he adds: "The sudden arrest of the knights placed their houses and all their contents at the disposal of the crown of France. If a secret obscene ritual existed and idols were worshipped in their chapters [as was alleged by their enemies] why was no visible evidence of such things produced?" None was produced, and yet in France fifty-eight knights were burnt on one day, and the Grand Master suffered the same fate for withdrawing a confession he had made under torture.

History of the Temple

In the attack on the knights much stress was laid on two points: (1) that erroneous opinions were held in regard to the power of the Grand Master to absolve, he not being a priest; and (2) the secrecy of their chapters. As to the first of these, so far as England goes, and there is no reason for believing that England stood alone, out of eighty members of the order only two gave what Mr. Williamson calls unorthodox answers, and they merely asserted that they ought to confess to chaplains of their order. Some learned canonist might be able to tell us whether this was unorthodox, or whether the rule was then the same as in later times, till the publication of the *Codex*, that the members of a religious order might, without permission, only confess to a member of the order. One of the English knights stated that the Grand Master could in chapter absolve in cases of infraction of the vow or rule, but that he did not interfere with secret sins as he was a layman: which points to his knowledge of his own limitations. It may be that there were loose ideas in the minds of some as to the powers of their superior: just as some years earlier certain Spanish abbesses, Cistercians, believing that they could absolve, heard the "sacramental" confessions of their nuns till they were stopped by Innocent III, a great Pope and a great canonist, who contented himself with suppressing the abuse.

Mr. Williamson lays great stress on the other point, the secrecy of the chapters. But the most cursory examination of the records of episcopal visitations of monasteries will convince anyone that such secrecy was not only the rule but was also strongly insisted upon by the bishops. And surely there is nothing remarkable in this. Religious orders do not even to-day publish the proceedings of their chapters or invite the presence of outsiders: and so far as one is acquainted with the facts the same practice prevails in regard to the parliaments of the Temple societies, the meetings of the master and fellows of colleges at the universities, and the boards of directors of limited companies. But surely no reasonable being would attribute any evil purpose to such secrecy?

So far as England is concerned, Mr. Williamson says

Some Recent Books

that "it must be taken that the accusers failed to substantiate any of their charges except upon one minor point"—the power of the Master of the Temple, the head of the English knights, to absolve from sin, but the Master himself, Sir William de la Mare, "denied ever making use of the priestly formula of absolution." So long as the knights were dealt with by English law no confessions were obtained: what confessions there were resulted from the ecclesiastical inquiry and were obtained by torture. Canonists had worked out strict rules of evidence, requiring the direct testimony of two unimpeachable witnesses. This was rarely found, and therefore every means was taken to extort confession. Torture, one rejoices to know, was against the spirit of English law; and it was never recognized by that law, though at a later date it was used in courts of a quasi-ecclesiastical character. The undying wonder is that any sane person should ever have thought that evidence produced by torture was good enough to justify the hanging of a dog.

E. B.

THERE is a peculiar, piquant interest in the impressions of ourselves which are published occasionally by the stranger within our gates. The result may be as revealing as a Sargent portrait, or leave us with the rueful smile of the caricatured. In recent years we have been regarded by Walter Page's keen intelligence, by the Sadhu's mystical penetration, and now a Czech-Slovakian writer has brought to his *Letters from England* (Geoffrey Bles) a philosophic humour and the frankness of a child. His Letters make an engaging scrap-book of the country and its people, for our own contemplation or the unprejudiced foreigner's. In the main, this is a sympathetic critic, and only a very thin-skinned English reader could resent such delicate irony as the author uses.

Capek aimed at going everywhere and seeing everything, yet did not lose his fresh vision and sense of wonder, nor his admiration for English trees and meadows, and London policemen "recruited according to their beauty and their size." He visited the Museums, the Zoo and

Letters from England

Madame Tussaud's—before its destruction—the West End Clubs, where he discovered the national significance of leather armchairs, and that “a man from the Continent gives himself an air of importance by talking, an Englishman by holding his tongue . . . in the silence of a gentleman among gentlemen.” Then he observed an English park, and declared he had never felt such unrestricted liberty as when he ventured to walk straight across the grass to an old oak—and nothing happened! He studied the “commercial cornucopia” of Wembley, and realized with dismay “the unbounded and unredeemable extent” of the East End. He visited the countryside, Oxford and Cambridge, Scotland and Skye: perhaps the lonely island satisfied his soul most of all. He tells us that he felt an “inflamed curiosity” about Ireland, but in the end he only made an imaginative map of the country—and left it under a veil of mystery.

Now and then Capek's nostalgia provides us with a sudden glimpse of his own land and his own city of Prague, where

the street is a sort of large tavern or public garden . . . an extension of home and doorstep;

while the London streets “are just a gully through which life flows to get home.” At Liverpool he consoled himself for his land without a sea-board by the thought of unlimited mental horizons—

Yes, it is needful to keep on sailing forth; the ocean is in all places where courage is.

Our genial visitor has such a light, graphic touch in writing that his illustrations are almost superfluous. But they, too, have the quality of his whimsical genius.

The severest thing he says of the English is that they seemed to him “a joyless and reticent race.” That is balanced by his acknowledgement that they have produced the finest childhood and the finest old age—

If you were a little boy, you would know that you could trust them more than yourself, and . . . the policeman would puff out his cheeks to make you laugh.

M. K.

Some Recent Books

ON the tercentenary of the foundation of the Congregation of the Mission (April 17, 1625) Father Joseph Leonard, C.M., has published a selection of St. Vincent's Letters and Conferences under the title: *St. Vincent de Paul and Mental Prayer*" (Burns Oates and Washbourne). The reference to prayer is often only very secondary. Many, indeed, of the Conferences, which are as a rule very simple and naïf conversations with the first Sisters of Charity, some of whom were quite unlettered, treat expressly of prayer; the Letters, however, are occasional answers to correspondents, often on business connected with the Saint's many foundations, and seem to owe their place in this collection to little more than a request for prayers or the suggestion of a subject for meditation.

St. Vincent, in regard to the method of mental prayer, takes St. Francis of Sales as his guide; and in his instructions hardly deviates from the lines traced out in the second book of the *Introduction à la Vie Dévote*. He is fertile, however, in suggesting subjects for prayer and valuable helps in overcoming practical difficulties. St. Francis shows how a life of prayer is compatible with life in the world; and St. Vincent shows its necessity for those engaged in the active ministry of charity. His aim is to combine the active with the contemplative life; and he makes the very highest claims for such a union:

Although the contemplative life is more perfect than the active, it is not more so than a life embracing action and contemplation. There is a great difference between the apostolic life and the solitude of the Carthusians. The latter is in truth most holy, but it is not suited for those whom God has called to a mode of life which in itself is most excellent; otherwise St. John the Baptist and Jesus Christ Himself would not have preferred it to the other, as, in fact, they did by leaving the desert to preach to the people. The greatest need the Church has to-day is for workers who will labour to withdraw the greater part of her children from the ignorance and vice in which they live, and give her good priests and pastors, which is the very work the Son of God came on earth to accomplish.

Prayer and work must not be allowed to interfere with each other. Both are essential, for the Church needs workers,

Mental Prayer

and their labours will be useless unless sanctified by prayer. Hence, if the Sisters are called away from their meditation to attend the poor or the sick, they are to go at once, making their prayer on the way or while they minister to their charges. If they have no other time they may make their meditation during Mass. If they cannot read or make formal considerations they may gaze at a crucifix or a holy picture. No excuse is accepted; mental prayer is for all of whatever class or profession or state in life.

Father Leonard has made an excellent translation, and in addition contributes a valuable Introduction. It would seem that the Saint's habitual self-depreciation has deceived many; even the Vincentians themselves have been charged with a lack of appreciation of their founder. The Abbé Brémond says good-humouredly that he is filled with a holy anger at their want of zeal in spreading St. Vincent's fame by a wider diffusion of his writings. The world looks on him as a busy and ingenious philanthropist, but does not realize the deep spiritual life that inspired his activity. In these letters he stands self-revealed. We see his tact, his sympathy, his moderation, his attention to details, his prudence; and we see, too, what is the foundation of all this—his burning love of God and his intimate union with Him in prayer.

P. E. H.

HAVING in Part I of his great work, *The Sacramentary* (Burns Oates and Washbourne), dealt with general conceptions of the Liturgy, in Part II the Right Rev. Ildefonso Schuster, Abbot of St. Paul's Outside the Walls, began his series of historical and liturgical notes on the Roman Missal by treating of the period from Advent to Septuagesima. These two parts formed the first volume. We extend a warm welcome to the second volume which now has appeared, containing Parts III and IV and carrying on the work to Easter and Trinity Sunday respectively.

The history of the composition of the eighty-five Stational Masses which come in the Roman Missal is a fascinating study. Who selected the portions of Holy

Some Recent Books

Scripture and what was the principle of selection? Some have considered St. Damasus I (366), doubtless with the assistance of St. Jerome, to have been the first to establish in Rome an official series of Scriptural passages for the Liturgy. Certain it is that some such series existed in the time of St. Leo I (440). St. Gelasius I (492) made additions to it, but to St. Gregory the Great (590) above all is due the composition and organization of the Stational Masses. His adaptations of Scripture are usually most happy. Unfortunately the same cannot always be said of the work of his successor and namesake St. Gregory II (715). Many influences determine the choice of verses and lessons from the Bible. Sometimes it is the occasion that is of primary importance—*e.g.*, the beginning of the Lenten Fast or the different stages in the preparation of Catechumens. Often the virtues or miracles of the patrons of the Stational Churches, or the relics venerated there, or other local conditions and customs, are taken into account. Abbot Schuster gives us the results of such lines of enquiry. They shed a valuable light on the text of the Missal and often supply the clue to a unity that at first sight seems to be absent.

The object of the author is not "either to write a book exclusively for the learned, or to compose a mere manual of piety," but to help the man of average education to appreciate better the treasures of the Liturgy. The Abbot tells us that what he has given us is largely the fruit of his daily meditation on the Roman Missal. His skilful exposition of the main ideas of each day's Mass and the lessons he briefly draws from each will be an invaluable help to the increasing number of Catholics who find in the Liturgy their chief spiritual food.

The work was originally intended for the Abbot's pupils in Rome, and a knowledge of Rome with its churches will add enormously to its interest. Those who by occasion of the Jubilee have become acquainted with the topography of the Eternal City may, with the help of this work, find in the Missal unimagined sources of interest and devotion. The translation is, on the whole, excellent. P. E. H.

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